Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 5, 1957—5:17 p.m.

1860. For Barbour. Ref London 1556.² Following for your guidance in bilateral talks with UK authorized in Deptel 1707.³

I. Background

Latest Greek reply to UK (Deptel 1743 London⁴) and continued uncertainty over date Turkish elections (Ankara 395⁵ and 562⁶) make holding London tripartite meeting doubtful. Its being held in immediate future or prior to UNGA now virtually out of question. London US–UK talks may, therefore, be in somewhat different context from that originally anticipated and UK may now emphasize problem of UNGA tactics. We nonetheless welcome these talks in hope that they will establish more adequate exchanges with British on Cyprus problem. In our desire to establish such communications, we should however avoid in fact or in appearance substantive understandings to exclusion of Greeks and Turks on matter involving their interests. These talks must therefore be kept on strictly informal and secret basis.

II. Probable British Objectives at Talks

A. Ascertain nature of current US thinking on Cyprus.

B. Test out on US current trend of British thinking, including defense plans and ideas on three-power condominium (Depcirctel 129⁷).

C. Seek understanding with US on tactics at UNGA.

III. US Tactics at Talks

Within context of the broad criteria set forth in Deptel 1707, you should be governed by following considerations:

A. Endeavor to ascertain British intentions with respect to Cyprus. This should include defense plans (including type of installations, location of enclaves, and projected rate of military expenditures), plans for retention or divestment of governing responsibility, timing of such divestment if intended, and interim plans pending formal and final divestment. You should establish assumption that any divestment will be an orderly one and associated with an understanding among interested parties concerning interim arrangement for or ultimate status of Cyprus.

B. Explore question of interim arrangements versus ultimate status. Tempers of interested parties leave serious doubt that agreement on ultimate status now possible. Moreover, dispute has assumed such character that any interim arrangements, including self-government, may have to be settled in international forum. In view UK difficulties in providing forum at proposed London tripartite meeting, it may be desirable to emphasize again role that Spaak can plan in this direction. Arrangements might be made whereby techniques used in settlement Trieste dispute might be brought to Spaak’s attention.

C. US not prepared to espouse any particular solution either as to interim arrangements or ultimate status, but believes it useful to consider criteria against which any proposed solution should be tested. Those provided in HMG oral communication (Deptel 856 London⁸) provide useful point of departure: i.e., (a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; (b) protection of island from Communist infiltration; (c) establishment peace and tranquility in island as a whole. We believe that: (1) these criteria might be further explored and refined in course of talks; (2) compromise assuring preservation of NATO unity should be another criterion; (3) account should be taken of viability of Cypriot economy under any future set up and desirability of avoiding international financial burden; (4) means should be considered for enlisting support and cooperation of orthodox churches in arriving at solution.

D. While we are interested in UK thinking, we feel that it is still premature to define UNGA tactics and also feel that any negotiation concerning either our tactics or position at UNGA should be avoided. We continue to believe solution of the Cyprus problem is to be found through quiet diplomacy rather than through public forums and that our UNGA tactics should be directed to those ends. This will require US to maintain maximum tactical flexibility. Generally speaking we should endeavor to avoid discussions and forestall resolution that would prejudice prospect for future negotiations or provide basis for increased Soviet Bloc or Afro-Asian bloc involvement in Cyprus. In view absence any significant progress toward solution since last UNGA resolution, we recognize it may be difficult to forestall resolution calling for specific solution either in direction of interim arrangements or ultimate status.

IV. Liaison with Spaak

You should suggest that UK and USG both undertake to inform Spaak of talks and to keep him currently informed. After British agreement obtained, Perkins should see Spaak and so inform him. You should of course mention in appropriate terms need for secrecy. Perkins may also inform Spaak of Barbour’s terms of reference (Deptel 1707 to London) and substance of parts I and III of this cable.

V. Reporting and Guidance

Detailed guidance will be provided as required, on basis full reports which should be made of each session. You may find it useful to refer to Cyprus supplement to NSC 5718/1⁹ which contains major policy guidance on Cyprus problem generally. Dep Director GTI¹⁰ arriving London September 8.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–3157. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.
2. Telegram 1556, August 31, reported that bilateral talks with the British would begin, if the United States agreed, toward the end of the week. Permanent Under Secretary Hoyer Millar or Deputy Under Secretary Hayter would probably represent the British. (Ibid.)
3. Supra.
4. Telegram 1743, August 30, transmitted the summary of a Greek aide-mémoire presented to the British Ambassador in Athens by Averoff on August 27. Among other things, the aide-mémoire rejected Britain’s proposals for a conference to discuss Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2957)
5. Telegram 395, August 16, reported that Esenbel had informed Warren that Turkey could not send representatives to a conference on Cyprus until after the Turkish national elections scheduled for October 15. (Ibid.,747C.00/8–1657)
6. Telegram 562, August 30, reported that despite the intention of the Prime Minister to hold elections around mid-October, Democratic Party leaders might have, for one reason or another, decided to hold elections at the normal time in May 1958, or even in 1959. (Ibid., 782.00/8–3057)
7. Circular telegram 129, August 12, sent to London, Athens, Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia, transmitted the text of a memorandum from Lloyd to Dulles and a proposed British reply to the Greek Government regarding the latter’s reply to the British proposal for a conference on Cyprus. Lloyd’s memorandum to the Secretary expressed Britain’s appreciation for the prospects of a U.S. observer at the proposed conference, speculated on Greece’s motives in rejecting Britain’s proposals, expressed regret at Greek conditions for attending the conference, indicated the possibilities of some compromise on Cyprus, and noted the importance of bringing Greece to the conference table. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1257)
8. See footnote 3, Document 251.
9. Printed as an Enclosure to Document 256.
10. Murat Williams arrived on September 8 to assist in the secret bilateral talks on Cyprus.