Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, March 20, 1957—7:16 p.m.

3415. Your 3154.² You should strongly urge GOG reserve its position re NATO initiative Cyprus on grounds (if public statement necessary) GOG will not reject any reasonable offer leading towards constructive solution. As member NATO alliance GOG determined work out solution Cyprus problem not only for benefit Cypriots, but also to restore NATO unity.

You may point out that as member NATO GOG would be in poor position if it refused cooperate in attempt being made within alliance restore unity of members, especially if refusal occurs before there has even been chance to explore what role NATO may play, which exploration itself Greeks may find helpful to bring about UK-Cypriot talks.

It is our understanding Ismay intends proceed cautiously and with consent governments involved therefore GOG views will be thoroughly respected. It is our hope British-Cypriot negotiations re immediate steps towards self-government may develop simultaneously with NATO explorations re long range problem of eventual status Cyprus. We would envisage that any agreement on eventual status would give Cypriots full opportunity express their desires. We believe settlement eventual status an international affair and may be possible work it out less painfully within NATO than by direct confrontation of British Greeks and Turks. We do not regard NATO as substitute for British-Cypriot talks on self-government, but rather as necessary complement since self-government question probably cannot be settled until there is also understanding re eventual status. FYI only. In this connection if British-Cypriot negotiations commenced on self-government, NATO might at same time play useful role in persuading the three countries and possibly some other NATO members to join in treaty whereby within fixed term of years (say 7 to 10) there would be plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. Prior to plebiscite signatories and representatives principal segments Island’s population would meet on equal terms to agree on terms of plebiscite. Treaty might also provide that if signatories and representatives Cypriots cannot agree, question would be taken to NAC. Such meeting might lead to plebiscite whose choices might include some form guaranteed independence (i.e. Cyprus government and some or all of NATO powers would sign treaty declaring that Cyprus would not become a part of any other country without consent signatories and that its independence would be protected by the signatory powers) or independence within Commonwealth. End FYI only.

Our hope is to encourage simultaneously British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government and long range arrangement within NATO which will lead to clearer definition of eventual status Cyprus and will allow Cypriots proper opportunity exercise eventual choice. If GOG rejects latter, we will be disinclined continue press HMG on former.

Re paragraph 1 your 3134³ we do not consider that NATO role in Cyprus question as outlined above would in any way be contrary requirements UN resolution, which did not specify shape negotiations should take.

USDel Bermuda may wish utilize pertinent arguments from foregoing during discussion Cyprus item.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2057. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Paris Topol, Rome for McSweeney, and Bermuda for the Secretary with the U.S. Delegation and pouched to Valetta.
2. In telegram 3154 from Athens, March 20, Allen reported that during a conversation with the British Ambassador to Greece, the Ambassador noted that Britain was prepared to make a statement indicating that Makarios would be released if he renounced violence. (Ibid.)

3. The first paragraph of telegram 3134 from Athens, March 19, reads:

   “Karamanlis told me last night he had instructed his Ambassador to NATO to return to Athens for consultation in order to gain time before making definitive answer to Ismay’s letter re Cyprus. He has rejected Ismay’s approach preliminarily and expects to reject it outright since NATO involvement would lead to negotiations between governments, including Turkey, whereas UN resolution called specifically for negotiations between UK and Cypriots. He suspects British are trying to use NATO channel to avoid carrying out clear requirements of UN resolution.” (Ibid., 747C.00/ 3–1957)