Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, March 15, 1957—11 a.m.

4891. Limit distribution principal officers. In considering possible next steps regarding Cyprus and reports of views, suggestions and comments from various sources involved (Department telegram 6197,² Athens 3060³ and 3067⁴ and related), it seems to us that undue emphasis may be centering on procedural aspects of the problem with a view to reactivating negotiations between the parties, without at the same time our having a clear idea of the substantive aspects of the solution we should seek or our having sufficient evidence of the acceptability of such a solution to all parties to warrant our seeking means to achieve it. We have in mind that the proposed NATO establishment of a team of wise men,⁵ the release of Makarios from exile, efforts to agree on a cease-fire with Grivas, are all designed to set the stage for further negotiations envisaged in the UN resolution. Meanwhile, however, we have no reason to believe that, if the stage is so set, the Greek, Turks and United Kingdom are any more likely than heretofore to negotiate for a given solution, for example, self-government with integral self-determination after reasonable period, which is the United Kingdom and Turkish position, of some concept of independence, toward which the Greeks appear to be moving and we wonder whether it might not be a more fruitful line of approach for United States to endeavor to narrow the substantive issues than to concentrate on procedural aspects of further negotiations between United Kingdom and Cypriots (Makarios), which in view of the history of this problem do not seem likely to be successful if renewed substantially on the same basis as where they left off.

We confess that the above reasoning is to some extent conditioned on the shifting positions that it seems to us the Greeks (read also Makarios) have taken in previous rounds of negotiation which we fear might well be rationalized by the Greeks as the optimum strategy toward their manifest long-term objective of enosis. In addition to record of direct negotiations with Makarios we are mindful Karamanlis insistence last autumn that Greeks could accept self-government with nod towards future self-determination and their present talk of independence. …

In circumstances, we question whether progress can be made toward solution by working, essentially procedurally, for improvement atmosphere until we ourselves anyhow determine what substantive solution we are aiming at, are prepared to try to hold the Greeks to and to sell to the United Kingdom and Turks. We would, therefore, recommend that United States (1) determine solution we believe most desirable and durable in light all factors of situation, and (2) embark on campaign to achieve its acceptance by all parties.

Realize this suggested re-direction course our efforts involves more direct involvement in problem than would be desirable if we could avoid it. However, if we estimate importance of solution is sufficient to warrant play for stakes risks would seem to be acceptable. In absence some such United States leadership we see no end to matter and United Kingdom imposed self-government with consequent continual Greek agitation and further exacerbative interallied feud.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1557. Top Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris Topol.
2. In telegram 6197 to London, March 8, the Department suggested beginning negotiations on self-government with the Cypriots rather than initiating tripartite talks with the Greeks and the Turks. The Department added that if a de facto truce could be arranged with EOKA, then it might be possible to bring Makarios to London in an effort to see whether he would urge the continuation of nonviolence. If he agreed, then negotiations might begin with leaders of the Cypriot communities. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–457)
3. Supra.
4. Dated March 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/ 3–1357)
5. In Polto 2135, March 12, Perkins reported from Paris that during a conversation with Ismay, the Secretary General noted that he planned to write letters to the three Permanent Representatives to the NAC from Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in order to initiate procedures for settlement of the Cyprus dispute. According to Perkins, Ismay planned to propose appointing three “outstanding citizens” to perform “good offices”. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–1257) Polto 2252, March 22, transmitted the text of Ismay’s letter to the Department. It contained Ismay’s idea of a three-man commission. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–2257)