Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 28, 1957—9:07 p.m.

5201. Re Cyprus in UN General Assembly.

1. During last year’s UNGA debate US pledged “to continue an active interest in the Cyprus question.” It would be consistent for US, especially in present Cyprus impasse, to take positive initiative. Present trend Cyprus increasingly harmful and in US interest continue seek constructive approach.

2. Therefore to maintain control over Cyprus UNGA discussion, and forestall proposals unacceptable to parties involved (e.g. possible Greek self-determination declaration, British condemnation Greek intervention, Indian proposal calling for independence of Cyprus), believe US should initiate immediate consultations on basis draft resolution, with objective endorsing direct discussions between British and Cypriots. Resolution emphasizing renewal of direct negotiations does not commit US to any of controversial “solutions” e.g. independence or partition, and amounts to UN suggestion that UK attempt settlement without substantive role by UN or participation any of its members (i.e. Greece or Turkey).

3. Resolution along following lines would appear serve above purpose:

“The General Assembly

“Noting that earnest efforts through several procedures have been made in order to reach agreement on the Cyprus question

“Expresses the hope that renewed negotiations between the British authorities and representatives of the principal segments of the population of Cyprus, may lead to concrete progress in achieving a solution.”

4. Unless objection perceived Embassy London hereby instructed promptly discuss with HMG.

5. Embassy should inform UK that in conjunction with such approach US disposed consider its opposing amendments of type that might be submitted by Greece, Turkey or others which would involve UN directly in subsequent discussions Cyprus or tend favor any particular type solution. For example, Department assumes (Athens’ 2487²) GOG may propose add language re self-determination. Present language aimed at fact a beginning needs to be made in negotiations and does not exclude any eventual solution. US would therefore probably oppose such amendments when debate commences.

If HMG refers to Radcliffe proposals, Embassy should say basis for talks should be decided by HMG. Embassy should convey following:

We realize HMG does not wish release Makarios from Seychelles until he condemns violence, but it is now 22 months since violence started, 10 months since Makarios deported and many more months may be required restore law and order. Meanwhile continuation violence will inevitably cause further hardening and distrust on both sides rendering eventual achievement any understanding increasing difficult. We therefore urge HMG seriously consider resumption talks with Makarios and leaders other Cypriot groups with understanding HMG desires continue talks until agreement reached. We also urge clear announcement promising eventual self-determination.

In making such suggestions emphasize Department view that if no progress re Cyprus when UNGA reconvenes in September 1957 it then will be, in our view, more difficult to handle successfully in the Assembly. For this reason if negotiations with Cypriots have not been fruitful within reasonable time US will seriously consider how NATO might play useful role and will be prepared take initiative. At present we are informing HMG, but no other Government, of this possibility.

After approach to HMG,³ Athens and Ankara will be instructed promptly inform the Governments and our efforts should thereafter be centered in New York. There should be no discussion above with representatives Governments other than UK until further instructions received.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–2857. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Wood and signed by Dulles. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to Paris for USRO, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.
2. Telegram 2487, January 14, transmitted the highlights of a meeting among Karamanlis, Averoff, and Allen on the Cyprus question. Allen reported that according to Averoff, the Greek demand for self-determination for Cyprus would only be for “home consumption”. Karamanlis argued that any resolution acceptable to Greece would have to call for the release of Makarios or at least negotiations with him. (Ibid., 747C00/1–1457)
3. In telegram 4012, January 30, the Embassy at London informed the Department that Barbour had discussed with Kirkpatrick the Department’s views on the U.N. Cyprus item in accordance with this telegram. Although Kirkpatrick reportedly expressed no significant objection to the U.S. position, he noted that it would only provide Britain with a temporary respite. He expressed a personal preference for a resolution calling on the three governments to resume negotiations. (Ibid., 320/1–3057)