Office of the Historian

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, January 28, 1957—6 p.m.

2632. During long discussion of Cyprus with Prime Minister this morning, at his request, I believe progress was made toward narrowing gap here between Greek and Turkish positions. … He said he could accept any solution Cyprus people wanted. He doubted that many Cypriot Turks wanted partition but he was ready and anxious to find out what they wanted through plebiscite. I said I did not believe Turkey was demanding partition but merely plebiscite offering partition as one possible alternative. …

I asked whether Greece would ask for UN troops to supervise plebiscite. He said that while UN troops would not be necessary, some kind of UN commission would have to be authorized to conduct or perhaps supervise or observe plebiscite.

Karamanlis said Averoff’s latest reports from NY were discouraging because he had not been able to obtain any indication what attitude US would take in UNGA debate. I reminded him that British and Turkish Governments were undoubtedly equally anxious to obtain this information and I doubted Averoff had any more reason for discouragement than they.

Karamanlis reemphasized that if US takes negative position against Greece during UN debates, demand for new elections here will be irresistible. He said he was not concerned whether his government stayed in office or not but he was deeply concerned about future orientation of Greek foreign policy. He predicted that if solution is not found to Cyprus now, problem will become very much greater international issue within 3 to 6 months and might even jeopardize new Eisenhower doctrine re Middle East. I asked why. He said Arab States, with strong support of Moscow, would demand independence and demilitarization of Cyprus to prevent its being used again as military case against Arabs.

I said I felt confident US would not take position hostile to Greece in UNGA but was concerned that if we did not support Greek position 100 percent, local press and politicians would construe this as hostile. …

Allen
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2857. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.↩