Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

415. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1957¹

Washington, November 29, 1957

SUBJECT

• Arab-Israel Problem; Mission of Secretary General

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Ya’acov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
• UNP—David l. Gamon
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban stated that Israel continued to act on the assumption that the basis of the United States–Israel discussions which had gone forward since last August remained valid. That is, in the Near East, we should endeavor to keep the threat to the Free World foremost and not highlight local quarrels such as the Arab-Israel dispute. Israel felt that this was the worst possible moment to raise the question of the totality of an Arab-Israel settlement. The Israelis had talked with friends in Asia who agreed. They wished their friends in London would likewise agree. There seemed to be some feeling among the British that a restatement of their position as expressed in Eden’s Guildhall speech of November, 1955,² would be helpful. The Israelis believed that such an act would only serve to produce a controversy and would not produce a solution. A situation would be created which the Soviets would enter and exploit.

The Secretary said that he hoped that in line with that reasoning Israel could be helpful to the Secretary General. A solution to the Mount Scopus problem must be found.³ The reaction in Jordan had been widespread. Mr. Eban was aware that there was always a tendency to revile an Arab nation which was pro-West for being “soft” on Israel. King Hussein had been subjected to a vicious propaganda campaign which had gone so far as to threaten his life, to proclaim him a United States stooge, and to state that he was conspiring with the Israelis. The net result of this was that he was sensitive on any of these issues. While we could not expect Israel to make permanent substantive concessions, we felt that it was in the common interest to do all that could be done to play down the situation and not exacerbate it.

Mr. Eban said that in general terms his Government accepted this line of action. The question was, could not Hussein act similarly? He had gone too far for Israel to follow him, particularly in the question of the repudiation of Colonel Leary on the alleged basis of his pro-Israel attitude. The Secretary said he appealed to Israel to do all it could to ease this matter along. On the whole, developments in the past few weeks had not been as unsatisfactory as they could have been. He hoped that such a trend could be continued. He asked Mr. Rockwell as to his views on the possibilities at this time of an Arab-Israel settlement. Mr. Rockwell said he agreed that there should be no attempt at a frontal attack on the entire Arab-Israel problem but felt that progress could be made on some aspects of it, such as the refugee problem. The Secretary noted that we had given a lot of thought to the refugee problem and were continuing to do so but had come to no decision. Mr. Eban felt that something might be done about the refugees but pointed out that the prospect of success varied inversely with the amount of publicity received. The Secretary said he was coming reluctantly to the belief that a formal overall plan for the solution of the entire Arab-Israel dispute would be difficult of achievement. We might have to whittle away at various aspects of the problem. At a later stage, we might have some ideas to discuss with the Ambassador. Perhaps the Secretary General would be developing some ideas.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2957. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on November 30. See footnote 1, supra.
2. Printed in The Times of London, November 10, 1955, p. 10. See also vol. XIV, p. 720.
3. On November 20, Jordanian officials refused passage to an Israeli convoy carrying petrol to the Israeli sector of the Mt. Scopus enclave on the grounds that it was not allowed under the Mt. Scopus Agreement of July 7, 1948. Petrol, however, had been admitted regularly under the heading of “fuel” used to operate a generator in the sector and the Israelis refused to send the convoy forward without it, thereby leaving the Israeli garrison without supplies. On November 26, the Consulate General at Jerusalem forwarded a report on the dispute to the Department of State in despatch 96. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2657) The text of the Mt. Scopus Agreement is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for April, May, June 1953, p. 30.
4. During the first week of December, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld visited the Middle East for the purpose of discussing the Mt. Scopus situation with Jordanian and Israeli officials. On December 4, it was announced that arrangements had been made for the resumption of convoys to Mt. Scopus. A U.N. spokesman reported on the following day that Hammarskjöld had decided to appoint a personal representative to negotiate with the Governments of Israel and Jordan with a view to implementing the Mt. Scopus Agreement of July 7, 1948. On December 16, Hammarskjöld appointed Ambassador Francisco Urrutia of Colombia as his personal representative. (United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, p. 38)