Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

414. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1957¹

Washington, November 29, 1957

SUBJECT

• NATO and the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Ya’acov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• The Secretary
• NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
• UNP—David L. Gamon
• NE—Donald C. Bergus

Mr. Eban said that Israel looked upon the forthcoming NATO Council meeting as a “town meeting” of the democratic nations which were at a turning point brought about by the rapid increase in Soviet strength. He hoped that this meeting would not produce an anticlimax or be imbued with a spirit of “provincialism.” By provincialism, he meant a concentration on NATO internal problems and disregard of the areas which flanked NATO.

In his November 13 memorandum,² the Ambassador had put forward three ideas. The first of these was that at the forthcoming Council Meeting, NATO should endorse the principles of the Declaration of Common Purpose issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. This would be a step forward, but Mr. Eban doubted that this would be sufficient to deal with the crisis in the Near East. The second proposal was that some means be found of expressing NATO’s interest in the independence and integrity of Near East states. Perhaps NATO would wish to endorse the United States commitment in the Middle East Doctrine and have it become a NATO commitment on the basis of the importance of the Middle East to European defense. Mr. Eban admitted that this might be too ambitious. As a middle course between this proposal and NATO’s doing nothing about the Middle East, there could be an expression at the conclusion of the NATO meeting of concern for the independence of Middle East states. Israel advocated as a minimal step that NATO find wording to express its interest in preventing the engulfment of the Middle East by Communism. Mr. Eban’s third proposal was one that did not involve public action. He referred to the statement in the Secretary’s message of November 12 to the Prime Minister³ to the effect that substance was more important than form. Mr. Ben Gurion had been impressed with that statement and felt that there was a need for concrete discussions with Middle East countries of various security contingencies, with the view to reassuring those countries that if they were attacked there would be help available. These would be secret conversations with each of the Middle East countries related to the security problems of each. Mr. Eban concluded by referring to the scientific aspect of strengthening the cooperation among free nations. He felt that Israel had more to offer the Free World than had yet been made available. The Israel Government was presently examining this question.

The Secretary said that as to the question of a NATO endorsement of the Declaration of Common Purpose, a primary problem appeared to be to find an appropriate way in which to do it. There was evidence that NATO countries were reacting against the prospect of their being called upon to merely rubber stamp what had been a United States–United Kingdom program.

A great deal of thought had been given as to the relationship of areas outside NATO. It was of course not possible for the Council even at the level of heads of government to increase the scope of the legal commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty. There were varying views within NATO. The Scandinavians, for example, generally were unenthusiastic about expanding NATO’s commitments to the South and East. However, consideration was being given to this matter including the possibility of an expression of concern over the Middle East, but we could not tell the outcome yet.

Mr. Eban said that a doubt which had been expressed as to the wisdom of a NATO expression of interest in the security of the Middle East was that the Arabs would react negatively because there were countries with a colonial tradition in the area in NATO. Mr. Eban believed that NATO was the only family which could express a communal Free World position. Israel believed that if NATO made available security and aid to Near Eastern states, few could resist. The Secretary stated that we were working very hard on these questions. We could not produce spectacular things when we operated as a democracy associated with a number of other countries. Anything acceptable to all the NATO countries could not be something which took them by surprise. He hoped that we would not be expected to produce miracles. Questions involving NATO’s relationships with other areas would probably be considered prior to the meeting itself. Mr. Eban understood that some governments were changing their views. He believed that The Netherlands and even Norway were now more interested in the Near East and its relationship to NATO.

Mr. Eban said that he was about to furnish more ideas with respect to that part of his memorandum which dealt with economic development, particularly as to how a regional development agency might be useful as a means of tackling problems such as the refugees and the development of river basins. The Secretary asked if Mr. Eban felt that NATO would provide good auspices for an economic development agency. He felt there were certain parts of the world where NATO auspices would not be good. Mr. Eban felt that in the economic realm a primarily United States approach would best be understood. Israel’s experience had been that aid from the United States involved no political conditions in derogation of sovereignty.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–2957. Secret. Drafted by Bergus on November 30. Prior to Eban’s visit on November 29, Rountree had sent Dulles a briefing memorandum concerning possible subjects which Eban might raise. (Ibid., 784A.00/11–2957) Separate memoranda of conversation cover other topics discussed by Dulles and Eban: “Approach to the USSR Re United States Attitude Toward Near East States” (ibid., 780.00/11–2957), “Israel Application for Export-Import Bank Loan” (ibid., 884A.10/11–2957), and “Arab-Israel Problem; Mission of Secretary General” (infra).
2. See Document 397.
3. Document 396.