Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

636. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, December 3, 1956—5 p.m.

699. Prime Minister invited me to his Jerusalem residence Sunday afternoon for “little talk in informal atmosphere”. Talk lasted hour and covered following: 1. Rhetorical questions as to US thinking on Israel’s principal preoccupations in wake of withdrawal foreign forces from Egypt; 2. His conception Nasser’s resurgence and probable moves henceforward; and 3. Probable development Soviet policy and actions in ME.

1. US views on principal Israel preoccupations: by way of introduction Ben Gurion emphasized influence President’s letter² had in persuading him to agree to withdraw IDF from Sinai. He implied his alacrity in acquiescing entitled him to answers following questions:

How was freedom of navigation Suez to be guaranteed, once Canal is cleared, if Hammarskjold has agreed that Nasser can remove UNEF at will?

If Canal is not under protective control UNEF, what guarantee is there Nasser will not block it again, not only against Israel but physically block it if he is told to do so by Soviets or if he wishes to blackmail west?

For first time Israelis enjoying freedom of passage ships and aircraft over Aqaba. For time being this also means free passage for other countries seeking link between Asia and Europe as alternative to Suez.

What guarantees are there Israel can maintain this vital freedom if she withdraws her troops from area?

How is Nasser to be prevented from blocking it again if he wishes?

How can Israel be assured Sinai will not be used again as base for attack on Israel either by land or air?

What is to prevent Egypt from building up tremendous attack forces there again in implementation declarations she made only today to continue efforts to destroy Israel?

2. Nasser’s resurgence: His portrayal of Nasser covered many points he had made in past but with following additions or new underscoring.

Despite Nasser’s protestations of adherence to western democratic principles, his eagerly expressed desire for good relations with US, and his alleged refusal to accept Soviet domination, there has been no fundamental change in his ambitions, reliance on intrigues and machinations, or his basic attitudes towards US and west. He is working against west in Arab countries and establishing close associations with Soviets through Syria until such time as he can openly resume his partnership with Russia. Ben Gurion said he was very much afraid Nasser will be successful in convincing US and others who may have no conception of his mastery of deceit. He feared we did not understand Arab mind-difference between artistry of Arab lying and blatant crudeness of Communist lying which was transparent to anyone.

I expressed genuine doubt any country which had already experienced Nasser’s unreliability would again be taken in. Ben Gurion replied he understood there were differences of opinion in Department as well as USUN as to how Nasser should be handled.

He said Nasser would move by phases, first insisting on British and French withdrawal from Egypt; then ousting UNEF, then demanding Israels’ evacuation of Sinai and areas adjacent to Gulf of Aqaba, followed by campaign to win friends and obtain much needed economic assistance from US.

3. Probable development Soviet policy and actions in ME. Confirmation of substantial shipments of Soviet arms to Syria and persistent false accusations by both Syria and Russia of British, French and Israeli troop build-ups on Syrian border made him apprehensive Soviets had some definite aggressive plan affecting Israeli’s security. Further evidence such intent was contained in Bulganin’s letter attacking Israel, Izvestia’s “very disturbing article” along same line (Moscow’s 1345 to Department)³ and reports he said he had from Israeli Legation in Moscow about Khrushchev’s statements to diplomats that Israel could be wiped out with only few rockets sent from Russia. Ben Gurion said he was worried more by intent than threat because there were easier ways to accomplish same result. He said he did not take threat of Soviet “volunteers” seriously, having regarded it as hoax from very beginning. In his view it was part of cover for real plans of building-up military supplies in Syria utilizing it as ME base instead of Egypt for time being.

“Of course I have no knowledge how Soviets will operate but I believe one of their first moves would be to subject Israel to heavy bombing, small in terms of Soviet thinking but very large in Israel’s”. He returned several times to persistence of Soviet-Syrian accusations of Israel troop concentrations on Syrian border despite categorical denials by UN observers. He interpreted their repetition as indicating some plan of military action has been devised for future use by Soviets in conjunction with Syrians.

I expressed doubt as to his conclusions based as they were on two points mentioned. I referred to strong US statement against introducing “volunteers” into area, and pointed out we had taken lead in promoting UN resolutions against further introduction of arms to ME. I pointed up fact that after Soviet propaganda threatening to send volunteers to Egypt and Syria, Soviets had completely abandoned line. It seemed to me recent propaganda line on military build-up on Israel-Syrian border possessed even more of “war of nerves” flavor and might well fade out in due course. Furthermore, I said, I had not yet seen any evidence sizeable build-up Soviet supplies in Syria and specifically had seen nothing indicating that Soviet planes had been seen on Syria airfields. He admitted Israel had been unable to locate any such planes. In any event, he felt for moment at least, Soviets were definitely utilizing Syria as area penetration channel and that developments to date indicated serious threat to Israel’s security.

Turning to our statement supporting integrity Baghdad Pact countries, he said Soviets would interpret statement’s failure to mention Israel and Lebanon as expression of indifference to their fate. I argued such interpretation would be entirely unreasonable and illogical; and obviously contrary to any intent by US. Statement was addressed to specific and clearly defined area with no more reason Lebanon or Israel should have been included than any other country in ME. He admitted logic this view but said this would not change Soviet interpretation [garble] described Lebanon as small country courageous enough to defy Soviet-supported Nasser. This defiance brought about definite order from Nasser to his agents to assassinate President Chamoun at same time Egyptian agents were instructed to assassinate Nuri Said. Nasser might also try to incite Moslems against Lebanese Christians.

While assassinations and internal disturbances might suffice against Lebanon, strong military action would be required to wipe out Israel. “They know it would do no good to assassinate me as principle of democracy and freedom would continue here as long as there was an Israel”. Accordingly he thought Soviets would depend on saturation bombing, immediately wiping out Israel’s air bases and air force.

He said Syria was completely under domination of Nasser who, at this moment, was using Syria against US and west while his own cabinet and Egyptian press were instructed to appear friendly to US. Quwwatly and Colonel Sarraj were directly under Nasser’s order. To same extent he felt Nasser was directing Jordan’s policies.

He concluded his conversation by saying if US was not willing make public statement warning Soviets against attack on Lebanon and Israel as it had in case of Baghdad Pact powers Secretary might call in Soviet Ambassador and make this point clear to him. I told him I would pass his questions and views to Department which would find them of interest although I could not assure him of specific replies in terms of US policy. As he knew our basic policy is to help in every way to settle Suez problem, settle Israel-Arab issues and bring peace to area and we meant peace with justice. Policy pertaining to each of his points might be under formulation and subject to future events and developments in which he had already agreed was very complex accumulation of factors. He had remarked that his comment was limited to viewpoint obtained within area and although he had long and close associations with regional problems he had said he could not undertake assess policies or recommendations involving other areas. Therefore he had indicated awareness that US had to consider many related factors of global nature. He agreed saying “never in history has so much depended on one power and I suspect one man. His decision will take courage”. He repeated his confidence in President and his belief President’s sincere desire to find just solution to area’s difficult problems.

Comment

Ben Gurion was more composed and quiet than in some time. I feel his purpose was to put his thoughts on record and to justify his request answers to this questions: first, by virtue his cooperation with Hammarskjold who, he said, had requested him to withdraw IDF, so work could begin clearing Canal, and to allow international force to enter area vacated by IDF. Responsive to Hammarskjold’s request he had instructed Dayan to move troops back some 30 miles from Canal⁴ (I gathered Dayan was not too happy with suggestion); second, because US pressures were also in large part responsible for his decision to withdraw Israeli troops in first place. I had anticipated this argument as logical from tactical standpoint (Embtel 614).⁵ However, while US pressure was certainly most powerful agent, fear of expulsion from UN and Israel’s isolation were almost equally strong incentive factors.

While his comments coincide very nicely with line Eban and Golda Meir are now pushing, I believe him genuinely worried (1) over Nasser and his ability to deceive US and emerge victor, (2) that Israel may find itself facing same or even greater threats to her security than before Sinai campaign. Although he spent some time discussing them, I have impression he was less worried about Soviet-Syrian threat and US statement in support of Baghdad Pact countries’ integrity which overlooked Israel (and Lebanon).

I doubt he expects definite replies to his questions but probably hopes for some general statement containing reassurance that these and other matters are in our minds as we study overall solutions for area. Obviously he would welcome any suggestion as we are prepared to make that our long term objectives if successful, would obviate most all fears he raised in his questions.⁶

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/12–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:18 p.m., December 4. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Paris, London, Rome, and Moscow.
2. Reference is to Eisenhower’s November 9 letter to Ben Gurion; see footnote 4, Document 560.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2956)
4. On December 3, the Israeli Government informed Secretary-General Hammarskjöld that it was withdrawing its troops from the Suez Canal area, along the length of the Canal, to a distance of some 50 kilometers. (Report by the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other measures, January 15, 1957; U.N. doc. A/3500)
5. In telegram 614, November 16, Lawson reported that “all quarters” in Israel felt that the Israeli Government’s decision to withdraw from Sinai had put the United States under an obligation to Israel and that there was some apprehension as to whether the U.S. Government felt this obligation. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1956)

6. On December 8, the Department of State responded to telegram 699 as follows:

   “Department approves comments you made to Ben Gurion. When you see him again you might thank him for sharing with us his estimate of present situation and his preoccupations concerning future. He can be sure that the various aspects of the basic NE problems are very much in our minds. Through UN and in other useful ways US is determined to assist in bringing about permanent settlement of Arab-Israel issue. We believe that road to such settlement will be less difficult if parties will offer full cooperation to UN in latter’s efforts restore peace and stability to area. US will continue maintain its demonstrated interest in independence and territorial integrity of NE states.” (Telegram 612 to Tel Aviv; ibid., 684A.74/12–356)