Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

635. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 3, 1956¹

Washington, December 3, 1956

SUBJECT

• Israel

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
• NEA—Mr. Rountree
• NE—Mr. Bergus

Mr. Eban reported that two things had been agreed upon with the United Nations Secretary General: Total withdrawal of Israel forces and an immediate Israel pull-back from the Suez Canal area. General Burns would shortly be in touch with the Israel command to discuss these matters.

This left a number of questions. One of these was Israel’s right to use the Suez Canal. At present, the Canal was closed to the shipping of all nations without prejudice to any. There must be vigilance to ensure that when the Canal was cleared it would be open to all shipping on equal terms.

Israel had so much faith that passage through the Straits of Tiran would remain free that it had taken a number of steps such as informing world maritime powers that passage was now available to world commerce, improving the roads from Eilat to Aqaba, and commencing work on an emergency oil pipeline from Eilat to Beersheba. Israel and Egypt were the only two countries in the world which had both Mediterranean and Red Sea shorelines. It was essential that Europe have two lungs rather than one to breathe with in the future. The question of Tiran could be handled in the context of a United Nations force but the United Nations should not leave that area precipitately.

As for Sinai, Israel wished to prevent the re-establishment of Egyptian bases at El Arish, Abu Aweigila and Bir Gifgafa. These places should be centers of United Nations forces. This again raised questions as to the duration of the UNEF and the authority under which it would operate. These matters could not be left vague. Mr. Rountree said that he must confess that the matter was vague. As he understood it, the Secretary General had reported that he was proceeding on the assumption that the forces would remain in Egypt until their mission was completed. This decision would not be a unilateral one. Mr. Eban said that the Secretary General had told him that this matter must be left vague for the time being. Mr. Shiloah expressed concern at the fact that the UNEF would contain Yugoslav and Indian troops. The attitudes of these two governments toward this question might be important.

Mr. Eban said that with respect to Gaza, Israel had accepted the Secretary General’s advice to accept the status quo and to put forward no juridical or political claims. Israel was lying low as regarded public statements as to the future of Gaza. There had been an improvement in conditions in the strip and the municipal autonomy of Gaza had been strengthened. Meanwhile Israel was wondering about the impact which absorption of the strip and its inhabitants would have on Israel. Mr. Shiloah said that in this case Israel would strive to think on the same wavelength as the United States.

Mr. Eban pressed for an expression of U.S. views on these matters. Mr. Rountree pointed out that these questions were under active consideration.

Mr. Eban turned to the economic situation in Israel and said that Israel had suffered less as a result of events in Egypt than had other countries. Israel still needed assistance in a number of fields such as P.L. 480, FY 1957 technical and economic assistance, and the Export-Import Bank loan. He asked if discussions on these matters could be resumed. Mr. Rountree indicated that while the United States would like to recover the previous position, the present disposition was that the time had not yet come to do so. He hoped that there would be no delay but a little more time was required.

Mr. Eban inquired as to the factors which required time. He pointed out that the United States was trying to revive practical relations for other countries. Mr. Rountree said it was our desire and objective to do this for Israel. What we were doing for the British and French was really for the benefit of Europe as a whole. Britain and France had adequate sources of oil and a large number of tankers with which to supply their own needs if they wished to do so at the expense of other countries which their companies normally supplied. Among the countries which faced difficult situations were those who were suffering from the impact of recent events in Egypt but had not been in any way responsible for them. There were other measures with respect to Britain and France which the United States could take as soon as the British and French announced a firm intention to withdraw their forces from Egypt within a limited specified time.

Mr. Eban said that he had submitted a memorandum to the Secretary concerning Israel’s need for oil.² While Israel did not require as much oil as European countries, the fact was that where Britain, for example, depended on oil for 35 percent of its energy requirements, Israel’s energy requirements were entirely filled by oil. He had proposed that percentage of oil used for energy requirements be used as a criterion in allocating oil supplies among consumer nations.

Mr. Shiloah wondered if despite U.S. reluctance to proceed with economic assistance matters generally at this time, an exception might not be made for P.L. 480 transactions which were, after all, not aid but sales of surplus commodities. Mr. Rountree said it was felt that this was not the time to discuss new programs, projects, or sales agreements.

Mr. Eban passed on to the subject of Israel’s request for a United States public statement of support and marshalled the arguments put forward by Mr. Shiloah on November 30.³ Mr. Rountree indicated that the Israel note of November 30 together with Mr. Shiloah’s remarks of the same day had been reported to the Secretary and that these matters were under consideration.

Mr. Eban said that he did not feel states which were members of the United Nations could rightfully refer to the possibility of the extinction of other member nations. He was thinking of introducing a general resolution into the United Nations General Assembly to this effect.

Mr. Eban said that Mrs. Meir would like to visit the Department of State this week and pay some calls. He understood how extremely busy the Secretary must be and would not press for a call on the Secretary himself. Mr. Rountree said that we would look into the matter.

Mr. Eban reported that Cairo radio had twice that morning announced that Fedayeen had been instructed to resume their activities in Israel.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–356. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus on December 6.
2. Eban had forwarded to Dulles a memorandum describing Israel’s petroleum requirements on October 9. (Ibid., 884A.2553/10–956) On December 5, Eban sent Dulles a letter which referred to the October 9 memorandum and noted that the Government of Israel welcomed the U.S. decision to activate the MEEC plan. Eban’s December 5 letter also expressed the hope that the Committee would concern itself with the requirements of countries, like Israel, who were not members of the OEEC and that favorable consideration would be given to Israeli needs. (Ibid., 884A.2553/12–556)
3. See footnote 3, Document 627.