Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

572. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 12, 1956—7 p.m.

2349. Re Deptel (Presidential Handling) 1784.² I delivered message reftel to Mollet at 3:30 p.m. local time, Monday. On reading it he said he could understand reasoning but felt that US decision was most unfortunate. After a few moments thought Mollet said that he would like to think out loud for a few minutes with the request that his thoughts be transmitted in detail and personally to the President. He talked for about 30 minutes and gave impression throughout of being discouraged and depressed.

Mollet said that in his view the supreme question of the moment was how to avoid a new Munich in the Middle East. The Arab problem as such was, in his view, greatly outweighed by the Soviet question. He felt that Soviet plans had been fully unmasked. It was now clear that if the Israeli operation had not taken place a joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian attack on Israel, directed by Soviet officers and technicians, would have taken place at the latest during December or January. While Israel could have been expected to handle an Arab assault, who [it?] could not have withstood the impact of Soviet volunteers without outside help. Therefore, the result would have been either the annihilation of Israel or the initiation of broad scale hostilities in the Middle East involving the Soviet Union, which would very likely have led to general war. Mollet said that there had been exaggerations regarding the Soviet equipment found in the Sinai Peninsula by the Israelis. But the extent and the extreme advanced design of the conventional armaments indicated clearly that they could only be for offensive operations. Also, no other interpretation could be put on fact that Soviets had delivered during past year 420 million dollars worth of military equipment to Egypt. Mollet considered that the placing of the Syrian and Jordanian armies under Egyptian command, and the trip of the Syrian President to Moscow were the final steps prior to a coordinated assault on Israel, which had now been forestalled by the Israeli operation.

Unfortunately, however, the end result of the operation had been a tremendous increase in Soviet prestige since the entire Arab world now considered the Soviet Union as their leader. He said it was clear that Nasser was now operating directly under Soviet orders and that this was particularly disturbing in relation to setting a date for a meeting between himself, Eden and the President. In effect the US position that such a meeting should not take place until after the UN force was fully installed and the French and British troops withdrawn gave the Soviets a kind of veto power over the holding of such a meeting. The Egyptians under Soviet guidance could be expected to place all sorts of obstacles in the way of the establishment of the international force in Egypt. This would further delay the meeting of the big three in Washington which was so needed to achieve overall unity.

Mollet cited, as an indication of the Soviets’ rising influence in the Arab world, a broadcast made on Friday over the Moroccan state radio by an official of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which it was stated on behalf of the Moroccan Govt that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the defeat of the Anglo-French aggression in the Near East, and that now it was clear that the Arab peoples had only one power to whom they could look for effective friendship, namely the Soviet Union.

Mollet felt that effective strong action by the US was necessary in the Middle East very promptly if there was to be any possibility of offsetting a Soviet takeover. I asked Mollet what he had in mind and he said that what was needed was a clear cut indication that US would resist such a takeover. Action could take various forms. For instance, statement that US would oppose Soviet volunteers by force if necessary, or some form of guarantee for Israel, or US membership in Baghdad Pact. He said that he was prepared to reverse previous Quai d’Orsay policy regarding the BP and do everything possible to strengthen it, and especially to strengthen the present Iraqi Govt. He said he had cited these specific steps merely as examples which did not by any means exhaust the range of possibilities.

Mollet said the lack of close coordination of Western policy was sharply evident in the handling of the replies to the invitation of the Swiss Govt to a Five Power heads of govt meeting. He pointed out that Bulganin and Nehru had accepted the meeting which the President had rejected.³ Meanwhile Eden had indicated willingness to accept such a meeting in principle, while he, Mollet, had not as yet replied. He said it was unthinkable that situation could arise where the US was the only power to refuse such a meeting and that we could be sure that his response would not put the US in such a position. However, he regretted that Eden’s reaction had differed from US reaction.

Mollet then stated that the Swiss idea had originated with Mendes-France, who had sent one of his followers, a young deputy named Hernu, to Switzerland where he had sold the idea to the Swiss Govt. Mollet said that such a meeting at this date would only be a trap and would certainly be a direct repetition of the famous Munich conference. He said that this was all the more true since after the Indian actions in the UN on the Hungarian situation he could only conclude that basically Nehru was now opting for the Soviet side.

Finally, Mollet said he thought the President’s first reaction in accepting the idea of an immediate meeting with himself and Eden had been the right reaction and that the advice of the State Dept experts that the meeting should be postponed was in error. Mollet then described his various telephone conversations with Eden which led him to the conclusion that the State Dept had persuaded the President to reverse his first judgment and to postpone the three power meeting. Mollet said he could only assume that US information on events on the Middle East was inaccurate in regard to the tremendous impact that the Soviet actions were having. He hoped that it would not be too late by the time a three power meeting was finally held. As I left he said that Munich had cost the world dearly in lives and he only hoped that the present situation would not lead to even more dire results within the next 3 to 5 years.

Comment: As it appears that high level meeting will not take place for some time, I feel it would be most helpful for me to receive in some detail US Govt’s latest thinking on future developments in Middle East for transmittal to French. If I could be instructed to deliver these thoughts direct to Mollet it would be most helpful. Pineau will undoubtedly press hard to get us thinking in New York. I do not have much confidence that Pineau would fully comprehend US position, much less report it accurately to Mollet. Therefore, I hope that I can be informed and directed to see Mollet both to offset such exaggerated and distorted reporting as may come from Pineau in next few days and to indicate US interest in problems now worrying Mollet.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1256. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Received at 5:54 p.m. a copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series is initialed by Eisenhower.
2. Telegram 1784, November 11, transmitted the text of Eisenhower’s message to Mollet; see footnote 4, Document 566.
3. The Swiss invitation had been issued in the form of a letter from the President of Switzerland, Marckus Feldman, to the Heads of State of Great Britain, France, India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. For text of Feldman’s letter of November 6 and Eisenhower’s response of November 10, see Department of State Bulletin, November 26, 1956, p. 839.