571. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

2648. For Acting Secretary from Ambassador. Following conversations with top level officials of HMG during past few days are all inter-related.

1.
At evening reception Buckingham Palace November 8, Butler took me aside and said with great earnestness how deeply he deplored the existence of what he termed mutual misunderstandings of policy which had arisen between US and UK Governments. He quite evidently was greatly disturbed by the course followed by majority of Cabinet although he did not specifically so state. He said to me, “I have been meaning to come to see you for a long time to tell you that in my opinion you are the only man who is in a position to explain to your government in detail the various attitudes of the members of our government. Never has an Ambassador occupied a more important position than you do at the present moment.” He went on to urge me to see Macmillan at the earliest opportunity.
2.
On November 9 at Macmillan’s request I saw him in the afternoon. He said he wished to get my advice as to whether he should ask Washington at once for permission to leave for Washington November 12 to see Humphrey and other Treasury officials about impact of current events in Near East on economic position of Great Britain with particular reference to dollar balances and oil imports. Having in mind that Department apparently wished to treat oil problem through OEEC rather than directly with Great Britain while British troops are still in Egypt, I advised Macmillan to wait until Eden had arranged to visit Washington and go with him at that time. Macmillan said he would follow that advice and asked me not to take the matter up with Washington at that time. Macmillan stated that he hoped that conditions for Washington’s agreement to have Eden visit Washington could be fulfilled within the next week or fortnight. Macmillan further said that he regretted very much that he had had to give up post of Foreign Secretary because he was afraid that Selwyn Lloyd was “too young and inexperienced” for a position of such great responsibility under the present difficult circumstances.
3.
At Lord Mayor’s banquet evening November 9 Eden asked me to talk with him privately and said that it was most urgent for him to have talk with President soon. As he expressed it, “the Bear is moving not only in the Middle East but in Eastern Europe and we must coordinate our plans concerning this situation.” He also said that HMG had been forced to act in Egypt because of the impotence of UN and that a beginning must be made to strengthen that organization. In view of the messages which are being exchanged between Eden and President on Egypt I simply said that he knew as well as I what the President’s attitude was about the timing of a conference between himself and the President.
4.
Yesterday afternoon I visited Salisbury at Hatfield at his invitation and we had a private conversation of over an hour. He started by saying Macmillan had told him of his conversation with me and that he (Salisbury) agreed with my advice to Macmillan. He said that he and Macmillan had recommended that Lloyd should go to New York yesterday (which Lloyd did) to represent Great Britain at UNGA and that as soon as a conference had been arranged between Eden and French with the President in Washington, Lloyd should return to London and remain in London during that conference and Macmillan should accompany Eden to Washington.

Salisbury also said that additional information was accumulating regarding definite character and scope of conspiracy between Nasser and Russians to take over entire Middle East and its oil as soon as Nasser had established himself as head Arab world. Salisbury felt that fact Nasser had blocked Canal was highly significant. This act he said had not been necessary and was not in interest of Egypt but could only be explained as part of a plot to assist Russia by making it more difficult for Europe to defend itself or protect its interests in Middle East.

Eden, Macmillan and Salisbury have all stated to me that while they believe that some form of United Nations is the only hope of the world, they have lost faith in the efficacy of the United Nations Charter in its present form. The latter said, “I was one of the founders of the United Nations but I must confess that I now feel that it has become an instrument which prevents the big five powers from preserving the peace and invites aggression by small powers against each other.” He said that he felt the Charter must be changed to set up some kind of an international force which could be available at short notice to prevent such aggression. Salisbury asked me to call the attention of the Department to the speech of Lord Coleraine on page 180 of Hansard for Thursday November 8 which he said contained very able discussion of the weakness of the United Nations Charter.

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Comment: I believe that the thing which is at present disturbing the members of the British Cabinet more than anything else is that if Eden’s visit to the President continues dependent on the moving in of an adequate United Nations force and the moving out of the troops of Great Britain and France, the visit may be indefinitely delayed because of Nasser’s refusal to accept the United Nations force. They are deeply concerned about the possibility of a protracted negotiation between Nasser and United Nations over the entry of such a force.

Aldrich
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/11–1256. Top Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling—Limited Distribution. Received at 1:43 p.m. A copy of this telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series is initialed by Eisenhower.