520. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
1091. Since dispatch Embtel 10832 Soviet attitude as expressed in press, and in particular in communications to Eden and Mollet, becomes more ominous, and in the messages to Eden and Mollet comes as close to ultimatum as possible without so stating and fixing of time limit in proposed Soviet SC resolution is along same lines. While none of this can be accepted as conclusive evidence Soviet unilateral action if fighting in Egypt continues, Soviet Government, particularly in communications to Britain and France, are making it increasingly difficult for them to maintain complete inaction in event fighting continues and Egyptian Government and armed force are still capable of resistance.
I believe events here have gone beyond simple proposition of cover for Soviet action in Hungary. In fact, while it is obvious that Middle East provided psychological cover for Soviet action against [Page 1017] Hungary, Soviet decision in this regard may have been also, and perhaps more importantly, motivated by conviction that Middle East fighting might spread and that sooner or later Soviet Union would have to take some definite position. In such circumstances Soviet leaders, and military in particular, may have come to conclusion that under no circumstances could they lose their military position in Hungary no matter at what political or psychological cost. I shall be sending message later this morning giving joint opinion service attachés here as to military possibilities open to Soviet Union in regard to Middle East fighting.3
Key factor remains now of course of developments in regard to hostilities, and while Soviets have other irons in the fire I believe that they are primarily at this stage interested in seeing cessation hostilities. Soviet threat, I realize, has complicated situation but I still adhere to views expressed last paragraph reftel.
It is obviously important to convince Soviets that any military action on their part against Britain and France would encounter the armed opposition of the US. However, this warning would be very much more effective if it could be accompanied by some official communication from U.S. Government as to when all hostilities would cease against Egypt.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–656. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Received at 10:44 a.m. Repeated Priority to London and Paris.↩
- Document 506.↩
- In telegram 1093, November 6, Bohlen reported the following estimate, made by U.S. service attachés in Moscow, of Soviet capabilities to exert military influence on the Suez situation short of deliberate military operations: “(1) Clandestine movement of token volunteer forces by air or submarine, (2) overt movement by naval escorted shipping of volunteers and/or supplies, (3) Adriatic-based clandestine submarine action against Anglo-French forces under guise as Egyptians, (4) long-range submarine attack south of canal disguised as above, (5) overt naval visit to any Egyptian port threatened by Anglo-French action, (6) movement bomber and fighter aircraft to or through Syrian bases for employment by volunteer crews ignoring overflight considerations of Iran, Iraq, Turkey or Greece.” Bohlen commented that this assessment was confined to operations in direct support of Egypt and did not include possible more serious actions which would involve world war, such as the bombing of Cyprus or direct Soviet military action. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–656)↩