Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

506. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 5, 1956—8 p.m.

1083. It is hardly likely that Soviet Govt anticipates any possibility that their proposal for joint action bring fighting Middle East to halt would be accepted by the U.S. Govt, and therefore purpose behind this action should be sought elsewhere.

1. In large part, if not entirely, proposal is motivated by desire through spectacular proposal this nature to divert world attention from Soviet action Hungary and provide Soviet propaganda with additional question to agitate.

2. However, in extremely tense situation believe that it would be imprudent to dismiss this merely as an empty propaganda gesture.

3. Egyptian resistance has lasted now over a week and as indicated Embtel 1027² possibility Soviet involvement would be related in part to duration Egyptian resistance.

4. Soviet Union in action against Hungary has cast aside any pretense to moral responsibility and this fact may increase willingness to risk more hazardous action in Middle East than would normally have been case.

5. I do not see Soviet Union deliberately starting World War III and reference to atomic and hydrogen weapons in communication may be merely designed to enhance dramatic effect of proposal, but some form of assistance to Egypt appears more likely than it did at initiation British and French action. As already reported Embtel 1060,³ there was strong smell of some military deal in Syrian talks here, and threat to Iran is always present.

Not only because of Soviet proposal but rather in spite of it every consideration of wisdom would indicate speedy cease fire by British and French if this could be brought about without reference to Soviet proposal; if British and French could be induced to declare cease fire immediately this would undercut effect Soviet proposal and eliminate what element of real danger involved in Soviet attitude toward Middle East hostilities.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/11–556. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Received at 2:05 p.m. A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.
2. In telegram 1027, November 1, Bohlen advised the Department of State that a Soviet declaration on the Middle East, issued on October 31, was a profession of official non-involvement at this stage. Bohlen also noted, however, that should hostilities spread to other parts of the Middle East, including those close to the Soviet border, the possibility of Soviet action would increase. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–156)
3. Dated November 3, not printed. (Ibid., 783.11/11–356) A Syrian delegation, headed by President Quwatli visited Moscow in early November.