Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

193. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹

Washington, September 8, 1956, 9 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Suez Canal

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• NEA—William M. Rountree

The Ambassador called at 9 p.m. Saturday evening to discuss with the Secretary possible next steps in connection with the Suez crisis. He said that Messrs. Mollet and Pineau planned to come to London on Monday at Prime Minister Eden’s request. London felt, he said, that we might be drifting apart in our attitude toward steps which should be taken. The UK had made two proposals upon which the US was disposed to throw cold water. Assuming that Nasser would reject the eighteen nations’ proposal, the British felt that effective and positive action should be taken immediately. Otherwise, Nasser would strengthen his hold on the Canal; it would appear as though he were getting away with a substantial victory; and many Arabs who were now hoping for a defeat for Nasser would get progressively more worried. If we were not in a position early next week to take quick steps, the consequences might be bad. On the other hand, the British felt that force should be used only as the last resort. As an alternative to the use of force, the British were quite attracted to the proposals made by the Secretary regarding an association of Canal users. They would like to know whether Mr. Dulles’ thoughts in this connection had been reduced to a plan of action or whether his ideas were still of a general character. Regarding the United Nations, the Ambassador recalled that the UK had prepared a draft of a letter to the Security Council, asking for Council action and enclosing a proposed resolution.² In view of the comments which the Secretary had made earlier,³ however, the British were prepared as an alternative simply to write a letter to the Security Council informing it of the situation but requesting no action at this stage. The Ambassador observed that this appeared to be in line with the Secretary’s proposal.

Responding first to the UN aspect, the Secretary said that he had not intended to propose the letter as an alternative, but that he had merely suggested that this might be explored as an alternative if it should be decided by the British for the reasons he had given not to proceed along the lines of their earlier draft communication and resolution. He had thought it might be a means of informing the Council and of getting priority for Council consideration on the basis of a British request, if the Egyptians should subsequently decide to bring the matter themselves before the Council. (He recalled the New Zealand letter to the Council in connection with the Quemoy and Matsu affair.) While he had no desire to assume a negative attitude in connection with the earlier British suggestion, he had pointed out the difficulties inherent in that program, which difficulties he considered to be very real. He observed that while it might be wise to go to the Council to get redress if treaty rights were violated or if force was threatened, it would be an entirely different matter to try to get the Council to force a country to negotiate a new treaty. At this point the Secretary handed to the Ambassador a classified communication.⁴ The Ambassador, after reading the document, observed that it answered some of the questions which he had been asked to put to the Secretary.

The Secretary said he considered it essential to determine a course of action which would be in between the extremes of employing force and of giving in to Nasser. He felt that if the users of the Canal could be organized, capitalizing upon the momentum gained at the London Conference, it should be possible to work together upon a plan which would give promise of success. He believed that we had rights which were very substantial. These rights should not be given up. Apart from that, we had means of employing economic pressures, and we had the possibility of alternatives to the Suez Canal which, if effectively employed, could obtain the desired results. Force, he said, was hard to justify under the UN Charter and, in any event, it would be very difficult to say where military action would end. The President was very deeply concerned by the situation and where it would lead. He did not see any end through the course of moving in with military force, since that might set East against West to a degree which had never before existed. There would not be enough forces to send troops to put out all the fires which might start once hostilities in Egypt began.

The Secretary realized vividly that we could not let Nasser win a victory, but he thought the way to avoid this lay through longer range projects than through too hasty action. He recognized that the British and French military preparations were expensive and he appreciated the importance attached by those Governments to keeping the forces in a state of readiness. This naturally created a hardship and expenses which, he understood, led the British and French to desire some quick action. However, if the next steps to be taken were determined on the basis of a few days or a week’s time limit, the possibilities for the most helpful measure might correspondingly be limited.

The Ambassador said that he understood fully the merits of the Secretary’s comments. On the other hand, London had its problems. Parliament was to convene on September 12 and the British Government would be asked what would be done in this critical situation. The Prime Minister would feel compelled to say something of a definite character. Perhaps a statement of the Government’s intentions regarding the UN would be helpful. Mr. Dixon had been asked to draft a letter for Makins to show to the Secretary which would report the situation to the Security Council without asking for specific action. The Ambassador showed a copy of the letter to the Secretary⁵ who made certain minor suggestions but thought the letter otherwise satisfactory.

At this point the Secretary showed the Ambassador a draft of the outline of his plan for a users association.⁶ Sir Roger said that he was tremendously impressed with the plan and stated he thought it would be extremely useful if he could have a paper to send to the British Government. He felt this would give to them a much more concrete idea of what the Secretary had in mind and might be very influential in connection with their consideration of measures to be taken.

The Secretary said he wished to work on the document further, but that on the following day (Sunday) he would give a copy to the Ambassador for transmittal to the British Government. He made it clear, however, that it should be considered to be an illustrative plan only and should not be regarded as a US Governmental document since he had not had an opportunity to discuss it with the other interested agencies.

While accompanying the Ambassador to his car, the Secretary mentioned his concern that the British had brought the French into discussions of the Canal users proposal. He pointed out that in giving his idea to Mr. Coulson he had said that he did not intend at this stage to take it up with the French. He understood, of course, the explanation which had been given that Mr. Lloyd had not understood this qualification which was set forth in the British Embassy’s telegram to the Foreign Office when he had raised the matter with Mr. Pineau. He also understood the British-French relationship in this whole affair, but said we were concerned about maintaining complete secrecy in connection with this matter. Ambassador Makins replied that he saw the Secretary’s point.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–856. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
2. Reference is to the tabs to Document 184. The draft letter to the Security Council is Message 4; the proposed Security Council resolution is Message 3.
3. Reference is to Dulles’ meeting with Coulson and Alphand on September 7 and the papers containing the U.S. response to Lloyd’s messages. See Document 188.
4. Presumably the message from Eisenhower to Eden, supra.
5. At 12:30 p.m. on September 10, Makins presented the draft letter to Dulles. See Document 206.
6. A subsequent draft of this outline is printed as Document 198.