Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

188. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹

Washington, September 7, 1956, 5:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• British and French Proposals on the Suez Question

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador-Designate
• Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy
• Mr. J. E. Coulson, Chargé, British Embassy
• Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Fraser Wilkins
• L—John M. Raymond
• IO—Francis O. Wilcox

The French Ambassador-Designate said that when the British Chargé had presented the British-French views that morning the French representative had been an observer and had not been able to make known French views. Mr. Alphand therefore wished to state the French position. The French were not, he said, especially in favor of a Security Council meeting. French public opinion would consider it an alibi to do nothing, a legalistic way of avoiding a solution. However, Selwyn Lloyd had spoken with Pineau in Paris. Pineau had accepted the idea because of the special arguments of British friends. Pineau had asked Alphand to ascertain U.S. views. Pineau wished to avoid any misunderstanding which might later cause bad feelings. The French wished U.S. views regarding two points: 1) Will the U.S. agree not to accept any formula which would be short of the Five-Power Proposal and 2) if a counter proposal were put forward from the other side by which it would try to limit our right to act, would we agree not to accept that counter proposal?

The Secretary said that if the Suez dispute were taken to the Security Council we would assume that it would include an effort to bring about an acceptance of the London proposals. We would not expect the Security Council to modify or depart from the London proposals by amendments, nor did we feel at all confident that the Security Council could be confined to seeking to impose the London proposals on Egypt. It was the primary function of the Security Council under Chapter VII to maintain and restore international peace and security. It would be difficult to contend that the only way to do so would be to require Egypt to accept these proposals. It would be difficult to exclude reference to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the renunciation of the use of force. Article 2 of the UN Charter was pertinent. Mr. Alphand had asked two questions which the Secretary wished to answer as follows: We would agree to stand by the London proposals but we could not guarantee the results. We would not want to be bound by developments we could not foresee.

Mr. Alphand interpreted the Secretary’s remarks to indicate that he accepted Alphand’s first point, but did not accept his second point. Mr. Coulson observed that it was this latter question that concerned the U.K. The Secretary suggested that if we went through the written paper which he had prepared, he would be able further to explain his views.

The Secretary commenced reading comments on Paper I …² “Recourse to Security Council”. He read the following paragraph (Tab A—page 2, paragraph 1):

“It would, we suppose, be very difficult to assure that a Security Council resolution would not call on the parties ‘to maintain international peace and security’ and to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force’, as this is a basic function of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.”

Mr. Alphand asked if the U.S. would vote for such a formula. The Secretary said that we would not want to feel bound to vote against it. We might want to abstain. Mr. Alphand said that his instructions were to ascertain the U.S. position on this point. Selwyn Lloyd had pointed out that “we are agreed not to countenance any resolution or wrecking amendment which would tend to limit our respective freedom of action in the last resort if Colonel Nasser continued to be obdurate”. (Tab G—“Recourse to the Security Council”—paragraph numbered 2)³ Mr. Wilcox pointed out that other portions of a resolution before the Security Council might be sufficiently favorable to justify acceptance even if there were limiting amendments.

Mr. Alphand said that they might want to proceed with the use of force where their vital interests were involved. Mr. Coulson observed that this was precisely what the U.K. wished to know. The Secretary thought his answer would be somewhat hypothetical. If the resolution called upon both Egypt and the parties, it might be satisfactory. He said that he would give further thought to the matter and would endeavor to be more precise. He observed, however, that we could not agree in advance to vote against a resolution which called upon the parties not to resort to force. Mr. Alphand observed that seven votes would be needed for the passage of the resolution. There was some discussion regarding adoption and rejection of resolutions in the Security Council.

The Secretary continued reading comments on Paper I. He read “We comment later on the formal resolution. We agree that it is preferable to delete the reference on passage of Israeli ships”. (Tab A, page 2, paragraph numbered 4)

Mr. Alphand said that France preferred to refer to the 1951 resolution.⁴ He noted that the USSR had abstained on this resolution at that time. Mr. Coulson said that the UK would accept it either way. The Secretary said that we did not feel very strongly about it. He believed, in general, that discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute might complicate discussions of the Suez dispute. He noted that there were some who did not strongly support Nasser but who were silent for the time being. If the Arab-Israeli dispute were now debated, these other Arabs would feel obliged to come forward. For this reason he thought it preferable to omit reference to the 1951 resolution. On technical ground he could see that it was juridically important. Mr. Alphand suggested that reference to the 1951 resolution might be made in speeches before the Council and not in the resolution itself. The Secretary and Mr. Coulson thought well of this suggestion.

The Secretary continued reading comments on Papers I, II, III and IV (Tabs A–D). He asked if the British and French had any precise formulation of how they proposed to handle the matter of transit dues (Tab D—Paper IV, page 2, paragraph 2). Mr. Coulson said that each country should have a separate account to which dues would be paid and which would be frozen. The Secretary saw complications in this suggestion. The pilots had been hired by the old company and also by the new Suez Board. They had been paid out of dues received. If dues were handled by each country there would be no funds for payment. Mr. Coulson said he hoped to have further instructions by the end of the present meeting.

The Secretary completed reading comments on Paper V (Tab E). The Secretary said that we may have acted hastily in responding to the British-French proposals, but because of the need for speed we had done the best we could.

Mr. Alphand referred again to the point regarding freedom of action as made by Pineau and Selwyn Lloyd. He said that if the U.S. response did not appear satisfactory he would be in further touch with the Secretary. He thought that the Secretary had spoken with wisdom and that a Security Council Resolution would be dangerous if it did not prove Egypt had violated the Charter. What, he asked, could be done? If we do not go to the Security Council, Egypt might do so. It was for this reason that France adopted the same position as his British colleagues.

The Secretary said that we had not as yet had an opportunity fully to explore the question of reference of the Suez dispute to the Security Council in the course of events as he anticipated them. The Secretary thought that the question might be put on the agenda but not brought up until a later date. He recalled that Quemoy and Matsu had been placed upon the agenda and had had priority but had not been subsequently discussed. The Secretary asked if the British and French had explored this possibility. It might represent a means of gaining some advantage by referring the Suez dispute to the Security Council before Egypt did.

Mr. Coulson said that unless the Secretary had further remarks he wished again to refer to the question of Canal dues. He had just received telegraphic instructions from London which he would like to read. Mr. Coulson then read the attached telegram (Tab F).⁵ The Secretary said that as he had remarked that morning, the question of Canal dues had two facets: 1) practical and 2) legal. He thought that denial of payment would probably lead to refusal to allow ships to pass through the Canal and to a period of economic stringency in the U.K. and Europe. The Secretary assumed that the British and the French were prepared to face these eventualities and without concerting with the U.S. Mr. Coulson said that the British were prepared to face these eventualities. They had been concerting with the U.S., although there had been no agreement. He thought that the materials resulting from these discussions would be available in a week’s time. The Secretary said this might well be the case but what to do about it was important. From the U.S. standpoint some pretty serious policy considerations would be involved. More domestic oil production would be necessary. Mr. Coulson noted that transport of oil was also a major matter. Mr. Alphand inquired who was on the Committee. Mr. Coulson said that it had not been meeting in Washington but in New York. Mr. Alphand observed that questions of finance and currency would arise. The Secretary again said that denial of payment of transit dues involves a decision to face up to practical economic problems.

The Secretary said that as to his second point he was not sure that he agreed with Mr. Coulson’s legal reasoning. He said that the maritime nations had the benefit of easement across Egypt in the form of the Suez Canal. Egypt would be entitled to be reimbursed for services. The maritime nations had a right to expect to take services from Egypt. We should try to place operation of the Canal on a cost basis. We ought not to acquiesce in Egypt’s taking over our rights. If Egypt did so and employed Soviet pilots, would we be willing to accept Soviet pilots on our ships? It is against this background that the Secretary was not sure he agreed with Mr. Coulson’s legal reasoning. He said that he would wish to study the question further.

Mr. Rountree observed that politically the British concept seemed to challenge Egyptian nationalization and for that reason the proposal was not desirable. The Secretary agreed and said that it seemed far-fetched to make an argument which would perpetuate the concession. Mr. Raymond added there were a number of legal questions involved. Mr. Alphand said that if the concession were broken, the Convention⁶ would be violated as well. He noted that Egypt had not published the preamble of the Convention. The Secretary thought that Article 14 of the Convention would be applicable, which said that engagements resulting from the present treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the acts of the concession. The Convention, he said, stood on its own feet.

Mr. Alphand asked when it would be desirable to refer the Suez dispute to the Security Council. Mr. Coulson replied that the British wished to make an announcement very soon.

The Secretary cautioned that the substance of today’s discussions was secret and requested that it be maintained.

Note: Following the discussion with the British and French this afternoon, the Secretary spoke with the President⁷ regarding the request made by the British Chargé and the French Ambassador-Designate for the U.S. attitude regarding amendments to a Security Council resolution containing the Five-Power Proposal on Suez. The British and French were particularly interested in an amendment which would call upon the parties not to resort to force. The Secretary authorized Mr. Rountree to inform the British and the French that further thought had been given to the question of amendments in the Security Council and that he would not like to go further than the statement made in Comments on Paper I, page 2, paragraph numbered (5) (Tab A). Mr. Rountree so informed the British Chargé and the French Ambassador-Designate late in the afternoon of September 7.

[Tab A]

September 7, 1956.

COMMENTS ON PAPER I—“RECOURSE TO SECURITY COUNCIL”⁸

(1) We did not intend to suggest Chapter VII action at the present time although we did point out difficulties in acting under Chapter VI. We are not sure that Egypt has as yet committed any action which would be held to be a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. We doubt whether this situation will develop until the parties to or beneficiaries of the Treaty of 1888 have agreed on the scope of their rights and given evidence of their intention to exercise them. At that point there may occur the action or threat of action on the part of Egypt which would bring the situation under Chapter VII.

(2) We welcome assurance that any recourse by you to the Security Council will be genuinely directed toward peaceful settlement.

We doubt that we could be confident that Security Council action would be limited to seeding to impose upon Egypt the 18-Power solution. This was frankly recognized to be an invitation to Egypt to make a new treaty. At the same time we recognized the right of Egypt not to make such a treaty. It seems to us that Security Council action should be designed to provide effectively for the rights contemplated by the 1888 Treaty, but it might not be possible to confine the action to the precise solution contemplated by the 18 powers which, as I say, was dependent upon Egypt’s voluntary acceptance thereof.

It would, we suppose, be very difficult to assure that a Security Council resolution would not call on the parties “to maintain international peace and security” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force”, as this is a basic function of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.

(3) We believe that the formulation of the item to be inscribed is adequate, although it does not clearly bring the item under Chapter VII. Superficially at least the item as formulated seems more the subject for Chapter VI.

(4) We comment later on the formal resolution. We agree that it is preferable to delete the reference on passage of Israeli ships.

(5) We do not now feel disposed to join with you and the French in calling for the meeting and/or sponsoring the resolution in the form submitted. While we would expect to support and not to modify the London plan, we would not want to feel bound in advance not to advocate a Resolution containing something besides this plan. (See (2) above.)

The function of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII is to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This is quite a different purpose from that of the London proposal which was an invitation to Egypt to make a new treaty in exercise of her sovereignty.

We doubt that it could plausibly be urged that Egyptian acceptance of the London proposal is the only formulation which permits of maintaining international peace and security.

It seems to us that the basis for Security Council action under Chapter VII is that certain nations possess rights of a vital character under the 1888 Treaty; but Egypt has taken or threatens action to interfere with those rights thus creating a threat to the peace.

It seems to us that the basis for Security Council action should be found in some existing treaty rights rather than upon Egyptian refusal to make a new treaty granting other rights than those now possessed.

[Tab B]

September 7, 1956

COMMENTS ON PAPER II—“TEXT OF DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION”⁹

We have reservations to the formal resolution which are indicated by our comment on the first Paper.¹⁰ We doubt that there is yet any adequate evidence of Egypt’s endangering the free and open passage of shipping through the Canal as laid down by the 1888 Convention. Egypt has consistently reaffirmed its purpose to abide by the 1888 Convention and while Egypt’s interpretation of that Convention doubtless differs from ours, the fact is that we do not yet have any agreed position as between ourselves as to what is the correct interpretation. Nor do we have any evidence so far that rights under that Treaty have been violated by Egypt, except as regards the ships and cargoes for Israel.

Also we do not see where the proposed resolution would get us, assuming it were passed. Of course, it may be justifiable to gamble that the Soviet Union will veto the resolution so that it will never pass. But we think it must also be considered where we would be if the Soviet Union does not exercise a veto power. The only operative paragraph is a request to the Government of Egypt to negotiate on the basis of the 18-Power proposal. If the resolution is passed, Egypt could conduct such a negotiation and prolong it and finally break it off and them we would be precisely where we are today.

Furthermore, the form of resolution leaves unanswered the question as to whom Egypt is supposed to negotiate with. Thus, Egypt in response to this request might call a conference of the 46 user nations for the purpose of the negotiation, as she has indicated a willingness to do.

[Tab C]

September 7, 1956

COMMENTS ON PAPER III¹¹

We do not, as of today, know whether the Egyptian Government has “refused to negotiate”.

We are not clear that a situation “which may” endanger the free and open passage of the Canal constitutes a threat to peace in the face of the repeated Egyptian Government affirmations of its intention not to interfere with the free and open passage of the ships. This again seems to us to emphasize the basic weakness of our position. So long as we do not specify what are our rights of the 1888 Treaty we cannot prove that Egypt threatens, or acts, to violate these rights.

The concluding sentence of the paper, which speaks about a “situation which, if allowed to continue, would constitute manifest danger to peace and security” closely paraphrases Article 33,¹² falling under Chapter VI and not Chapter VII.

We greatly doubt that a refusal to negotiate—which was in reality merely a refusal to accept—certain proposals, constitutes “a manifest danger to peace and security”.

[Tab D]

September 7, 1956.

COMMENTS ON PAPER IV¹³

We are, as you know, sympathetic to the idea of the principal users of the Canal agreeing upon their rights under the 1888 Treaty and taking concerted action to exercise their rights. This action, in our opinion, should comprehend the development of a uniform system for handling the dues to be paid by ships passing through the Canal. Also, we believe it should deal with the question of pilots and perhaps some other matters such as arranging the pattern of traffic and the system of signals and aids to navigation, perhaps also the dredging of the Canal. It seems to us that the Treaty of 1888 creates a sort of an international easement and that those entitled to benefit therefrom have the right, and perhaps the obligation, to maintain and operate their easement.

It does not seem to us that we should acquiesce in the exercise by Egypt of functions which are more properly those of users than of the sovereign through whose territory the easement passes. Obviously, all this would take time. Also, it might lead to a clash with Egypt which, while it would provide a clearer basis for Security Council action, would also entail major economic consequences.

I do not feel at all confident that we are prepared for those economic consequences. It may take as much time to make preparations for these as it will to achieve some program of concerted action by the users.

Have you any precise formulation of how you propose to handle the matter of transit dues?

[Tab E]

September 7, 1956.

COMMENTS ON PAPER V¹⁴

Our suggestion for a users agency is, we would say, an effort to implement the 1888 Treaty rather than to implement the London proposal of eighteen.

That proposal frankly sought a new treaty with Egypt. It gave Egypt rights and advantages which Egypt could not demand under the 1888 Treaty. On the other hand, the users would gain greatly by thus obtaining Egyptian cooperation.

It may not be practical in the long run to use the Canal without Egyptian cooperation, but it seems to us that since our basic rights flow from the 1888 Treaty, we should not assume that Egypt can and will nullify those rights or that there are no alternatives other than to accept Egyptian terms or to seek by force to impose our own.

It does not seem to us that it carries much conviction to say that we have rights under the 1888 Treaty unless we try in good faith and reasonably to use those rights. If we do try to use them and Egypt takes forcible action to prevent such use, then, and perhaps only then, will Egypt be an aggressor or guilty of a threat to peace.

Theoretically, of course, each nation having rights to use the Canal could attempt to use these rights without concerting its action with others. As a practical matter this would lead to confusion and breakdown of the Canal operation which could be attributed to the users rather than to Egypt. Therefore, we should act as though we had rights and, having them, concert for their effective use.

You speak of “future Egyptian membership”. We think of our proposal for a concert of users as a provisional arrangement and not a substitute in the long run for another arrangement which would involve Egyptian participation. But this, when it came about, would probably be something quite different than the interim user agency which might now be adopted as a makeshift.

As previously indicated, it is our thought that the user agency would be set up to perform functions broader than the mere collection of dues.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–756. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Tabs A–G are attached to the source text. Tabs A–E, printed below, are a series of papers containing the U.S. response to the messages delivered by Lloyd, Document 184. In composing their response, State Department officials treated Lloyd’s first message as an introductory statement. Hence, references to Paper I indicate Lloyd’s second message, etc. Tab F is a copy of the instructions received that day by the British Embassy from the Foreign Office; it is summarized in footnote 5 below. Tab G, identified as “Recourse to the Security Council”, is the message from Lloyd printed as Message 2 in Document 184.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. See footnote 1 above.
4. Reference is to the U.N. Security Council Resolution of September 1, 1951 (U.N. doc. 5/2322), which affirmed the right of shipping to and from Israel to transit the Suez Canal.
5. Not printed. This telegram instructed the British Embassy in Washington to communicate to the U.S. Government the following views of Her Majesty’s Government: Reports from Cairo indicated that Nasser was not prepared to negotiate on the basis of the 18-Power Proposals; and this rejection would constitute a major rebuff to the 18 Powers. In order to offset this and to prevent Nasser from stringing the 18 Powers along while he strengthened his hold over the Canal, the British Government considered it essential that as many governments as possible make clear publicly that Nasser would not be allowed to benefit from his act of unilateral expropriation. Therefore, the governments concerned should issue statements forthwith indicating that they did not recognize either the validity of the nationalization decree or the new canal authority and that they were taking steps to deny transit dues to the Egyptian Government and were advising their shipowners and charterers accordingly. The government confidently expected that the U.S. Government would act in this sense.
6. Reference is to the Convention of 1888.
7. See infra.
8. Secret. The reference to Paper I indicates Message 2 in Document 184.
9. Secret. The reference to Paper II indicates Message 3 in Document 184.
10. See Tab A above.
11. Secret. The reference to Paper III indicates Message 4 in Document 184.
12. See footnote 3, Document 148.
13. Secret. The reference to Paper IV indicates Message 5 in Document 184.
14. Secret. The reference to Paper V indicates Message 6 in Document 184.