Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

174. Annex to Watch Committee Report No. 318¹

SC 05194/56

Washington, September 5, 1956.

CONCLUSIONS ON BRITISH-FRENCH INTENTIONS TO EMPLOY FORCE AGAINST EGYPT

1. Military action by UK-French forces will almost certainly not be launched while discussions are under way in Cairo.

2. The UK and France are likely to launch military action against Egypt if they decide that their objectives are not obtainable within a reasonable time by negotiations or by other non-military means.

I.² In reaching its conclusions, The Watch Committee considered that:

A. British and French forces now in the Middle East are sufficient for an attack against the Suez Canal Zone, although additional ground forces would be required to seize and occupy more than the Canal area; such additional deployments could be accomplished in a short period of time.

B. The UK and France appear determined to attain their objectives vis-à-vis the Suez by one means or another; there is little likelihood that they will accept the humiliation of backing down.

C. British and French statements have provided strong indications of an intent to employ force if a satisfactory solution is not reached by negotiation.

D. Although it cannot be determined what time limit the British and French may set on negotiations, they have revealed a reluctance to permit discussions to be dragged out.

E. Any provocative act by Nasser could serve to precipitate hostilities.

F. The UK and France are apparently convinced that the USSR will not intervene directly and that indirect Soviet assistance to Egypt would be ineffective.

II. List of Possible Significant Indications Bearing on British and French Intentions to Employ Force Against Egypt

A. British and French Statements

1. A US Embassy, London, report that top British Government officials consider that Nasser cannot be persuaded to accept international operation of the Canal and that military action will be necessary.

2. An alleged statement by a British military attaché in Damascus that the British plan military occupation of the Suez Canal Zone should Nasser refuse to accept the terms of the five-nation committee.

3. Reports that the British Embassy in Cairo at a secret meeting hinted to British correspondents that resort to military action would be made in a short time.

4. Statements by Prime Minister Eden (a) implying that if the United Kingdom is to meet disaster as a result of a possible Soviet reaction to its policy on Suez, he preferred that such disaster come about as a result of British action rather than inaction; and (b) indicating that an appeal might be made to the Security Council, in expectation of a Soviet veto, prior to recourse to military action.

5. Reports that there is a growing feeling in France, and apparently unanimous sentiment in the French Cabinet, that the use of force may be necessary; also a firm belief in official French circles that the USSR would not intervene if the British and French used force.

6. A statement by the French Army Attaché in Cairo that the British and French are bent on getting rid of Nasser and will use all pressures possible to force him to accept the full British and French position; also a report that France would be prepared for military action by 10 September and that there will be no crisis before 15 September.

7. An expressed belief by French officials that France would have less trouble in Algeria if Nasser were removed.

8. A statement by a British official to a reliable American source that British timing concerning possible joint British and French military action against Egypt had not been set, and would not be, pending the outcome of the negotiations in Cairo.

B. Military Preparations

1. British

a. Alert of British Armed Forces for emergency operations in the Middle East.

b. Authorization to call up all organized reserves, numbering more than 500,000.

c. Operational plans including preparations for amphibious assaults known to be under way in the British War Office in early August.

d. Recent rehearsals by two British parachute battalions of the 16th Airborne Brigade now in Cyprus for a special drop in the Suez Canal area along with French paratroopers; the readiness of the British 16th Airborne Brigade for immediate operations; and the appointment of Lt General Sir Hugh Stockwell to command operations against the Suez Canal.

e. Movement of 8,100 British troops to Malta and Cyprus between 1 August and 5 September. Forces available in the Mediterranean for employment in Egypt now total 25,000 troops.

f. The completion of equipment loading of the British 3d Infantry Division in England which is reportedly being held there pending the outcome of the five-nation committee negotiations with Nasser.

g. The reported alerting of the British 2d Infantry Division in Germany for the apparent replacement of the 3d Infantry Division in the UK but possibly for use in the Middle East.

h. Reinforcement of the British Mediterranean Fleet, particularly in landing craft and minesweepers.

i. Augmentation of land-based aircraft strengths in the Mediterranean area to 149 fighters, 40 jet light bombers and possibly 16 jet medium bombers.

j. Increase of British naval aircraft strength in the Mediterranean to at least 70 fighters.

k. Reported scheduling for Mediterranean deployment of other land-based fighter and light bomber units and one more carrier with 28 fighter aircraft.

l. Authorization for extension of expiring enlistments in British naval and ground units.

2. French

a. Assembly of major elements of the French Mediterranean Fleet at Toulon for possible employment in the Mediterranean area.

b. Establishment of the French Air Force Middle East Command and the reported departure of some elements from their bases in France.

c. The reported arrival in Cyprus about 30 August of the advance party of French Army units which will total about 12,500 men consisting of the 7th Rapid Mechanized Division and the 10th Airborne Division, actually estimated to be a regimental combat team.

d. The reported presence at Algiers on 24 August of a French planning staff for Suez operations under command of Maj General Beaufre.

e. French notification to NATO that some French units committed to NATO may be withdrawn because of the Suez crisis.

C. Other Indications

1. An unconfirmed report that the British are planning the overthrow of Nasser and the capture of Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal Zone, regardless of the outcome of the London Conference.

2. Evacuation of British and French nationals from Egypt and reported plans to evacuate British nationals from Syria and Jordan.

3. Reported French Government concern over the problem of its available foreign exchange in the event that the Suez Canal is closed and the oil pipelines cease to operate.

1. Source: CIA Files. Top Secret; Noforn; Limited Distribution. The Watch Committee was composed of senior representatives from the Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Joint Intelligence Group, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was chaired by the Deputy Director of the CIA and met regularly on Wednesday of each week as well as being on call for emergency sessions. Its mission was to provide the United States Government with the earliest possible warning of hostile action on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies. The Watch Committee analyzed and evaluated information and intelligence, furnished by agencies represented on the IAC, relating to the imminence of hostilities and developed conclusions concerning Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities and other developments susceptible to direct exploitation by Communist countries that would jeopardize the security of the United States. A more detailed description of the Watch Committee is in CA–7918, May 14, 1955; Department of State, Central Files, 101.2/5–1455.

   This is the first of several annexes dealing with the Suez Canal situation attached to the regular Watch Committee Report.

2. The Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, considers that this section should be deleted because it goes beyond the task assigned by the IAC to the Watch Committee. [Footnote in the source text.]