Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

173. Report Prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State¹

Summary No. 2

Washington, September 5, 1956.

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SUEZ SITUATION

Cairo Negotiations

The Committee’s third session with Nasser took place on Tuesday evening² with Nasser replying to Menzies’ presentation of the previous day. He said that Egypt’s sole international obligation with regard to the canal was the Convention of 1888 which Egypt had not violated and to which it continued to adhere. Egypt had only exercised its sovereign rights in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.

He stressed that, in making arrangements for cooperation between Egypt and other nations in operating, maintaining and developing the canal, there was a distinct difference between cooperation and domination. The proposals he had heard envisaged the seizure of the canal by an international board, which would certainly be considered by the Egyptian people as “collective colonialism in regulated form”. Nasser indicated that an institutional arrangement such as that of the International Bank, to which Menzies had referred, would be unacceptable.

He turned to the phrase “insulation of operation of the canal from the influence of politics of any nation.” He said that it was impossible to disassociate the canal from Egyptian politics, flowing as it does through Egyptian territory and employing Egyptian nationals.

An international board could not safeguard the canal, said Nasser. It was not the intention of Egypt to close the canal to the traffic of any country. Nevertheless, if she should decide to do so, no institution of the type suggested could stop her; nor could any Egyptian Government give the canal its necessary protection if the control of the canal were taken out of her hands.

When Nasser finished, Menzies reiterated the intention of the 18-nations to find a friendly solution which would be satisfactory to the Egyptian people and to their own people. However, the canal represented a life line to many people. In particular, the people of Great Britain and France considered the Egyptian action as a dangerous threat to their welfare.

Nasser commented here with asperity: if Menzies was trying to convey the idea that rejection of these proposals would lead to trouble, he was quite prepared to let it come at once. Egypt would not give up its sovereignty because it feared trouble. Menzies replied that Nasser had misinterpreted his meaning; he certainly did not intend to make direct or implied threats; he was trying to point out that the international tension would continue to exist until satisfactory arrangements for the future of the canal could be concluded.

Alternative Solutions

In the event of Nasser’s rejection of the 18-nation proposal, we question the value of bringing the matter before the Security Council. However, the British are considering this as an “exercise” which must be gone through before more drastic measures are undertaken. We believe that, if the matter is brought to the SC, it must be for the purpose of sincerely seeking a peaceful solution, but we recognize that a resolution meeting the minimum demands of the canal users is not likely to be adopted by the SC because of the Soviet veto. Further, incidents in the canal would probably precipitate a showdown while the matter was under consideration in the SC.

(Nevertheless, Hammarskjold told our UN delegation yesterday,³ and is so informing Selwyn Lloyd, that he will feel himself obliged to bring the matter to the SC under Article 99 if the Cairo negotiations are unsuccessful and if the parties to the negotiations fail to bring the matter before the SC under Article 37.)

We have told Henderson⁴ that, if Nasser rejects the 18-nation proposal, we should concentrate more upon the guarantees provided by the 1888 treaty and the measures which users of the canal might legally and morally take to assure that the rights so guaranteed are not impaired. We know of no way to impose a new canal treaty on Egypt. However, the guarantees of the 1888 treaty constitute a perpetual easement for the free use of the canal, and insistence on this right to use the canal places us on the best possible ground. For the users of the canal to exercise their guaranteed rights by forming an “international shipping control association” is in no way dependent upon Egyptian consent, nor is it inconsistent with the 1888 Convention.

Evacuation Plans

Embassy Amman reports⁵ that the drift of British nationals from Jordan, Syria and Egypt, coupled with the continuing British and French military buildup, is causing growing bitterness among Jordanians—who question the necessity of such preparations if the UK is sincerely trying to reach an agreement in Cairo. Both Jordanians and Europeans have commented that the fact that all Americans are remaining has had a reassuring influence and has strengthened the belief in the sincerity of US efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement. Henderson says⁶ he is unable to comment on the question of safety of Americans in the area until the course of the Cairo discussions becomes clearer.

Canal Pilots

Embassies London and Paris have been instructed⁷ to raise urgently with the UK and French Governments a report that the Suez Canal Company plans to encourage pilots to serve notice today that they are leaving within 24 hours. Such a move would obviously seriously prejudice the Cairo talks. If the report is true, we hope the UK and French Governments will seek to persuade the Company not to take this step. Meanwhile, Embassy Cairo reports⁸ that, although European pilots have never been treated more solicitously, they are working extremely long hours and their morale is low.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret; Eyes Only for Designated Recipient. At the top of the source text Eisenhower wrote: “File/D”.
2. This session began at 7 p.m. in Cairo, September 5. Henderson’s report is in telegram 596 from Cairo, September 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/9–556)
3. Hammarskjöld met with Lodge and other members of the U.S. Delegation during the morning of September 4 in New York.
4. See telegram 640, Document 170.
5. In telegram 174 from Amman, September 4, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–456)
6. In telegram 578 from Cairo, September 4, not printed. (Ibid., 974.7301/9–456)
7. In telegram 1628 to London, September 4, also sent to Paris as telegram 845, not printed. (Ibid.)
8. In telegram 592 from Cairo, September 4, not printed. This telegram also reported that the morale of the American community in the region was good, that there was no backlog of ships awaiting canal clearance, that no action had yet been taken to ensure compliance with the new order requiring toll payments in Egyptian currency, and that it was generally expected in the region that force would be used if the talks failed. (Ibid.)