Office of the Historian

392. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)1

Washington, June 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • F–86’s for Israel

The Israeli Ambassador talked to the Secretary about F–86’s last Friday.2 The Secretary said he would raise this subject with Pearson on Monday.3 The new Israeli Counselor4 called me this morning asking if I had anything to tell him. I told him I had no information but would call him later today.

I have checked with Douglas MacArthur and find that only Burke Elbrick was present when the Secretary discussed F–86’s with Mr. Pearson.5 Burke Elbrick tells me that Mr. Pearson said the Canadian Cabinet had gone into the matter on several occasions and had decided to take no action for the present. The Cabinet thought it would be unwise at this time because the Security Council Resolution on Hammarskjold’s report was then pending6 and because it was a highly controversial subject. Furthermore, the Canadians had been subject to pressure from the Arabs as well as from the Israelis.

Mr. Pearson also said that he wished to talk with General Burns not because he was a Canadian, but because he was the UNTS. Mr. Pearson thought Egypt was not arming to attack Israel, but in order to strengthen its standing in the Arab world.

The Secretary said the U.S. did not wish to confront the Soviet Union in the Near East through U.S. support for Israel, while the Soviet Union supported the Arabs. Some pressure had been brought to bear upon the Government to supply arms to Israel, but the Administration had decided not to act. It was, however, prepared to intervene in the event of an emergency, and, for this purpose, was carrying equipment in the area which would be supplied to the victims of aggression. The Secretary suggested that if there was a [Page 724] delay by Canada in supplying F–86’s, it might be possible to provide Israel with pilot and maintenance training for Israeli personnel.

Mr. Pearson reacted favorably to this suggestion and said he would look into it and present it to the Canadian Prime Minister. Canada would not be able to take any action with respect to F–86’s until Mr. Pearson returned from Europe in July.

There was additional discussion regarding the recent Security Council Resolution and Egyptian acquisition of submarines from the Soviet Bloc. Burke Elbrick is sending down a copy of the memorandum of conversation as soon as it is ready.7

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/6–1256. Confidential.↩
  2. The memorandum of conversation, June 8, is not printed. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)↩
  3. June 11↩
  4. Zev Argaman.↩
  5. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)↩
  6. See Document 376.↩
  7. Eban discussed the results of Secretary Dulles’ meeting with Murphy on June 14:

    “Ambassador Eban added that if these efforts should be negative, the question would arise regarding alternative sources of supply. There were only two other sources: the U.S. and Italy. If the U.S. was not in a position to sell F–86 aircraft, he hoped that they could be obtained from Italy. Mr. Murphy made no commitment regarding alternative sources of supply.” (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins, June 14; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/6–1456)

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