Office of the Historian

388. Memorandum to the File, by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell)1

Washington, June 5, 1956.

The Israel Government is, and will with increasing insistence, be pressing us for a formulation of our position with respect to the diversion at Banat Ya’qub. There has been discussion between the Secretary and the Under Secretary and Eban about a possible tie–in between that question and the IG application to the Export–Import Bank for a $75 million loan. As a result of discussions with Ambassador Johnston and as a result of careful consideration of the various factors involved, the following is suggested as a position which we should take:

1.
It would not be desirable to tie–in the Export–Import Bank loan with an agreement between the U.S. and the IG on the commencement of work at Banat Ya’qub. The Export–Import Bank loan should be considered on its own merits.
2.
The United States should not give a specific commitment to the IG that it will, at any given time, give any formal support to the IG in the commencement of work at Banat Ya’qub. The furthest step we should go in this respect is to point out to the IG that we have for several years now been giving the greatest possible amount of support to progress in the cooperative utilization of the waters of the Jordan River. This will continue to be a primary objective. There are several reasons why we cannot be more formal or more specific. One is that the United States cannot appropriately assert the right to make a decision on this question which is partly one of international law between Israel and the Arab states and is partly one of which UNTSO and the Security Council are concerned. Another reason is that Israel’s policy of raids such as that at Galilee on December 11, 1955, just before the meeting of the Arab League Council that was going to deal with the Johnston Plan, makes it impossible for us to say ahead of time whether the political conditions at any particular time would be such that we could afford to give our support to a particular IG position. Nor is it feasible to attempt to work out in specific detail any agreement with respect to such raids even if the IG were willing to make commitments as other political or military action might be equally preventive of U.S. support.
3.
Our position, therefore, should be that:
a.
The Export–Import Bank loan should be decided on its merits;
b.
We believe that the IG should show restraint with respect to construction at Banat Ya’qub, not continually threatening to commence construction and keep tension at a high pitch, proceed with [Page 717] other necessary construction first and cooperate with UNTSO and the Security Council; and,
c.
We will continue to give such support as we believe desirable under all the circumstances to steps that will further the use of the Jordan waters, both by Israel and the Arab states.

  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega–Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956. Secret.↩