Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹

Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US–UK Interests and Objectives in the Middle East in Light of the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • NEA—Messrs Allen and Rountree
  • S/P—Mr. Bowie
  • S/P—Mr. Mathews
  • EUR—Mr. Merchant
  • NE—Mr. Byroade
  • S—Mr. Russell
  • AF—Mr. Cyr
  • GTI—Mr. Baxter
  • SOA—Mr. Jones
  • NE—Mr. Wilkins
  • NE—Mr. Geren
  • NEA—Mr. Dixon
  • DRN—Mr. Ogburn
  • EUR—Mr. Evan Wilson
  • EUR—Mr. Lister
  • E/E—Mr. Blake
• UK
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. Geoffrey Arthur (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. Ian Samuel (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. Willian Barker (UK Embassy)
  • Mr. Willie Morris (UK Embassy)

Friday Afternoon, January 13, 1956

Mr. Allen welcomed Mr. Merchant to the afternoon session and suggested that the meeting begin with consideration of Soviet penetration in the area. In our view the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviets constitutes a dramatic point in this subject. Our present point of view is that while we do not plan to engage the Communists on each one of their offers, we do recognize Communist competition as a fact of life. Our policy on the Aswan Dam is to go ahead very much as before with changes in tempo rather than content. If we should say to the Egyptians that we will not consider any enterprise for which the Russians are bidding, then the Russians would have an easy weapon with which to drive us away from any project. We are not prepared, however, to change our policy in its fundamental principles. For example, we are not prepared to give up our policy of competitive bidding merely because it would be easier to meet Soviet competition in [by] doing so.

Mr. Allen said the U.S. is worried by reports of Communist and subversive activities in Kuwait and asked for the British estimate.

Mr. Samuel replied the British believe the Communists use Kuwait as a “convalescent home” and distribution center for Communism, but not as a place to hatch plots. There is no immediate threat because the economic situation does not provide a fertile field for Communism.

Mr. Shuckburgh promised a fuller answer for Monday.

Mr. Byroade said that from his perspective in Cairo a definite pattern of attempted Communist penetration could be observed, starting long before the consummation of the arms deal, and perhaps employing the Geneva spirit as an occasion. The Communist penetration is taking political and economic rather than military forms. It seems the Communist policy aims to make economic satellites of certain countries. In the case of Egypt, the U.S.S.R made economic approaches first and later consummated the arms transaction taking advantage of such developments as the Israeli attack on Egypt on February 28, 1955, and the formation of the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh said this accords with the British analysis, but such action required a prior Russian decision to back the Arabs. He regards the arms transaction as a function of this decision. The Communists are anxious for as many ways as possible to curry Arab favor and will exploit all their opportunities.

Mr. Allen made a distinction between the British and American positions in respect of the point at which the Soviets choose to attack. In the case of the U.S. the Soviets seize on American support for Israel and picture themselves as allies for the Arabs against Israel and Israel’s masters. In the British case, the Soviets attack the established position of the British as evidence of imperialism and colonialism.

Mr. Shuckburgh objected that the British have no “position” in the area, in the Russian sense. The thing that brings down the Russian ire is not a special British position in the area in terms of colonialism, but instead an attempt by Britain to line up the area for the West.

Mr. Bowie confirmed that the Russians are everywhere making much of the claim: “the West is trying to control you, but Russia leaves you to make your own decision for freedom and independence.”

Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that the British position in the Persian Gulf is very good. The British are there because they have been invited.

Mr. Bowie granted that this position might be good, but contended it can be exploited.

Mr. Shuckburgh explained that the British position in Jordan is different from that in the Persian Gulf. For Britain to station British officers in Jordan and to spend money for the Arab Legion does not help Britain particularly but does serve to keep Jordan independent. He granted that the British tie with Jordan had some significance in getting Jordan committed to the Baghdad Pact. He added in response to Mr. Allen’s earlier description of the U.S. connection with Israel that Britain is just as committed to Israel as the U.S. is. Further, Britain does not wish to suffer any less defamation than does the U.S. because of Israel.

Mr. Allen granted that British and Americans are tarred with the same brush on the Pact question. If we decide that our Pact policy causes more damage than benefits, we will have to take another look at it.

Mr. Shuckburgh said Britain cannot possibly back out of the Pact. The British favor discussing the question in terms of developing the Pact.

Mr. Allen agreed that the U.S. has no intention of pulling the rug from under the Pact countries. By “taking another look at the Pact question” he had meant an examination of all the possibilities.

Mr. Shuckburgh emphasized in particular the British conviction that going back on the Pact would not make the Russians any nicer to us. The Baghdad Pact had become a reality. It is necessary and good. It is not necessary (a) to solicit new members or (b) to build up a great military force. The British would now like to build up its political significance.

Mr. Bowie stated that the real question is whether to take the view that the Baghdad Pact has now served its purpose as a useful military warning against Communist aggression.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the Pact can become a means of coordinating development among the member countries of combatting subversion and conceivably of mutual technical assistance. The Baghdad Pact cannot practically be converted into a customs union. In replying to Mr. Bowie’s question, Mr. Shuckburgh said that that Baghdad countries have shown a real interest in anti-subversion problems.

Mr. Bowie asked whether the acceptance of Soviet arms had exposed Egypt to intensified Communist subversion.

Mr. Byroade replied that the Egyptians had probably been naive in this regard but that internal security is basically good in Egypt. The regime will do a good job internally except for trade with the Communists which will be continued. The regime will not permit the distribution of Communist literature, but it must recognize the gratitude which many Egyptians feel to the U.S.S.R. for the arms. What Nasser wants is independence from the Russians, the British, the U.S. and everybody else.

Mr. Shuckburgh then asked whether dealing with Nasser would exact any of the following prices: (1) Would it require us to give up the Baghdad Pact?; (2) Would we have to agree there would be no additional accessions to the Pact?; (3) Must the British give up Jordan?; (4) Have we got to turn Libya over to Nasser?; (5) Must we abandon the Sudan to Nasser?; (6) Must we pay him more than we can afford on the Aswan Dam?

Mr. Allen added another question. Will Nasser’s demand on the U.S. be no arms to Israel?

Mr. Byroade answered Mr. Allen’s question affirmatively. To Mr. Shuckburgh’s questions, he replied we would not have to do all the things enumerated, but it is clear that Nasser’s price has gone up on Jordan. Nasser told Mr. Byroade that Britain in regard to Jordan was like a man who had a watch safely in one pocket and in trying to transfer it to the other pocket, lost it. Mr. Byroade believes that Nasser will not require anything of the Sudan except an agreement on the Nile Waters.

Mr. Allen asked how strong an influence the British officers are in the Arab Legion.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the British training and financial support make a decent Arab army of the Arab Legion and protect Jordan against Israel. The British would not suffer if they got out of the Arab Legion, but on the other hand they do not wish to hand the Legion and Jordan over to the Egyptians.

Mr. Arthur said that the effect of such a hand-over would be disastrous in Iraq.

Mr. Allen asked for the British estimate of Soviet economic intentions in the area.

Mr. Arthur replied that the Russians are not on an all-out export drive, but have selected certain economic targets for political ends.

Mr. Byroade and Mr. Arthur pointed out the facility which payment in cotton provides both Egyptians and Russians. The Russians need the cotton and the Egyptians have a surplus of it to sell.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that the West should not attempt to counter block every Soviet attempt. Indeed, it might be well to let the Russians and the Arabs fall heir to certain of the friction which might arise from their working on projects together.

Mr. Allen conceded that this possibility might be worth pursuing.

Mr. Bowie said that one of the benefits from our own technical assistance programs was to get our people into foreign countries. If we wish the Russians and foreigners exposed to the friction of working together, this would require the Russians getting a number of their people into these countries, which is not in our interest.

Mr. Allen doubted if there was any project which would increase Communist activity in the area to which we are willing to say: “O.K., let them do it.”

Mr. Byroade quoted Clare Booth Luce as holding the theory: anything the Russians can do we can do better; therefore, on any project invite the Russians to do 40% and we will do the 60%.

Mr. Samuel said we must recognize the extent to which Moslem engineers might be used by the Russians. We cannot really count on frictions between Russia and others except those which proceed from the fact that the Russians are hard traders.

Mr. Blake said that in Afghanistan the Russians have made the most of their opportunities in economic assistance. They sent Moslem technicians who prayed faithfully with the Afghanis. Where any friction developed, the Russians rapidly pulled back. It is doubtful if the Russians are less competent in the psychology of technical assistance than we are.

Mr. Allen said that the Western offer of aid on the Aswan Dam is going to be an invitation for many countries to come in with their requests. Some may employ a variation of the Egyptian pattern of flirting with the Communists.

Mr. Bowie inquired what is the criterion for our aid? On whom do we wish to make an impact?

Mr. Shuckburgh said we must keep the Russians from getting contacts that enable them to run the country.

Mr. Allen recounted that the Ceylonese, Libyans, Iranians and others had come to us with great complaints after the word of our possible assistance for the Aswan Dam became public.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the British had complaints from the Iranians, but an understanding attitude from Nuri Said in Iraq.

Mr. Allen said there had been little public objection to the Aswan Dam in the U.S., notably none from the Zionists.

Mr. Shuckburgh made the point that the Egyptians are highly unpopular in the U.K. since so many British have had experience of the Egyptians in the Canal Zone and in the country generally. When Mr. Allen pointed out that the Zionist groups are not so influential in Britain as in the U.S., Mr. Shuckburgh remonstrated mildly.

Mr. Allen remarked that the proposal to commit the U.S. Government for a long term aid program in an election year might give difficulty.

Mr. Russell inquired what we can do to counter the Soviet policy of going through the area and picking out the political issues like Kashmir and Palestine for destructive exploitation.

Mr. Allen said such action fits in with the Russian policy of exacerbating rather than solving tensions. The Russians are not bound to a responsible practice of diplomacy. Mr. Allen inquired whether the British thought there was any possibility that the Israelis might turn towards the Soviets.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied negatively.

Mr. Bowie pointed out that the Russians had not slammed the door on Israel, but are asking Israel to cut itself off from the West if Russian assistance is desired.

Mr. Byroade and Mr. Shuckburgh agreed that until we get over the crisis of confidence in the Arab world, nothing we do for the Arabs is likely to please them.

Mr. Bowie inquired whether the hatred of Israel really dominates the Arab mind, or whether this results from exploitation by Arab leaders.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Allen [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pointed to the problem of the U.S. base in Dhahran and the Buraimi question. From a certain point of view, the existence of Israel is a benefit in dealing with certain Arab questions. For example, it was fortunate during the recent riots in Jordan that there was no common border between Jordan and Egypt.

Mr. Shuckburgh [1½ lines of source text not declassified] reiterated that the British do not think of Jordan as a colony.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the British are in Jordan because the Arab Legion provides a cheap division for the West and to prevent a vacuum there.

Mr. Allen suggested that if Britain should leave Jordan, probably the Iraqis are the ones to take over. He inquired whether it would help us to say to Nasser that we do not object to Jordan joining the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact.

Mr. Arthur said this would be no inducement to Nasser.

Mr. Byroade agreed.

After the reading of the several telegrams depicting new violence in Jordan, the British delegates said it had been decided that if additional troops must be sent to Jordan, they should be British rather than Iraqi.

The afternoon meeting was adjourned shortly after 5:00 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.