Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• US–UK Interests and Objectives in the Middle East in Light of the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area

PARTICIPANTS:

• US
  • NEA—Messrs. Allen and Rountree
  • S/P—Mr. Bowie-Mr. Mathews
  • EUR—Mr. Merchant
  • NEA—Mr. Byroade
  • S—Mr. Russell
  • AF—Mr. Cyr
  • GTI—Mr. Baxter
  • SOA—Mr. Jones
  • NE—Mr. Wilkins
  • NE—Mr. Geren
  • NEA—Mr. Dixon
  • DRN—Mr. Ogburn
  • EUR—Mr. Evan Wilson
  • EUR—Mr. Lister
  • E/E—Mr. Blake
• UK
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. Geoffrey Arthur (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. Ian Samuel (UK Foreign Office)
  • Mr. J. E. Coulson (UK Embassy
  • Mr. William Barker (UK Embassy)
  • Mr. Willie Morris (UK Embassy)

Friday, January 13, 1956

Mr. Allen welcomed Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues to the State Department, signaled the particular importance of the talks for which they had come, expressed the confidence that the conversations which are preparatory to the talks of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, would be friendly and frank, and invited Mr. Shuckburgh to lead off with a description of the overall situation.²

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the problems the U.S. and Britain face in the Middle East are insoluble unless the two countries have a similar policy. He recalled that British Chiefs of Mission in the area had been recently summoned to London and had worked out a set of conclusions more practical than philosophical. He would begin by passing on to the group some of these conclusions.

Mr. Shuckburgh turned to a review of the findings of the British Chiefs of Mission. He said that they had concluded it is impossible to have a fixed policy applying to the whole area. Rather the best policy lies in knowing where to yield and where not to yield. It is a policy of finding the best course between extremes, a course between getting every country in the area to commit itself to joint defense arrangements with us and the opposite extreme of complete neutralism in the area. It lies between defending our acquired positions and not dividing the Arabs. In certain respects the policy forces a choice between the rival parties Iraq and Egypt. Where we run up against Arab opposition, a policy of withdrawal is not automatically indicated. Withdrawal creates vacuums and it also prejudices our position in a part of the world where strength and consistency count for a great deal. We ought not set ourselves up against the mainstream of the emotions of the area. Our real objective is to secure the right of the West to extract and use the oil of the region. The British have troops in Jordan not because they derive some psychological benefit from having troops there, but because they believe the British effort in Jordan contributes to the security of the oil for the West. We can only get the oil by the willing cooperation of the Arabs. In search of ways to secure this objective we should avoid running against Arab passions.

Mr. Shuckburgh then undertook to state some specific objectives mentioning that he was not bothering to take special account of the Palestine question since all are agreed that solution there would be the greatest single gain which could be made. Leaving this aside, he set forth as a basic objective the continued support of the Baghdad Pact powers. Regardless of the origins of the Pact, we cannot let the Pact countries down. We must send high-level representatives to Pact meetings, must put substance into its force and protocols, must give it prestige.

Mr. Allen said he did not know that he could agree to Mr. Shuckburgh’s proposition that the basic objective in the area is to preserve Western access to its oil. We would wish to consider this point further.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed to discussion of this point at a later time, and returned to means of support for the Baghdad Pact countries. He said we should pay special attention to the economic and political aspects of the Baghdad Pact. The British Ambassadors had for a time considered the possibility of having non-members of the Pact participate in its economic functions, but later gave up this objective. The Ambassadors had also considered the question of new members for the Pact. It had been clear from meetings in Baghdad that the Iraqis wanted another Arab State in the Pact. The British thought of Jordan for three reasons: (1) The strong desire of King Hussein to re-write the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. A similar desire in Iraq had been accommodated by association with the Baghdad Pact. (2) The request of the Jordanians for more money and more arms in the current year. The British were not keen to grant more arms and money unless some benefit could be proved. Association with the Pact seemed to be such a benefit. (3) Things were slipping in Jordan, particularly along the line of Egyptian, Saudi interference and the British felt something positive must be done. Templer’s visit went well for a time. The Jordanians never said that the proffered aid was not enough. Then the four Palestinian ministers resigned, holding that no amount of assistance from Britain could make the decision of adherence to the Pact at that time politically palatable. The ensuing riots and demonstrations proved that the Palestinian refugees have been infused with Communism and Saudi-Egyptian anti-Western propaganda beyond what most observers had expected. Therefore the British do not altogether criticize themselves for precipitating in Jordan the question of joining the Pact. At least something has been found out concerning the extent of penetration by Communist, Saudi and Egyptian agents. The young King’s behavior in the crisis has gratified the British. He has been courageous and has not backed down. However, the British do not hope to get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact at any time soon. For the immediate future the Pact will be played down in Jordan. The present Jordan Government have given notice that they will join no pacts. The British hope to stabilize the situation, to repair the damage done to their position, though it must be recognized that the damage is not at the top, but rather with the Palestine section of the public. By all means, nothing should be done to betray the young King. The British are convinced that the disturbances in Jordan were in large part owed to the Egyptians. Mr. Trevelyan, British Ambassador in Cairo, says that Nasser never acts against the West, but only reacts when he conceives the West to be acting against him. In view of the present British attitude regarding Jordan’s association with the Pact, Nasser should now call off his activities in Jordan. The British do not plan to go to him and beg him to call off such activity, but rather take the position that the logic of his own position requires him to stop fighting Jordanian association with the Pact, since the Jordanians have no present intention of moving in that direction.

Mr. Allen expressed thanks for Mr. Shuckburgh’s analysis and regretted a recent news report that American officials had criticized British action in attempting to get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Events of the kind in Jordan have hurt us as they have the British. Our window lights sometimes get broken in the reaction to a British initiative. In fact, the recent rioting in Jerusalem chose American rather than British institutions as the prime target. He then compared the Iranian and Jordanian situations with respect to their identification with the Baghdad Pact. In each country there was one pre-eminent person in favor of association: in Iran the Shah, in Jordan the King. In Iran, however, no visitor came from outside to persuade the Iranians to adhere. The Shah himself went before the Majlis and said that Iran should join out of its own interest and sit down as an equal with Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. Mr. Allen recognized that the King of Jordan does not have the position of the Shah in Iran. Nevertheless, it is possible to appropriate from this experience the principle that indigenous forces make stronger arguments for identification with the Baghdad Pact than visiting statesmen. The official American position in this matter is very close to that of the U.K. We do not wish to pull the rug out from under Baghdad Pact countries by saying publicly we do not favor additional adherents to the Pact. For the present we are not urging anybody to join. The Secretary of State believes that the Pact should remain for the time being with the present adherents. We do not rule out our own eventual adherence, but for the following reasons we would not adhere at present: (1) Some elements in the U.S., certain Congressmen in particular, believe that adherence is undesirable from the point of view of our relations with Soviet Russia. So long as we donot adhere, the U.S.S.R. can maneuver to keep us out. Once we are in, the U.S.S.R. is able to make the argument that it is finally bottled up from all sides by Pacts and has the right to react with hostility. Mr. Allen granted that this argument was not persuasive to him. (2) If the U.S. enters the Baghdad Pact, we would involve ourselves in intra-area politics. Britain has been able to join the Pact without upsetting Egypt unduly, but it is doubtful if the U.S. can join without a complete upset of the Egyptians. (3) The Arab-Israeli situation constitutes an argument against immediate American adherence. The Israelis are pressing us for a security guarantee, pointing out that Britain guarantees Jordan, various other states are guaranteed in one way or another, leaving Israel alone with no guarantee. Should the U.S. adhere to the Pact, the hue and cry on this score might become unbearable.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that he was impressed by the third point, but not by the first. He cited Syria as a country whose recent leftist leanings were not modified by the refusal of the U.S. to adhere. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would not be deterred by the first argument from assisting the countries which have joined the Pact.

Mr. Allen requested the British appraisal of the situation in Iraq.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that things are going well in Iraq, that Nuri Said is having no special troubles and that British observers see no signs that the Iraqis are restive over Iraq’s adherence to the Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh noted that the Iraqis have somewhat different views from the other Arabs on the specific question of the Russian threat. Iraqis believe that by virtue of their geographical position they are immediately exposed along with Turkey and Iran. Their association with the Pact has had a broader basis than a whim of Nuri’s.

Ambassador Byroade said that Nasser in Egypt does not recognize Iraq’s association with the Pact as representative of anybody but Nuri and the government of Iraq.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he must smile at the dictator Nasser giving estimates of what is representative of the people. He would not attempt to say what might happen in Iraq should Nuri die, but for the present the British see no restiveness there.

Mr. Allen recounted that Fadhil Jamali had criticized the Iraqi government in his hearing for its slowness in economic development and on some other points, but he had shown the same enthusiasm for the Pact as had Nuri Said.

Mr. Shuckburgh admitted that things could go wrong in Iraq should the Iraqis find themselves isolated and without support.

Mr. Allen asked for an assessment of Iraq’s claim to leadership in the Arab world.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the Iraqis are not presently occupied with a contest for leadership. Iraq’s hope lies in the future. They want to get on with their economic development. After that they can be real contenders for Arab leadership.

Mr. Allen asked Mr. Byroade what he thought about Egyptian preoccupation with a claim to leadership in the Arab world.

Mr. Byroade said that the Egyptians think about their leadership chiefly when they believe it is challenged. Given ten years of reasonable stability, the Egyptians would not care greatly what happened in other Arab States.

Mr. Allen asked if we should attempt to pick the winner and back him?

Mr. Shuckburgh said that we should try to reconcile Nuri and Nasser. We should dissuade Nasser that we are attempting to isolate him. The British should answer his contentions that they are trying to wreck him in the Sudan, in Libya and in Jordan. It is true that the British wish to thwart Nasser’s purpose in Libya, but this is because his purpose is inimical to the purposes of the West and not because Britain wishes to isolate Egypt. We have failed in an effort to cooperate with Nasser in the military realm. Perhaps our hope should now be fixed on the economic. This should not be too difficult. Ambassador Trevelyan believes that Nasser is not really neutralist and does not wish to cooperate with the Russians.

Mr. Byroade agreed completely, but asked whether the problem of cooperation with Egypt is not one to be attacked immediately, rather than a year from now. To get a settlement of the Palestine question, we must tell the Egyptians something of our plans covering the next several years. If we do not give Nasser an assurance of our intentions regarding the Baghdad Pact, we cannot get his consent to the Palestine settlement. On the other hand, if we could move in the direction of the Palestine settlement, having assured Nasser of our intentions respecting the Pact, Mr. Byroade does not despair of getting Iraq and Egypt together, perhaps by means of some association of the Baghdad Pact countries with the countries of the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Pact. By such a means the West could become the champion of Arab unity.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed and recalled his opening statement that the West should not throw itself across the stream of Arab emotions, especially those concerning Arab unity. However, he expressed a reservation about working with Nasser until his ambitions could be divined. For example, does Nasser propose that the British officers should be ejected from the Arab Legion in Jordan or that the West should get out of Libya? He recounted that on the day when the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regarding the Suez base was signed, Mahmoud Fawzisaid to the British that the British officers should get out of the Arab Legion because their presence is an embarrassment to the Arab countries.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that Nasser is running against time in view of the severe economic problem in Egypt, particularly the growing population.

Mr. Russell asked suppose we go along with Nasser’s line? How cooperative will he be after he gets what he asks for? Even if he should go through the motions of making a settlement with Israel, he would still have the power to do great damage if in the meantime the Western powers had cooperated extensively with him. We might do well to fall in with the drive for Arab unity, but only after, say, five years.

Mr. Byroade said he did not believe Arab unity would materialize. Our aim should be to get out of a position of opposing it.

Mr. Allen said that our overriding concern for Arab unity is the fear that unless we do something about it, the Russians will beat us to it. So long as we appear to oppose and the Russians to favor Arab unity, they will win in the area. We must give genuine support to Arab unity.

Mr. Shuckburgh said he had some reservations since such unity as now exists among the Arab States depends on the state of Israel. We should not appear to be against Arab unity, but he did not see how we could work actively for it.

Mr. Rountree commented there are so many diverse elements among the Arabs, that it is unlikely any cohesive force can emerge for sometime; the competition for leadership will continue.

Mr. Allen asked about the possibility of the Fertile Crescent scheme within the framework of Arab unity. Should Iraq invite any and all Arab States to join it?

Mr. Byroade said this should not be advocated at present, but might be possible after five years. The Saudi Arabians will continue in fear of the Hashimites to oppose anything that Iraq does. The Russians will also object.

Mr. Allen remarked that the Communists can always offer a more strenuous anti-Israeli resolution in the Security Council than we. This tactic may force us into a position of championing Israel against all the Arabs, or of championing some Arabs against the others. We may, for example, have to decide whether we are against the Northern Arabs.

Mr. Shuckburgh speaking personally and off the record commented that the tragedy of our position is we might be forced in the absence of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to abandon Israel.

Mr. Allen, also speaking personally, said that the U.S. cannot completely abandon Israel.

Mr. Shuckburgh next considered the question of Saudi Arabia and its influence in the area. Britain has experienced much trouble from this source [10½ lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Allen agreed that this is a key problem and that it would figure large in the discussions. He recollected his earlier remarks concerning the indivisibility of American-British relations in the Near East, but pointed out a difference in Saudi Arabia. American oil people have been active there for the last ten years. They are close to the present ruling monarch, as they were to his father. While they do not have one hundred percent support from the Saudi Government, they are able to differ, and to present their case. When the British say that Saudi action is anti-Western, this may be true in regard to Saudi activities in Syria, but in Saudi Arabia the King himself maintains a distinction between the U.K. and the U.S. The King knows that the Communists, if they take over Saudi Arabia, would cut his as the first throat. It may be possible to take advantage of the working relationship between the Saudis and the Americans and turn present Saudi activity into less destructive channels.

Mr. Shuckburgh made it plain that he intended no criticism of ARAMC’s policy in Saudi Arabia. He thought that ARAMCO may have been more clever than the British petroleum interests in Iran. The problem is a serious one. Western oil interests have gone into the Arab world and upset their way of life. When this happens, the West is responsible for seeing that the vacuum is filled with constructive social and economic organizations. The funds which accrue to Arab States must be husbanded and put into development. Britain, for example, went into India in a governing capacity after the British East India Company had exploited the commercial possibilities there. Britain was required to run India for a time. In Iraq 60% of the petroleum revenues goes for economic development, in Iran 70%. In Kuwait revenues go into bonds. But in Saudi Arabia the oil revenues have not been harnessed to constructive development.

Mr. Allen said he could not take great exception to this analysis but wished to point out that the present times are complicated by considerations of nationalism and anti-imperialism to a degree which the British did not face in a different century. Maybe the U.S. government has left the oil company too much to itself. Maybe we would do well to persuade the Saudis to hire American consultants as the Turkish government has employed Mr. Dewey.

Mr. Shuckburgh suggested the possibility of a development board.

Mr. Rountree remarked that we are dealing in a world context totally different from the past. Furthermore, while the Saudis know that U.S. dollars come into Saudi Arabia they also know their oil flows out to Europe. We are dealing with a sovereign and a sensitive government.

Mr. Allen said he hopes for a growing responsible middle class in Saudi Arabia, that is, a group outside the royal family but having influence.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the Saudi Army may present a possible alternative. It is not a question of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] King Saud, but of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] his advisers.

Mr. Rountree said that at the moment Saudi Arabia is primarily concerned with two things:

Israel and Saudi Arabia’s position on the Arabian Peninsula in relation to the dispute with the Sheikhdoms. A Saudi Arabian representative recently commented that Saudi Arabian-American differences arise not from their enmity with us, but from their troubles with our friends. If those two problems could be removed, perhaps the Saudis would not continue to be so unreasonable.

Mr. Rountree replied that the subject would be discussed separately but that he thought the British are aware of our general views on the question of arbitration.

Mr. Shuckburgh disputed Mr. Rountree’s analysis. He claimed that the Saudis had been intriguing against the Hashimites longer than the British had been involved in the Buraimi question.

Mr. Byroade said the Saudi fear of Iraq-Syria union is a leading cause of Saudi intransigence.

Mr. Allen requested the British estimate of the Sultan of Muscat.

Mr. Samuel described the Sultan as straightforward, a man who knows what he wants, honest, upright, a man who would not be rushed and is altogether an outstanding Arab leader.

Mr. Allen recalled an American oil man describing the Sultan of Muscat in almost lyrical terms. He mentioned the possibility that the U.S. would open a Consulate at Muscat.

Mr. Samuel in replying to Mr. Allen’s question said that the British have a Consulate General in Muscat and the Indians are the only other country having a resident representative there.

Mr. Allen asked for the British estimate of Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that he keeps changing his mind on this point. Once he thought the Turks very good, now he is not sure they give good advice. They are very sure of themselves, even to the extent of believing they could have brought Nasser into the Baghdad Pact if the Western nations had given them the chance. He did concur in Mr. Allen’s tribute to the Turks for their help on the Baghdad Pact in Tehran and Amman.

Mr. Allen said he was encouraged by Mr. Byroade’s view that the Turks are not the main problem in the Egyptian mind.

Mr. Allen left for another appointment at 12:00 o’clock. Mr. Rountree presided following Mr. Shuckburgh’s proposal that the meeting carry on until 1:00 o’clock.

Mr. Bowie said he would be glad to have the British impression of the Baghdad Pact’s prospects for making a lasting impact. What are the possibilities that the Pact will gain an institutional momentum and require great Western resources for its continuation?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the main significance of the Pact is now political. It gives strength to the Pact countries to remain independent by the encouragement of association with one another. The nations now in the Pact have real fears of being overrun by Russians. The Pact is a guarantee of the same kind that Norway receives in its association with NATO. This does not require great military forces nor does it require the nations to devote a great share of their resources to defense. For example, Nuri, after joining the Baghdad Pact still wants to spend Iraqi money for economic development.

Mr. Rountree said that neither Iraq nor Iran is inclined to overextend itself in military expenditures, but they do regard their membership in the Pact as meriting large grants of Western military equipment.

Mr. Rountree agreed that the precise military significance is less than the political significance.

Mr. Bowie put his questions in a different form: (1) What are we trying to achieve by the Baghdad Pact? (2) How can we avoid pressures on our own resources resulting from the images created by the Pact—the image of our beneficence as a reward for their joining the Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh answered the first question by saying that the Pact serves as a deterrent.

In the Baghdad Pact the nations say to the Russians, “if you take Azerbaijan, then you attack all of us.”

Mr. Bowie said that the validity of such a warning does not require adherence to the Pact, as may be proved by the position of the U.S.

Mr. Rountree said that Iran adhered because the Pact would be a deterrent and would give Iran, which was seriously concerned about its capacity to withstand invasion, a basis for the development of its military capability.

Mr. Shuckburgh said there is also the political factor in that the Pact creates domestic support for the people who advocate it.

Mr. Bowie feared that this process leads to the building up by the Pact members of impossible demands on the generosity of the West, the U.S. in particular. The nations joined the Pact in the expectation of great assistance. The assistance is not forthcoming in the expected quantities and the nations then feel that they have been let down. Pakistan, for example, is always griping that it does not receive enough help from the U.S. in return for its pro-Western stand in contrast to the American and Western generosity given in return for Indian neutralism.

Mr. Rountree confirmed that where expectations of military aid are seriously disappointed, there will be trouble.

Mr. Russell directed this conversation to the problem in the Arab States by remarking that Nasser had said he had no objection to the Northern Tier as such. May it not be possible to keep Iraq happy and in the Baghdad Pact but at the same time not antagonize Nasser over the question of Arab leadership?

Mr. Arthur said that Iraq does not regard the Baghdad Pact as a means of getting leadership among the Arabs.

Mr. Russell inquired whether the British contemplate that the Arab League will be a useful instrument once a settlement with Israel is achieved. If this is the case, we should think of Jordan as an arena for Arab unity, rather than as a prospective candidate for the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the British want the Northern Tier to remain as it is and want some association of the Northern Tier with the Southern areas.

Mr. Byroade said we can live with this. Nasser does not wish to destroy Western influence, but Western domination. The recent attempt to secure Jordanian adherence to the Pact is an example of the latter.

Mr. Bowie granted that the Baghdad Pact puts an umbrella over the countries, but insisted that this is something for them. What does it do for us?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the Pact takes its place as a part of history and must be viewed in its historical context. Its formation was indicated by the historical circumstances obtaining at the time of its formation. As these historical circumstances alter so will the character of the Pact. Just now, the need seems less for military might than for the kind of resources required to fight a cold war. In any case, the Pact countries must be kept on our side. We can suit the methods to the circumstances.

Mr. Rountree said we should not minimize the significance of Iran’s entry into the Pact. In effect, this constituted Iran’s departure from neutralism.

Mr. Byroade said the Pact is a good thing and needs strengthening by additional help for the countries that have already joined. However, no additional adherents are needed. We require a more sensitive response to the Bandung type countries. They are not allied with us, but they are not so far from us as completely neutralist countries. Our attitudes towards them should not be formalized so that we lose flexibility of action.

Mr. Ogburn explained that we are on the horns of a dilemma. If countries join the Baghdad Pact, we must reward them with aid to show our approval. On the other hand, if we attempt something for a country outside the Pact, as in the case of the Aswan Dam for Egypt, then we fall under the censure of doing as much or even more for the non-Pact countries. The Pact countries then ask: What do we get out of the Pact?

Mr. Byroade said there is no need to worry about Egypt’s action should we give more assistance to the Pact countries.

Mr. Shuckburgh reiterated that the British believe in military aid for the Pact countries.

Mr. Rountree and Mr. Bowie pointed out that the cost to the U.S. on a per year basis for the proposed Aswan Dam will be far less than the annual cost of military assistance for the Pact countries, and far less than economic aid being rendered to Iran and Turkey.

Mr. Rountree catalogued a long list of countries including Iraq, Turkey, Libya, Ethiopia and Ceylon which had reacted with an unfavorable comparison between what the U.S. may do for Egypt in the form of the Dam and what the U.S. has been able to do for them.

Mr. Shuckburgh said we cannot adopt a policy of outbidding the Russians in every economic development project.

Mr. Arthur inquired whether it is not possible to get out of the dilemma by making a distinction between economic and military aid, expressing the view that military aid made more of an impact than economic.

Mr. Rountree replied that military aid in Iran gains the praise of the Shah and the Army, but has little effect on the public. The Iranian people consider their number one problem now to be economic and are far more aware of American financial and economic aid.

Mr. Bowie inquired of the prospects for area-wide economic programs. He supposed there was not much economic development which could be attempted in Saudi Arabia even if the West were prepared to sponsor a program.

Mr. Rountree said there may be a greater possibility for regional economic development after settlement of the Palestine problem.

Mr. Russell inquired whether the Arab League could serve as a useful device after settlement of the Palestine question.

Mr. Byroade said that we already have in the Jordan Valley development plan, the plans for the High Aswan Dam and the proposed compensation of refugees a considerable economic development program for the area.

Mr. Arthur pointed to the ancient rivalry between Iraq and Egypt over Syria. Such Arab unity as has been achieved up to now is itself the product of outside influence. An example is British organization of the Near East countries for supply and military operations during World War II. Only Western participation can produce Arab unity.

Mr. Byroade agreed but held that we must stabilize the situation for a time rather than exciting it.

The morning session was adjourned shortly after 1:00 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.
2. Between January 13 and 19, officials of the British Foreign Office, led by Assistant Under Secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh, met in Washington with representatives of the Department of State to prepare the ground for upcoming talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden. Briefing papers and background material on the Shuckburgh talks are ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; NEA Files: Lot 61 D 260; and Conference Files: Lot 62 D 187, CF 647. For documentation on the Eisenhower–Eden talks, see volume XXVII.