Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, September 11, 1955—5 p.m.

441. In one point in conversation with Fawzi (Embassy telegram 440)² I made a side remark that Soviets would probably be greatly surprised if they knew he and I were talking about “freezing”, for a time, Turk-Iraqi pact. He replied to the contrary, they would be displeased if they knew he and I discussing way to organize entire Middle East, settle Arab-Israeli conflict, do away with dangerous friction among states of area, continuation of build-up of strength in North and attaining general atmosphere allowing for build-up of strength and confidence in rest of area so as to effectively “block them off” from Middle East. Did not say so but I thought this a very telling reply.

Have been trying to analyze Fawzi’s remarks now for some days as it seems to me they may open up possible new avenues of approach. What follows is somewhat speculative as to what Fawzi actually had in mind.

(A) An Arab-Israeli settlement which Egypt is in position to advance by valuable assistance or block by uncompromising negativism may be of more immediate interest to US than completion and expansion of Northern Tier. At this particular time when both Egypt and US would welcome a settlement but when US is under greater pressure to take positive steps in coming months Egypt could anticipate that, in return for its cooperation, it would receive the most favorable consideration from US. Against this general background he might visualize events taking somewhat the following form:

(B) We would assure Egypt that although we could take no positive steps keep other countries from joining Turk-Iraqi-British Pact we would do nothing to press for formal completion of Northern Tier at this time. (Actually military coordination involving Iran and Pakistan could, however, continue or increase.) Our position would, however, be subject to review if concrete progress not made in very near future in direction of Arab-Israeli settlement. Egypt for her part must recognize delicacy such a position on part of US re states in north and that there was very little time move forward toward settlement.

(C) In lull created above, Egypt would take lead on Arab-Israeli settlement.

(D) Egypt would drop concept of ESS Pact and Arab States to reorganize themselves to participate in defense of area as a bloc. Eventual treaty arrangements would be made to include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and all Arab States, with perhaps Israel associated in some way. Egypt to realize this concept of Arab participation impossible without prior Arab-Israeli settlement.

For above approach to be successful it is obvious that both Israel and Arabs must be prepared to accept reasonable settlement of boundaries question. This problem in essence resolves itself into question of Negev, as otherwise we and Egypt at least could agree on essentials of settlement. We must therefore, I think, give the fullest consideration as to what, given the stake involved, should be our position on this question. Am turning more and more to thought that Elath worthless to Israel in hostile Arab world and she would do well give up southern half of Negev in exchange for over-all settlement plus some form of international guarantee on Suez.

I would expect there would be sharp reactions to some of above yet believe this line of thought (with of course possible variations thereof) deserves consideration. If Egypt does in fact become specific along these lines we would have to be very careful not to get drawn into trap involving long delay and actual harm to Northern Tier setup if Arab-Israeli settlement does not come along readily. Certainly, however, the Arab-Israeli situation needs to be resolved without delay and I presume we can pay considerably for such settlement. Perhaps upon analysis the price we would pay in shift of emphasis of our policy toward the Middle East would not be too great. Turkey, I would presume, would strongly object. Have no feel for situation in Iran but if Shah’s past philosophies prevail it not unlikely he would welcome some delay, with increased military equipment, and join subsequently in new arrangements to cover all of Middle East. Pakistan, Fawzi stated, not too eager under present conditions and with new government, and might also welcome delay. This am unable to assess (but have feeling he had in mind they might talk to Pakistan if we could agree on some over-all approach). Iraq, I would presume, would be a special problem which others can assess far better. Perhaps her Ambassador here not representative but I am certain he would favor moves which would get Iraq and Egypt back in step. While this may be difficult given Nasser’s antipathy for Nuri Said, it should be possible to find some way whereby Iraq could be given special position in view of her advanced geographical location.

Several reasons may be advanced as to why we chose some two or three years ago to organize defense of Middle East exclusively through Northern Tier approach (which decision under all conditions then prevailing still seems to me to have been correct). One factor, i.e., Suez base dispute, has now been removed. The other and certainly predominant reason was presence of Arab-Israeli situation. It may be time now consider delaying (and perhaps modifying) somewhat our present plans for completion Northern Tier, if by so doing we can be certain of rapid movement toward Arab-Israeli settlement and establishment of over-all organization of somewhat different type subsequent thereto.

Nasser is returning Cairo within day or two and Fawzi and others say he eager have long talk with me. I may then be able to find out how much of my speculation as to Egypt’s thoughts is correct. Will, of course, tell Nasser I have no authority without consulting Department to express views of US Government, if he does follow lines somewhat as above.

This and preceding message labelled Noforn in view of speculative nature of contents. For London Embassy: For same reason have not consulted Trevelyan³ but will do so if either Nasser or Fawzi present their ideas in more concrete fashion.⁴

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.
2. Supra.
3. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British Ambassador to Egypt.
4. The Department of State responded to telegrams 440 and 441 in telegram 515 to Cairo, September 15, printed in vol. XIV, p. 471.