63. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
440. When I last saw Fawzi he said he wanted to talk about possible co-relation of the Turk-Iraqi Pact and the rest of the Middle East. He stated that present situation had resulted in a kind of paralysis to Arab unity and understanding. It was difficult to foresee how Arab cooperation and coordination could ever be fruitful under present circumstances. Could they, for instance, ever discuss really important matters such as military coordination with Iraq sitting at the table? Certainly every other member of the Arab States would have the feeling that Iraq’s alliance with Turkey meant that family planning by the Arabs would be immediately available to Turkey and thence probably to Israel. Replied I thought he overestimated the closeness of relations in chain he had referred to. He said nevertheless this type of psychological barrier had been created and it difficult to see how primary goal of getting Egypt and Iraq, and also Turkey, back into cooperation could be achieved unless some steps were taken.
Fawzi said objective was to take steps that would help open door to new Arab cooperation which would include Iraq—steps which would neither vitiate what had been accomplished in northern tier setup so far nor the accomplishment its ultimate objective. His suggestion was that the membership in the Turk-Iraqi Pact be “frozen” for time being. We should instead turn our attention to a build up of good will and strength in entire Middle East.
Assuming he referring to Government of Egypt position that no additional Arab States should join Turk-Iraqi Pact, I reminded him that he knew our position this regard. He replied that this was not what he had in mind. He was thinking of a delay in any additional state joining as one more adherent would bring into effect Council of Ministers organization. He felt that once this had happened it would be far harder to work out something satisfactory for the whole Middle East and for the long run. I replied that surely he would realize it impossible for U.S. to take any negative act towards build up of southern tier. He replied he did not have that in mind but merely that we should “do nothing” for a time as regards urging Iran and Pakistan to join. I replied that even an attitude of indifference on the part of the U.S. might have the same effect as taking a negative stand because such things demand a sense of momentum, which if halted, perhaps [Page 155] could not be regenerated. Fawzi questioned that this was the case and thought we could do other things to indicate our continued interest in strength and security of northern states.
I told Fawzi it seemed to me he was asking that we hesitate in strengthening the north where creation of such strength was possible in exchange for rather vague assurances regarding the future in an area where such a build up of strength was most difficult if not impossible due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. His reply was two-fold. Firstly, he did not suggest we hesitate in strengthening the north. On the contrary, he would recommend, as a sign of our continuing interest, an increase of military equipment in the north if that were possible for us to do. Secondly, he stated he was including the concept of an Arab-Israeli settlement in his thinking which would produce a situation whereby southern states could be strengthened and even Israel if we felt this desirable. After an Arab-Israeli settlement it should then be possible to proceed with “further development” of defensive organization in the Middle East which would include entire area. I remarked he was now getting a lot closer to something that could be fruitfully discussed and we would give his remarks on this subject every consideration. Fawzi replied that Nasser would wish to talk to me soon on further development of these ideas.
My comments in immediately following message.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.↩