54. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1970. Telegrams from my colleagues in area plus rumors that float downward from various nations in north lead me to wonder if position this Embassy misunderstood on certain basic issues, particularly in connection recommendations in Embtel 1929.2
This Embassy has not lost its conviction that northern tier approach and success to date of that policy is most important and far reaching development in Middle East in many a year. We do not wish that approach to falter or lose momentum. It is logical, inherently sound and in best interests of US deserving our support. Furthermore consequences of loss of momentum in context East-West matters generally and loss of prestige that would accompany show of US indecision would be very detrimental indeed.
What we have been seeking to do is find some way to turn things around down here so that the remainder of the area will openly accommodate itself to most important objectives in the north. Believe this may now be possible and it seems to me we should be willing to sacrifice things we either won’t get or don’t want anyway to accomplish this end.
I hear that Turks and possibly others seem to feel we weakening because of indecision (presumably in deference to Egypt) as to whether induce or pressure other Arab States to join TI Pact. It seemed to me Department views, as confirmed by NSC, were clear on this point long before this issue became bone of contention throughout area. It all comes down to fact that US, until Arab-Israeli situation greatly improved, is not in position follow through adequately on obvious follow-up requirements of military assistance these states. The disillusionment that would inevitably follow our failure of adequate follow-through, it seems to me, far better be avoided.
Would not we be in double trouble as regards Syria on this same point if she joined TI Pact and did in fact federate with Iraq or move in that direction. Should think this could not help but affect our aid program with Iraq because of its new proximity with Israel.
Believe period of no new initiative on part of US in past few months has been wise policy. Diversive [Divisive?] and disruptive counter-effort here had to run a certain course and develop obstacles of their own before other ideas would be seriously considered. Time [Page 127] now seems about here to try pull area out of dive that may develop along more and more dangerous lines, particularly as regards Soviet bloc opportunities.
If solution something along lines Embtel 1929 can be obtained (and even if unattainable and those in north feel our support northern tier weakening) would recommend US try to spur along enthusiasm by quick adherence Pakistan and such moves with Iran as may be profitable. Increased military assistance all along the lines would be good in itself if this possible. In last analysis, rather than let it falter would recommend US adherence. It seems to me these are things that really count and that we should not be forced into appearing to seek (at great detriment US position in large part Arab world) that which we do not want under present conditions merely because efforts have been made to deny those things to US.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–2855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Document 45.↩