45. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1929. Nasser and I discussed at great length last night current situation in Arab world. Although we covered much the same ground as previously it clear Nasser is near brink of deciding there is no solution satisfactory to Egypt. His only response to my repeated questions as to why he felt it necessary to carry things so far is that he could think of nothing else to do. There was he said a “great debate” going on in the Arab world. Everywhere in the north there was a question as to whether a state would join the Turk-Iraqi Pact or the ESS Pact or what. This conversation was going on incessantly. It was disrupting the affairs of every nation. It must be stopped but he could not see how to do so without incurring a defeat which would lead in the long run to Egypt’s being left alone with Israel.
I told him I could see one solution. That was for Egypt to decide to stay out of Arab quarrels. Instead Egypt should concentrate on matters really affecting her developing her economy and formulating constructive policies regarding Sudan, Israel and the West. He felt this would separate him from the Arab world and could not believe that to Egypt’s advantage at present time. Replied that I had no intention of implying Egypt did not have religious and other ties with Arab States but that I thought Egypt was squandering her energies in useless quarrel.
I inquired as to what he meant by “unity” in the Arab world. The Arab States although linked by culture and religion seemed to have as many difficulties and rivalries as the historic European scene. He stated this was true but that was no fault of the Arab people. Everywhere there were govts in power who merely looked out for their own political interests. He hoped to see an Arab world eventually in which this sort of thing could be replaced by men dedicated to the good of the people.
In connection with his repeated question as to whether Lebanon or Jordan would join the north I replied I obviously did not know. The United States would not put pressures on those states to do so. It could not however act in any way to deny their right to make up their minds to join arrangements of which we were not a member.
[Page 76]I asked status of ESS Pact. He replied he honestly did not know whether there could be such a pact. He had completely lost faith in Azm in Syria who was opportunist merely seeking Presidency.
One thing seems certain here. For the good of everyone the “great debate” as Nasser calls it should be stopped by the Arab world and promptly. The answer I gave Nasser above seems to me the best but he obviously will not turn aloof from Arab matters at a time when he is so preoccupied with Israel. Have been wondering if there is not another way out that could be acceptable to United States. We are not as far as I know particularly eager for states south of northern tier to join that arrangement. What we wish I suppose is a hinterland not hostile but willing to cooperate with developments in the north. Would it therefore make sense to my colleagues in this area and Department if we were to try to persuade Egypt to shift from ESS Pact to something along following lines: Egypt would seek not a complicated treaty of alliance but merely an agreement among Arab States on an expression of opinion which should not prove at least textually too difficult to negotiate. It could be along line that Arab States desired to strengthen their unity and to conclude at a later date agreements to strengthen security arrangements between them; the Arab States recognize however the benefits to the Middle East in the move being made in the north and while, with the exception of Iraq, they are not active members, they desire to cooperate in the rear with this effort to strengthen the defenses of the M.E.
A formula along these lines might on the one hand solve dilemma here as it would in effect say that states other than Iraq were not contemplating joining the northern tier. On other hand it would say as far as we (and Turks and Iraqis) are concerned that the struggle had been ended since area as whole wld have dropped hostility and tactics of disruption as regards movement in north. With such solution we could without hard feelings reemphasize our very great interest in backing northern tier. In order Egypt (and Saudi Arabia particularly) to accept this idea it might be necessary for Iraq to make some convincing gesture (perhaps in form of letter) to effect it had no designs on Syria. Restoration of Iraq to “Arab community” might make this worthwhile. It may seem that the above approach tends bring Arab world back together when some argument at least can be made for letting it drift farther apart. Doubt however Arab unity is in any case going to mean very much. What we are looking for is some document to stop charges and countercharges and arrest deterioration of United States position in at least large part of Middle East, as well as to arrest obvious Commie advantages present situation. With all propaganda of past few months we have been placed publicly in position of opposing symbol of Arab unity. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
[Page 77]Sponsoring such new approach would be rather abrupt about-face for Egypt but I would be willing to try to persuade Nasser to do so if idea seems to have merit. I am convinced if some means can be found which will reassure Egypt and enable her extricate herself from present disruptive position we could then rely on Nasser’s cooperation in working constructively toward solving other Middle East problems not excluding that of settlement between Israel and the Arab States.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.↩