Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, June 24, 1955—9 a.m.

754. Cairo Embtel 1929.² For some time US Government has relied on Nasser’s assurances he will eventually adopt a pro-Western attitude. Certain US decisions have been predicated on his subsequent willingness and ability promote US objectives in Arab world. Insofar as Syria is concerned, doubt US confidence justified. Proposal in reference telegram appears envisage another phase, indeterminate in length, of attempting assuage Egyptian sensibilities in hope of future benefits. Before US Government buys additional Egyptian futures this Embassy believes Department might usefully review Nasser’s role in carrying out US policy this area.

Reference telegram indicates Nasser now recognizes present GOE Arab policy is getting him and other Arabs nowhere. Since recent difficulties to considerable extent “made in Egypt”, calling halt would inevitably be interpreted as defeat for GOE. However Nasser’s conclusion that such about-face would leave Egypt alone with Israel conveniently ignores continuing validity Tripartite Declaration and ALCSP and fact Turko-Iraqi Pact inter alia comprehends possibility Israeli aggression.

Specifically, Embassy sees following possible difficulties in suggested Arab policy statement:

1. As noted reference telegram, it would restore facade Arab unity which in past has hindered rather than helped achievement US objectives. US Government has not in Syria been criticized for opposing “Arab unity” except by out-and-out proponents ESS pact. Many Syrians regard Egyptian intransigence rather then Turko-Iraqi pact as responsible current division among Arabs.

2. Proposal requires Egypt do nothing for US Government until after US Government has found means “reassure Egypt”. While Embassy Cairo in best position predict what Nasser would then do, Egypt’s recent opposition Turko-Iraqi Pact and anti-Western activities in Syria raise question whether US actions favorable Egypt should not follow and depend on Egyptian actions favorable US.

3. General terms of the suggested statement hardly likely be interpreted here as strengthening ‘Arab unity”. Many Syrians who have favored ESS pact (in part because its text provides for greater degree unity than ALCSP would probably take strengthened ALCSP in preference to proposed statement).

4. Reference desire cooperate in “rear area” would probably be unacceptable present anti-Western GOS.

5. Because it contains no reference Palestine problem, proposed statement likely have limited appeal here.

6. December AL meeting attempting unsuccessfully clarify Arab attitude area defense. Effort negotiate statement along suggested lines might well prove even more difficult.

7. Phraseology acceptable to Nasser might have discouraging effect on Turks and Iraqis, who have openly declared for West. Should US appear waver in supporting them, Syria will hardly feel impelled follow their example in aligning self with West.

On balance, Embassy believes proposed statement would introduce complicating factor into situation which, with prospect diminishing Iraqi-Egyptian difficulties and reduced likelihood signature ESS pact, seems to be improving.

Message Unsigned

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–2455. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2. Document 45.