Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

267. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board¹

Washington, October 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East

REFERENCES

• A. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, September 6, 1957, item 4²
• B. Memo for Planning Board, September 5, 1957,³ and Memo for Board Assistants, September 16, 1957 (State)⁴
• C. Memo for Board Assistants, October 4, 1957 (Defense)⁵
• D. Memo for Board Assistants, September 13, 1957 (CIA)⁶

The enclosed draft list of questions on the subject is transmitted herewith for use by the Board Assistants at an early meeting in preparing a list of questions for Planning Board discussion pursuant to Reference A.

The enclosure consists of a topical arrangement, prepared by the NSC Staff, of the State, Defense and CIA questions circulated by References B–D, supplemented by NSC Staff questions not previously circulated. All questions submitted by State, Defense and CIA have been included in the enclosure with the exception of No. 6 in the State list of September 5.

Marion W. Boggs⁷

[Enclosure]

REVIEW OF LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST: POLICY QUESTIONS

1. U.S. Objectives. Are the following objectives in the Near East the most important for the protection of U.S. security interests?

a. The elimination or reduction of Soviet Bloc influence in the area.

b. The production and transit of oil through the area of the Middle East to the satisfaction of Free World requirements.

c. Denying the Soviet Bloc access to the resources, markets, and lines of communication of the Middle East.

d. The development of pro-U.S. governments in all nations of the area. (Defense)

2. U.S. Commitments

a. The United States has formally assumed Free World leadership in the Near East. How shall we carry out this endeavor, and to what degree should we commit our prestige to it? (State)

or

a. In view of the deep involvement of U.S. prestige and interest in the Near East, what action should the U.S. take to maintain its prestige and interest against the formidable challenges they now face in the area? ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified])

b. Should the U.S. undertake additional commitments with respect to the Near East in order to meet contingencies, such as subversion and non-Communist aggression, which are not provided for under the terms of the Joint Resolution? (Defense)

c. Should circumstances require it, do we have the capability in the area for quick and effective action in such “limited war” contingencies as an outbreak of Arab-Israel hostilities; an armed attack by a Middle East nation under the control of international Communism against another nation in the area; a Communist-inspired internal uprising against the established government of a friendly Near East state? (State)

3. The Baghdad Pact and Arab Unity

a. What is our present view of the Baghdad Pact? NSC 5428 (para. 6-c) stated that the immediate benefits of a Northern Tier defense arrangement would be primarily political and psychological. Do we still view these as the primary benefits or do we consider the Pact an important military instrument? (NSC Staff) Should the U.S. attempt to expand the membership of the Baghdad Pact? (Defense)

b. What should be our attitude towards “Arab unity”? Are there other possible regional groupings which we should promote? Have recent developments altered our thinking as to the short-term and long-range roles to be played by indigenous forces in area defense? (State)

c. Should we establish contingency planning in the event Arab unity should prevail? In such an eventuality, what Arab leadership would be in the best interests of the U.S.? (Defense)

4. U.S. Bases

a. Does our new role in the area require us to seek peace-time expansion of our military facilities and bases in the Near East? Should we seek stockpiling facilities in the area? Do we need to station additional forces there? Are our transit rights adequate? (State)

b. What is our future need for our military installations at Dhahran; and how can they be made more secure? (State)

5. Soviet Penetration

a. What degree of Soviet presence in the area can the United States tolerate? Is it possible to arrive at a workable modus vivendi with the USSR in the area? (State)

(1) What should be our attitude toward area states which assume a neutralist policy and position? ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified])

(2) What should be our attitude toward area states which (a) accept a close relationship with the Soviet Bloc, or (b) gradually accept Communist doctrine and establish the Communist system? ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified])

(3) What should be our attitude toward the further extension of Soviet influence and Soviet activity throughout the Near East area by legal means not involving the use of force? ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified])

(4) Can an acceptable mechanism for controlling arms shipments to the area be devised? (State)

b. In order to prevent further Soviet influence and penetration in the Near East, should the U.S. adopt courses of action vis-à-vis the USSR which involve a more direct confrontation of Soviet activity and interests in the area? (Defense)

c. Can we expect to do more than isolate Syria and Egypt? (State) Is Egyptian and/or Syrian cooperation with the U.S. essential to future stability and settlement in the Near East? If such cooperation is essential, what actions can induce such cooperation? (Defense)

d. Can we take steps to lessen the dependence of certain states in the area on Soviet Bloc markets for an outlet for their exports? In view of the importance of cotton to several of the states, should we review our own cotton purchase and disposal programs? (State)

e. How can we best assure the leadership of responsible and constructive elements in the growing trade union movement in the area? (State)

6. U.S. Aid Programs

a. How can we reconcile our increased role in the area with significant public and congressional sentiment favoring a curtailment of economic and military assistance programs? (State)

b. Should the U.S. as a government make a greater coordinated effort with respect to the Near East and accord it higher priority in policy considerations? Should U.S. assistance elsewhere in the world be decreased accordingly to provide the necessary U.S. resources? (Defense)

c. To what extent should the U.S. engage in regional as opposed to bilateral aid programs? (NSC Staff)

d. In the light of the limited economic capability of the majority of Near East countries, should our U.S. grant military assistance furnished in the future be limited to providing equipment and training primarily for internal security purposes, with reliance on U.S. capabilities for defense against external aggression? (Defense)

e. In view of the fact that Jordan is not an economically viable state, are we prepared to provide continuing economic support for an indefinite period? Is there any alternative which is compatible with U.S. interests? (NSC Staff)

7. Jordan River Development. What alternatives are possible and what approach should we take on Jordan River water development? (State)

8. Arab-Israeli Dispute

a. The Secretary of State’s speech of August 26, 1955 indicated our willingness to take the initiative in assisting the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to work toward a settlement. In view of recent developments, would it now be in the U.S. interest for this country to assume the leading role in such an endeavor? (State)

b. Would U.S. security interests in the Near East be better advanced by backing one side or the other in the event the Arab-Israeli dispute remains unsettled: (1) in the short-term and (2) over the long-run? (Defense)

c. Can and should the USSR be forced to clarify its pro-Arab position, e.g., does it include dissolution of Israel? (NSC Staff)

d. Are there further steps which the United States can take to prevent the question of the Gulf of Aqaba from becoming an explosive issue? (State)

e. What is to be our long-run policy with respect to the Gaza strip and with respect to the continued maintenance of the UN Emergency Force in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh? (NSC Staff)

f. What should be done about the Palestine refugee problem? What are present prospects of action on the proposals of the Secretary of State in his speech of August 26, 1955? What should be the U.S. attitude toward extension of the mandate of UNRWA beyond 1960 when its present mandate expires? Should the U.S. increase the percentage of its support (70%)? Would such an increase contribute significantly to rehabilitation and resettlement? (NSC Staff)

9. Oil (Including the Suez Canal Problem)

a. Can we strengthen the position of the Suez Canal as a truly international waterway? What degree of moral and material support should we give to proposals for alternatives to the Suez Canal? (State)

b. Are present arrangements for the production and transit through the area of Near East petroleum resources adequately responsive to area political trends and the needs of the consuming countries? (State)

c. Would a revision of recent U.S. policy regarding voluntary oil import restrictions, which would permit an increase in U.S. oil imports from the Middle East, enhance U.S. influence in the area over the long term? (Defense)

10. Roles of Other Non-Near Eastern Countries in the Area

a. What are the future roles of Britain and France in the area? (State)

b. How can we help to improve relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia? (State)

c. Is it to our interest to promote increased roles for Italy and the German Federal Republic in the area? (State)

d. Can Greece and India play constructive roles in the area? (State)

e. Should we seek to strengthen the relations between the states of North Africa and those of the Near East? (State)

f. What contributions can the United Nations make to the stability and economic and political progress of the area? (State)

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)
3. Document 260.
4. Boggs’ memorandum of September 16 transmitted to the National Security Council Board Assistants the text of a paper, prepared by the Department of State, that listed “Additional Questions for Consideration in Review of United States Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 5428).” (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File)
5. Boggs’ memorandum of October 4 to the National Security Council Board Assistants transmitted the text of a paper, prepared by the Department of Defense, that listed “Possible Questions in Connection With Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy in the Near East.” (Ibid.)
6. Boggs’ memorandum of September 13 transmitted to the National Security Council Board Assistants the text of a paper, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, entitled “CIA Comments and Questions.” (Ibid.)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.