The enclosed reports, prepared by the Department of State, on (1) the
adequacy of the current statement of U.S. policy toward the Near East
(NSC 5428) and new policy questions
not covered by NSC 5428,
[Page 578]
and (2) publicly announced U.S. policy on
Near East questions, are transmitted herewith for discussion by the
Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, September 6, 1957.
[Enclosure 1]
LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST: REPORT ON EXISTING
POLICY AND NEW POLICY QUESTIONS
Problem
- (1)
- To break the existing policy statement in NSC 5428 into two categories:
- (a)
- Policy statements apparently acceptable and reflecting
the current situation;
- (b)
- Policy statements about which there is some question
or uncertainty as to present applicability.
- (2)
- To list policy questions not covered in the existing
paper.
Discussion
NSC 5428 was approved by the
President on July 23, 1954. The pace and magnitude of events in the
Near East since that date has manifested itself in every aspect of
our relations with the countries of the area. There remain
statements in NSC 5428 with respect
to our interests and our objectives in the Near East which are still
valid. There is hardly a paragraph in the entire document, however,
which fulfills the criteria of acceptability and accurate reflection
of the current situation. We believe that a complete redrafting
rather than a mere revision of this document is required and have
not attempted to dissect out those fragments of NSC 5428 which could be said to have
continuing validity.
The Current Situation
The NIE on major trends affecting
U.S. interests in the Near East over the next five years (Target
date October 1)3 should be of great
assistance in identifying and evaluating the developments of the
past three years and their lasting impact on the area. Without
prejudging the conclusions of this forthcoming NIE, it can be stated that the
principal development of the past three years has been the
assumption by the U.S. of main responsibility for the Near East on
behalf of the
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free nations
and tacit recognition of this fact by our allies. This development
has perhaps been most dramatically brought to the attention of the
American people by the promulgation of the “Middle East Doctrine” by
the President and the Congress followed by the highly successful
trip of Ambassador Richards to the area. Our
country took these steps after a series of events, particularly the
ill-fated invasion of Egypt, demonstrated the decline of Britain’s
position in the area and the eclipse of French influence. It was
clear that urgent and effective assumption of Free World leadership
in this area was essential, in view of the substantial increase of
Soviet presence and influence in the area brought about by heavy
propaganda support of Arab causes, arms deals, and trading
arrangements.
Policy Questions We Face
This burgeoning of our responsibilities in the Near East has had its
impact on all aspects of our relations with each of the countries of
the area. New day-to-day guidelines of policy have had to be
devised. Without attempting to anticipate the detailed treatment of
specific questions which will be set forth in the requested staff
study (Target date October 15) it would seem that our objective in
reviewing our long-range policy toward the area will best be met if
we seek to provide the best possible answers to this general
question:
The United States has formally assumed Free World leadership in the
Near East. How shall we carry out this endeavor, and to what degree
should we commit our prestige to it?
From this broad line of inquiry will flow a great many specific and
detailed questions. In a preliminary examination in the Department
of State, over thirty hard questions affecting political and
economic matters quickly emerged. In the military field use has been
made of the documents supplied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the
attached annex, we set forth a few questions of the type which we
feel will come to light and call for answers in the course of our
continuing study.
[Enclosure 2]
SUMMARY OF PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED UNITED STATES POLICY ON NEAR EAST
QUESTIONS4
1. The Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The
issuing Governments (United States, United Kingdom, France)
recognize that the Arab states and Israel need to maintain a certain
level of armed forces for the purposes of internal security,
legitimate self-defense, and to permit them to play their part in
the defense of the area. The three Governments require assurances
from states receiving arms that such states do not intend to
undertake any act of aggression. The three Governments, should they
find that any of these states (Arab states and Israel) was preparing
to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with
their obligations as UN members,
immediately take action, both within and outside the UN, to prevent such violation.
In testimony before Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees on January 15, 1957, the Secretary said that the British
and French had stated that the Declaration was no longer binding on
them, but that the Declaration was still an expression of United
States policy.
[Page 581]
2. Arab-Israel Settlement. The United States
believes a settlement is an imperative necessity and will in all
probability require support from outside the area for its
achievement. The plight of the refugees requires that these people
should, through resettlement and, to such an extent as may be
feasible, repatriation, be enabled to live a life of dignity and
self-respect. The President is prepared to recommend: (a)
substantial United States participation in an international loan to
enable Israel to make adequate compensation to the Palestine Arab
refugees; (b) a United States contribution to the realization of
water development and irrigation projects which would directly or
indirectly facilitate the resettlement of the refugees; (c) United
States assistance to enable the parties to reach agreement on
permanent Arab-Israel boundaries and United States participation in
an international guarantee of such agreed frontiers. The United
States would support a UN review of
the status of Jerusalem.
(Secretary of State’s speech of August 26, 1955)5
3. Supply of Arms. While we continue willing
to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we
do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East
because we do not think such a race would be in the true interest of
any of the participants.
(Statement by the President, November 9, 1955)6
4. Attitude toward Israel and Arab States.
United States foreign policy embraces the preservation of the State
of Israel in its essentials. It also embraces the principle of
maintaining our friendship with Israel and the Arab States.
(Secretary of State’s letter to Congressman Hugh Scott et al.,
February 6, 1956)7
5. Aggression in the Near East. The United
States, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of
the UN, will observe its commitments
within Constitutional means to oppose any aggression
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in the area. The United States is
likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be
subjected to such aggression.
(White House statement, November 29, 1956)8
6. The Baghdad Pact. The United States has,
from the inception of the Baghdad Pact, supported the Pact and the
principles and objectives of collective security on which it is
based. A threat to the territorial integrity or political
independence of the members would be viewed by the United States
with the utmost gravity.
(Department of State statement, November 29, 1956)9
7. The “Middle East Doctrine” (Public Law
85–7, March 9, 1957). The President is authorized to cooperate with
and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the
Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic
strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. The
President is authorized to undertake military assistance programs
with any nation or group of nations desiring such assistance. The
United States regards as vital to the national interest and world
peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the
nations of the Middle East. If the President determines the
necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces
to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting
assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by
international Communism. The President should continue to furnish
facilities and military assistance to the UNEF in the Middle East
with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.
