242. Memorandum for the File by Eli Stevens of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting with General Twining on Middle East Defense Planning

Outstanding Points

1.
Mr. Rountree outlined points in his talking paper to Mr. Murphy2 and stressed that no commitments be made or position taken at the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.
a.
General Twining agreed.
2.
Rountree stressed delicate political problems would result from a high level planning survey and suggested such a trip may be premature.
a.
General Twining stated he also had misgivings about the timing and agreed such a survey would be premature.
b.
General Twining also agreed the Military Committee meeting should be the only thing tackled at this time. He planned to return immediately to Washington after this meeting.
3.
Mr. Murphy raised issue of the area of Baghdad Pact, and it was agreed our position would be same as that reached with Defense last fall, also that:
a.
State would arrange to discuss this matter with the British in order to find out why they wished to exclude Western Turkey and East Pakistan.
4.
Murphy and Rountree asked for Defense’s views on the command structure and possible requests that U.S. head same. Rountree had reservations on this point.
a.
Twining stated this subject had not been considered by the JCS. He would take matter up with the Chiefs on the following day, and apprise us of their views.
b.
It was generally agreed the acceptance of the Command idea may well be followed by a request for assignment of U.S. forces.
5.
Mr. Henderson agreed to meet with General Twining next week to discuss further their respective roles at the forthcoming meeting.
6.
General Twining said his present feeling was to attend the Military Committee meeting more in the role of an observer, and make no commitments. That the results of the meeting should be reviewed here on his return before a decision is reached on any further action such as the planning survey.
a.
Rountree, Murphy and Henderson were in agreement.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1457. Top Secret.
  2. Supra.