Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

241. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, May 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Suggested talking points for today’s meeting with General Twining on ME defense plan

We understand that General Twining will wish to discuss certain points relating to: I) the Baghdad Pact meeting,² as well as the proposal for, II) a high level military survey to be made in several Middle Eastern countries.

I. Baghdad Pact:

1. We are very pleased that General Twining is representing the United States at the Military Committee meeting. His presence will demonstrate the great interest of the United States in the Baghdad Pact. We are aware that the presence of such a prominent military figure will probably cause some nervousness on the part of the Soviet Union, but we do not believe this will be a serious matter particularly if, as expected, there will emerge from the Pact meeting no communiqués or reports of a provocative character.

2. We are awaiting with interest position papers which we understand are in process of preparation in Defense for the Military Committee meeting. Since some of the principal items will, of course, involve important political considerations, we hope that we will have plenty of time to study the papers before General Twining’s departure.

3. Among the specific items which will probably be discussed at the Military Committee are the questions of the Treaty Area and the Command Structure. We would like to comment on these items as follows:

a) Treaty Area: We have already taken the position that the treaty area of the Baghdad Pact should include Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan (both East and West) and their contiguous waters. We have agreed with Defense, moreover, that the Pact area might be extended to cover other areas to include contiguous waters if such nations join the Pact.

At the same [time] we have told Defense that we believe the fixing of the Pact area is basically a political matter and should be debated and settled within the Baghdad Pact Council. Since the United States is not actually a member of the Pact, we have indicated that we question the propriety of our entering into the debate on this matter, his does not, of course, preclude us from letting our views on this subject be known to the active members on the Pact Council as well as to the Military Committee.

b) Command Structure: Apart from the reference to a command structure contained in Baghdad’s Telegram No. 1873,³ we have not been aware that the subject was under active consideration and required an urgent reply. We knew, of course, that informal suggestions have been made from time to time by military officers of various of the Pact member states that they would like to see an American commander. So far as we know, we have made no commitment to this effect. From a political point of view, we have certain reservations concerning the desirability of naming an American to command whatever Baghdad Pact Treaty state forces may be developed. In any event, we do not feel that we can give any definitive views on the command structure question until such time as we have had an opportunity to study the Military Deputies’ report on the subject. We should ask, therefore, that the U.S. Delegation to the Military Committee make no commitment on this subject pending further study of the matter here.

4. With regard to the general position to be taken at the Baghdad Pact [Military?] Committee, it is clear that the military role of the United States in the area will be greatly affected by the National Security Council consideration which is presently in train. As a general proposition we would of course urge that no position taken at the Military Committee prejudge the issues which will be involved in the National Security Council decision.

II. Proposed High Level Military Survey:

1. The proposal for this survey as incorporated in Secretary Sprague’s letter of March 28,⁴ involves a number of extremely important policy questions which we believe should receive attention at the highest levels before the survey is undertaken. We therefore have considerable doubt that the time is right for this project to be carried out. We believe that for the time being discussions of Defense arrangements for the Middle East be confined to those items which might properly be discussed in the Baghdad Pact meeting at Karachi within the framework of policy which has been agreed or will be agreed before the Pact meeting.

2. While we welcome the possibility of a visit by General Twining to various countries in the area, we are aware that this involves a certain risk at the present time, particularly if it should appear that the visits have for their purpose the establishment of military arrangements with countries in the area (especially with non-Baghdad Pact countries) which are undergoing severe strains as a result of recent political developments. We would prefer, in fact, that General Twining not visit those countries at this time. (As a fall-back position we might agree to a visit to some of the countries, notably Baghdad Pact countries, strictly within the context of orientation.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1457. Top Secret.
2. The Third Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council Session was to be held at Karachi, June 3–6.
3. Telegram 1873, May 11, reported in part that the U.K. military delegation had suggested that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact convene on June 1, and noted that it was most important to obtain decisions regarding a command system and definition of the Baghdad Pact military area. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1157)
4. Not found in Department of State files.