Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 18, 1957¹

Washington, April 18, 1957

SUBJECT

• Problems Relating to Western Access to Petroleum Resources of the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • NEA—William M. Rountree
  • S/P—Elbert G. Mathews
  • NE—Fraser Wilkins
  • NE—David Newsom
• United Kingdom
  • John Coulson, British Embassy
  • Adam Watson, UK Foreign Office
  • Willie Morris, British Embassy

Mr. Coulson began by mentioning that the British Embassy in Rome had reported an article in an Italian newspaper stating that the U.S. and the UK were having a ten-day conference on Middle East and African problems. Mr. Rountree suggested that, if the press in the United States should inquire about the current discussions, the matter should be played “in a low key” and the Department should merely state that regular exchanges were continuing with representatives of the United Kingdom and other governments which share the United States interest in the Middle East.

Mr. Watson remarked that, if the press asked him about his mission here, he intended to say that he was here on routine business with his Embassy, but would take advantage of the opportunity to talk to people in the Department.

Aden

Mr. Coulson then proceeded to the first agenda item of the day, Aden. Reading from a prepared briefing paper, he said, in summary:

The British regard Aden as important in their chain of world-wide defenses, particularly since the British trouble in Ceylon.² Aden is one of those points, like Singapore, whose geographical importance transcends its local importance. This fact has not escaped the Kremlin’s notice. Aden is also important from the civil point of view, as an air transit point, and because of its oil refinery. It is also an important bunkering station and naval refueling base. Moreover, it is an oasis of good government and calm in a savage part of the world.

In the British view, the Protectorates are chiefly important as a buffer for Aden, although the British Government feels a strong obligation to improve conditions in the Protectorate and to prevent interference from others.

Mr. Rountree, at the conclusion of Mr. Coulson’s summary, commented that the United States recognized the significance of Aden and was well aware that Aden and Yemen could each, potentially, control the Red Sea.

Mr. Coulson remarked on British concern over Soviet influence in Yemen. Mr. Newsom said that there had been a favorable turn in that the Yemenis had presented a note to the British which appeared to be more conciliatory in tone than the previous ones. He said that, while the Department knew of no connection, it was perhaps interesting that King Saud had sent an emissary to the Imam to urge prudence in dealing with the British only a short time before this note was sent.

Mr. Rountree added that he had, in his talks with the Yemeni Chargé in Washington pointed out that the terms in which the Yemenis had earlier described the proposed agenda had been unsatisfactory to the British. He had urged the Yemenis not to attempt to predetermine the substance by the phrasing of the agenda. Mr. Rountree said he believed that Mr. Zabarah understood. He said he had also stressed to Mr. Zabarah that the United States had reports from both sides in the frontier dispute and that it was not in a position to evaluate the situation or to take sides.

Mr. Coulson said that the British had been going to ask the United States to use its influence with Yemen and he was pleased to hear that it had been doing so. He also hoped the Department would keep the Saudis in touch with the situation and warn the Yemenis against permitting Soviet influence to gain a foothold.

Mr. Newsom said that, in discussions with the Yemenis, the United States had also stressed the 1934 treaty³ as a basis for an understanding. He was, he said, interested in the fact that the latest Yemeni note referred to this treaty for the first time in the recent exchange of notes.

Mr. Watson stressed that the British had no desire to expand the Protectorate and that all the urge to expand came from Yemen— encouraged by Egypt and the USSR.

Mr. Coulson also said the British would be delighted if the United States could increase its influence in Yemen. He mentioned the Yemen Development Company and wondered if this company could increase its activities.

Mr. Rountree said that we were aware that the Yemenis wished the firm to be more active, but that preliminary exploration took considerable time.

Propaganda

Mr. Coulson said there were a few comments he wished to make on propaganda in the area. He said he believed the U.S. and the UK were in general agreement on the dangers of Egyptian propaganda. He wished to note that his government hoped that those who organize the programs broadcast from the radio station at Dhahran should take greater care to avoid items which seemed to aid the Egyptians.

Mr. Newsom explained that he believed Mr. Coulson had reference to the ARAMCO station at Dhahran and that he understood the British Government had spoken directly to officials of the company. He also understood that the company had inquired of Dhahran about the problem and had been advised that the Dhahran station, intended for the American personnel at ARAMCO, used only United Press news.

Mr. Rountree added that he believed all the broadcasts were in English.

Mr. Coulson suggested that greater effort might be made positively to make these broadcasts helpful. Mr. Newsom explained that this was a company station over which the United States Government had no control.

Iraq-Kuwaiti Frontier

Mr. Coulson said the British would give the Department a note on this subject at a later stage.

Egypt

Mr. Watson, again following the prepared briefing paper, made these comments on Egypt:

Egypt was undoubtedly the most important Arab country. It was at the center of the Arab world and had strong cultural influence through teachers, radio and publications, although its current political dominance might be waning. The long term problem was grave, however, because of the rapidly growing population and the static income. Even the High Dam, if built, would only serve to keep pace with growing demands. This combination of growing population pressures and static income will tend to make Egypt the center of revolutionary ferment and discontent in the area. Egypt will then seek other means to increase its income and will look to the sources of Arab oil and seek to change the present situation. Egypt will seek to make the oil “belong to all the Arabs.”

These economic features, the Israel problem and the resentment of imperial tutelage will cause conditions which will make many Egyptians look to Russia. The problem is not necessarily one of internal Communism, but of the Soviet Union’s influence as a supporter of Egyptian causes. In this situation, the Soviet Union has a natural field of activity.

Everywhere in Egypt, even in the Army, there is now some concern over the extent of the commitment to the Soviet Union. This situation is also estranging other Arab powers. The hostility of the U.S., also, is causing anxiety regarding the wisdom of Nasser’s policy. Many people in Egypt, including the bulk of the trading classes, would prefer to go with the West. The forces of revolution are dominant, however, and demogagic leaders prevail. It would appear that almost any other Egyptian government would have to favor the same policy of subversive imperialism, even though many classes in Egypt may not want it.

If there is agreement that this is a reasonable analysis, the U.S. and the UK cannot hope to procure a radical change. They can hope for three things:

1. Greater expressiveness for the desire of the masses and the commercial elements for a more moderate policy.

2. Lower degree of fanaticism.

3. Less efficiency in carrying out the revolutionary policies.

It looks as if the West would have to accept an unsatisfactory settlement on the Canal. After this, there will undoubtedly be pressures to relax exchange controls. This will lead to further pressure in the United Kingdom and perhaps to negotiations on the resumption of commercial relations and diplomatic ties.

The West cannot expect Nasser to cut his Soviet ties. He may moderate his policies in the interests of practical concessions from the West. Some believe there is no prospect of a better Egyptian government. The UK believes this is a question of degree. It is probably hopeless to convert Egypt to an active ally, but it might at least become as neutral as India.

The UK believes that such an Egyptian government is attainable and within resources the UK and U.S. can command.

In summary: (1) Nasser is not the best Government of Egypt that can be obtained; (2) it may be in the UK’s interest to resume commercial and diplomatic relations, at the same time continuing the policy of “cutting Nasser down to size;” (3) the U.S. and the UK should continue to withhold economic and financial aid and other marks of favor, while at the same time avoiding conspicuous evidence of hostility likely to increase Nasser’s prestige; and (4) the UK would like the U.S. to consider a program of support which might be given another government and to discuss the psychological moment and means of making this program known in Egypt.

Following Mr. Watson’s presentation, Mr. Mathews asked at what point such a program might be made known. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Rountree added that he did not believe the point had yet been reached. Mr. Wilkins remarked that such a program was, in fact, in existence and that the Egyptians were well aware of the results of their past policies.

Mr. Watson said the British were not rigid in their approach to the problem and wanted the views of the United States. He emphasized that Britain believed another Egyptian Government or leader, however difficult and neutral, would be less symbolic and less effective than Nasser [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Mr. Rountree said it was the present view of the United States that Nasser’s efficiency could be reduced by minimizing the influence of Egypt in the area. He said he believed great progress had been made to this end. He said he believed there were signs the other Arab countries were becoming deeply concerned over Egyptian influence. The thing to do, he said, is to reduce Egyptian influence and Egypt’s power to make trouble. He said he believed this held more possibilities than effecting a governmental change. He said he saw no real alternatives to the present government in Egypt.

Mr. Watson said Britain did not wish to take a purely negative approach. He asked whether it was clear what the U.S. and the UK would do for an Egyptian government which behaved better. He said Britain was thinking along the lines of doing something for the Nile waters, the Canal, the wheat problem, resumption of U.S. aid, providing more to Egypt for the transit of oil. He said Britain wants Egypt to be richer.

Mr. Rountree said that the United States had also considered what it might do if the Egyptian Government changed its policies. He mentioned the possibility of unfreezing blocked funds, of permitting normal commercial shipments, resuming CARE, P.L. 480, technical assistance, development assistance and EximBank loans. [1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified] In answer to a question on Nasser’s present mood, Mr. Rountree said that he seemed to be tense and preoccupied and motivated by an intense suspicion. He said he believed Nasser was not moving with the same sureness as before.

Iraq

Mr. Coulson summarized the British position on Iraq along these lines:

Iraq has the brightest prospect economically and has made considerable advances in the social and political field. It has remained firm and sensible in the midst of the recent uproar. How long this will last depends on Nuri. Many people think a change is due. This could take several forms. Nuri could form another government. Nuri could participate in someone else’s government. Unless Nuri were a victim of a coup détat, the UK saw little reason to presume the new government would not follow the same policy, but another government might not be so staunch in the pursuit of these policies. The UK believes the consequences of Nuri’s going must be minimized by strengthening those who follow his policies through close support of the Baghdad Pact, supply of arms, and support in the political field. The UK believes it very important for the U.S. and the UK to keep Iraq in touch with their views on political issues.

In reply, Mr. Rountree said that the United States agreed Nuri was an important asset, and the United States had given him firm support and would regret to see him leave. He said he believed there was no basic difference in the U.S. and UK estimates of the situation. He mentioned that the U.S. did talk over with the Iraqis matters of common concern and mentioned the Jordanian situation. He said the United States membership in the military committee of the Baghdad Pact will form a new platform for such cooperation. The United States, he said, had also agreed to a military assistance program for the current year of a considerable order of magnitude.

Mr. Mathews remarked that he hoped that, if Iraq were asked to assist in Jordan, they would be more forthcoming than they had been in the past. Mr. Coulson admitted that this had been a problem.

Syria

Mr. Coulson stated that the British regarded Syria as the center of Communist activity and as a threat to the rear of Iraq and Lebanon. He said Britain desired to see a more friendly Syrian government, not necessarily a member of the Baghdad Pact, but cooperating with the Baghdad Pact countries and the West. He said the greatest problem was that, if Iraqi influence increased in Syria it would disturb the Saudis. He said that the best way to meet this was to increase Saudi-Iraqi cooperation, and he knew this was being done. He said he hoped Saudi Arabia could be brought to recognize Iraq’s special problems and position in the northern part of the Arab world. He said Britain did not intend to press for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria under the present government. He said Britain might favor economic assistance to another government, but doubted that Britain, itself, could do much.

Mr. Rountree said he had no comment on these remarks.

Jordan

It was agreed that the discussion of Jordan would be postponed until the joint assessment by the U.S.–UK Ambassadors in Amman had been received.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1857. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.
2. In May 1956, the Ceylonese Government informed the British Government that it must eventually evacuate its military bases at Trincomalee and Negombol. Documentation on U.S. interest in this question is Ibid., 741.56346E.
3. Reference is presumably to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation among the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen of February 11, 1934.