221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 17, 19571
SUBJECT
- US-UK Discussion of Factors Affecting Access to Petroleum Resources of Middle East
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- William M. Rountree—NEA
- Elbert G. Mathews—S/P
- Fraser Wilkins—NE
- David Newsom—NE
- United Kingdom
- John Coulson, British Embassy
- Adam Watson, UK Foreign Office
- Willie Morris, British Embassy
Mr. Coulson began by handing Mr. Rountree a memorandum on the Gulf of Aqaba question.2 Mr. Rountree said he would study and comment at a later meeting.
Mr. Coulson then said that he had read with interest the paper on factors relating to Western access to petroleum in the Middle East.3 He said the UK was in general agreement on the exposition of the revelant factors in the first ten paragraphs of the paper. He suggested that the third section, on petroleum, be left for a later meeting. He suggested that the group then proceed to review the recommendations contained in the second section, after which the United Kingdom representatives might wish to express certain of their views in writing. He suggested that a drafting committee might then put this section of the paper into final form.
Mr. Coulson, turning to the section on recommendations, noted that these appeared to be based a good deal on the supposition that it would be possible for the United Kingdom to make some concessions on the Buraimi issue. He said he still did not believe this was a practical possibility, but he believed the United Kingdom would be prepared to discuss this in the third phase of the talks.
Paragraph 11 (a), Mr. Coulson noted, referred to the desirability of restoring normal diplomatic relations between Iraq and France and between Saudi Arabia and France and the United Kingdom. He agreed that this was desirable but asked how the United States thought this might be accomplished. He said the United Kingdom felt the Iraqis would restore relations with France as soon as they could, and said the UK had not attempted to take any lead in the matter.
[Page 505]Mr. Mathews suggested that both the US and the UK could speak to Iraq. He said the establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia was tied in somewhat with the problems in paragraph 11 (b). Mr. Wilkins said that the United States had discussed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the UK with Saudi Arabian representatives during the King’s visit and had the impression that, at the proper stage, Saudi Arabia would consider it.
Mr. Coulson said the UK had taken the line that it was up to both Iraq and Saudi Arabia to do something when they could. He asked whether Saudi Arabia might make the establishment of relations contingent upon a settlement of some of the problems with the United Kingdom. Mr. Mathews replied that he did not think so.
Mr. Rountree noted the Saudi Arabian move in lifting the embargo on British and French flag tankers as an indication of their desire for ultimate normal relations.
Mr. Coulson added that the United Kingdom would be willing to resume the talks with Saudi Arabia broken off by the rupture in relations. Mr. Watson agreed that they could revert to the earlier situation.
Mr. Coulson then referred to the sub-paragraphs of 11 (b). He said (iii) seemed to be a question of both procedure and substance. He thought (iv), suggesting that Saudi Arabia might recognize the status of Inner Oman under the Sultan’s rule had merit.
Mr. Rountree pointed out that these various suggestions were put down in an effort to catalogue elements of the problem. They did not necessarily represent isolated steps. Step (iv), for example, he said, might have to be taken in conjunction with step (iii).
Mr. Coulson commented on suggestion (v) relating to a neutral zone with administration by indigenous tribes as being unrealistic since the tribes in the area had never been able to get on together before. He said be believed (vi) would require a reversal of the position of the Sultan of Muscat on the return of the Buraimi refugees.
Mr. Newsom said that had been inserted under the impression that the British representatives had indicated to Saudi Arabia in the talks in 1956 that some of the refugees might return. Mr. Morris confirmed this, saying that only two or three of the leaders would continue to be excluded.
Mr. Watson commented that he was interested in the emphasis in the paper on relations between the Sultan of Muscat and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Coulson said he was under the impression that the Sultan did not want any direct relations with King Saud. Mr. Watson asked what the United States had in mind.
Mr. Rountree said that, in the past, it had appeared to the United States that when the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia discussed the question of Buraimi, each was actually interested in a wider problem. [Page 506] The United States, he said, was seeking ways to attack the wider problem and, by so doing, to reach some settlement on Buraimi. Since the primary concern is really Muscat and the Trucial Sheikdoms, Mr. Rountree said it might be desirable to determine whether some of the previous obstacles might be overcome by a new approach encompassing this wide area.
Mr. Watson asked how the Sultan could give any assurance that would satisfy King Saud on the Oman question without giving up some of his sovereignty. Mr. Newsom explained that part of the problem, so far as King Saud was concerned, was what he believed to be his genuine obligation to the tribes of the area and to the Ibadhi people who had appealed to the King for assistance. Mr. Newsom said he believed any settlement had to provide the King with something he could point to which satisfied this obligation. He said that, in informal conversations with Azzam Pasha, the latter had suggested that King Saud might accept the sovereignty of the Sultan over Oman in direct negotiations with him. Mr. Newsom said he believed it was conceivable that language could be devised in an agreement between King Saud and the Sultan which would recognize the Sultan’s sovereignty, but still recognize the special status of the Ibadhi people in a manner which would meet Saud’s problem.
Mr. Coulson noted the first point, mediation by the United States. He said this was a “tricky” point and one that the United States would want to consider most carefully. Mr. Watson said he believed it would be a thankless task.
On the last point (vii), Mr. Coulson said return to arbitration was impossible. It would, he said, be difficult to sell to the Sultan.
Mr. Rountree, discussing the general approach to the problem, said the United States was seeking some way to break the past impasse. He said he believed this would require a new approach. He said he believed resumption of the previous talks without some new idea would merely restore the early bottleneck. He said he believed Saudi Arabia would be responsive to suggestions. He suggested that the possibility of informal discussions with Azzam Pasha not be excluded.
Mr. Coulson commented that “new approaches” seemed always to involve concessions by the United Kingdom. Mr. Mathews said this was not the intention and, further, that he was worried by the implication that each new approach meant “concessions.” He said a new way was essential if the problems were to be met.
Mr. Watson pointed out that the United Kingdom had only a partial power in this matter and that they were, in a sense, merely acting as the attorneys.
Mr. Newsom said that the United States had seen nothing to indicate that King Saud wished either to reduce substantially or eliminate the British position in the area. He said that agreed boundaries [Page 507] with the British position would, in the opinion of the United States, eliminate some of the factors of uncertain authority which caused the present difficulty. Mr. Rountree supported this view.
Mr. Rountree added that the King had counselled moderation on the Yemenis in their dispute with the United Kingdom and had, similarly, supported forces of moderation in Jordan.
Mr. Watson acknowledged that it was possible King Saud’s earlier policy might have changed.
Mr. Coulson then moved on to paragraph (c), relating to the Persian Gulf problems. Mr. Rountree said he wished to stress at this point that this paper was purely a planning document and that some of the suggestions would require considerable study.
Mr. Coulson acknowledged the seriousness of the sea bed problem in the Gulf. He suggested that the US and the UK might approach this problem in stages. He said he believed it was necessary to start with political factors and then, at a later stage, refer legal questions resulting from the political factors to the International Court, or the International Law Commission. All were agreed on the seriousness of the problem and that the problem required further study.
Mr. Coulson indicated his agreement on paragraphs (d), (e), and (f).
There was considerable discussion on the problem of Egyptian and Syrian teachers in Kuwait and other petroleum areas. While acknowledging that this was a problem, Mr. Watson pointed out that there were good Egyptian and Syrian teachers and suggested that the word “undesirable” should be used. There was general agreement that there were no short range alternative sources. Mr. Rountree added that many areas, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, all wanted to get rid of Egyptian teachers, but were unable to do so. The American University of Beirut was mentioned as a possible long term source for new teachers.
Mr. Mathews suggested that the real short term solution was to strike at the subversive apparatus. Mr. Wilkins indicated that this had been done with some success in certain areas. Mr. Watson suggested that a change in the Egyptian government might help and that this possibility should not be ruled out.
Mr. Morris stressed Cairo’s importance as a source of the printed word. The possibility was mentioned that British and U.S. agencies might seek to expand the influence of Beirut and, also, examine the possibility of publishing more suitable texts for the schools.
Mr. Coulson said the British agreed on paragraphs (e) and (f), but did not know the meaning of (g). Mr. Mathews explained that this was meant to emphasize the importance of interchanges between friendly [Page 508] nations in the area. Mr. Coulson said the committees of the Baghdad Pact might help in this. Mr. Watson mentioned the growing importance of television as a medium in the area.
Mr. Coulson asked, also, what the United States had in mind in paragraph 12 (a), referring to the increase of Iraqi and Saudi Arabian influence in Syria and Jordan. Mr. Coulson said that Iraq and Saudi Arabia should work together on this. Mr. Rountree said the United States had been working through King Saud in certain matters related to Syria where the King had been inclined to counsel moderation. [2½lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Coulson said he was agreed on 12 (b), (c), and (d).
Mr. Coulson said he would, at the next meeting, wish to say a few words on the Yemen-Aden situation and to discuss the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier problem. Other items to be discussed would be Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. On the latter, he said, he was waiting for an agreed estimate from the two Ambassadors in Amman.
Mr. Rountree said that he was inclined to think the King would not want the Richards Mission to come at this time. He said the Mission did not propose to go to Syria, unless there was a change in government there.
Mr. Morris asked whether the Department had as yet an answer to the question put by Sir Harold Caccia relating to the U.S. position in the event of a request by Hussain for assistance from the retiring British forces in Jordan.
Mr. Rountree said the Department hoped this situation would not arise. At best, he said, this would be a last resort and other measures should be tried first. The use of UK troops would have grave implications. He said he was not prepared to provide the answer on Mr. Herter’s behalf, but he could say that, in Departmental discussions, the United States had been acutely conscious of the dangers and difficulties involved.
With respect to the general situation in Jordan, Mr. Rountree said the United States believed that any violation of Jordan’s frontiers by Syria would be covered by the Tripartite Declaration. He said he did not know what action the United States might take in such a case, but, whatever it was, it would be within the authority of the Declaration.