Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

192. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, March 8, 1957.

AMBASSADOR RICHARDS’ MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Use of U.S. Armed Forces Under the President’s Proposals

In a letter regarding the military aspects of the President’s proposals, signed by Mr. Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., on February 13, the Department of Defense stated in part:² “… the best defensive arrangements can be obtained through cooperative effort involving the use of combined forces (United States and indigenous) in which each nation contributes that which it can do most effectively. This concept could culminate in a combined United States indigenous capability of sufficient strength to permit, in some cases, a reduction of local military forces to levels more compatible with indigenous support capabilities … The prerequisite to determining those U.S. forces which should be earmarked for deployment to the area, as well as the question of bases, can only be determined in connection with a U.S. defense plan. This is now in process of preparation.”

During the visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq in February 1957, he was given to understand that in the context of the President’s Middle East proposals the United States hoped to be able to go much further in its participation in the Baghdad Pact’s Military Committee, as well as in all Pact activities directed against communism. Similar statements were made to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on February 26 and the Turkish Ambassador on January 17.

The Richards’ Mission inevitably will be queried intensively by certain countries with respect to the employment of United States armed forces. The protection offered thereby in case of need is to some countries a most attractive feature of the Middle East program as a whole. This aspect will be particularly important to the “northern tier” countries which are bound to be disappointed over the limited, if any, additional aid available. Also, unless the Mission makes clear the seriousness of the United States determination to act in case of necessity, the value of the Joint Resolution as a deterrent to communist aggression will be seriously weakened.

Pertinent Factors

The problem of the possible use of U.S. armed forces under the President’s proposals is obviously a most complex one involving far-reaching military and political decisions, affecting United States relations both with the Soviet bloc and nations of the area and questions of military expenditures. Set forth below are some of the factors which need consideration:

1. Although the Joint Resolution carries with it no United States commitment, there will be set up a strong moral obligation to respond to an attack by international communism by use of U.S. armed forces if a victim of aggression which shows a determination to resist so requests. Failure to act would adversely affect defense arrangements throughout the world, encourage Soviet aggressiveness, and destroy area confidence in the United States.

[Numbered paragraph 2 (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Local counteraction by United States and indigenous forces is a possible alternative to global retaliation. If local action is to be a real possibility, advance preparations of a military nature are certainly required. Beside the military problems involved, questions of the most far-reaching political significance arise:

a. With respect to US-USSR relations, it is a major objective of United States policy to seek an acceptable adjustment which would reduce the dangers of armed clash with the Soviet Union. The further intrusion of a United States military presence in the Middle East area probably would make an adjustment more difficult to realize, at least in the first instance. While a stronger U.S. military position in the area might have a deterrent effect and eventually induce the USSR to seek a real accommodation, it is likely in the immediate future to stimulate greater Soviet activity. Should the U.S. decide to establish additional bases near its borders or deploy troops to the area, the USSR might estimate that a military threat was being directed against its own security and that this would justify its talking increased risks of war before the United States had consolidated new positions in the Middle East. Fear that the Baghdad Pact was the precursor of U.S. military bases was a factor of indeterminate importance leading to the Soviet decision of April 1955 to increase its activities in the Middle East.

b. With respect to the Middle East area, the present climate of opinion, with few exceptions, is strongly opposed to any arrangements implying subordination to a Western power. Efforts by the United States to obtain additional bases or other facilities for use in peacetime would mean, except for rare exceptions, bucking the dominant trend now at work in the area. Although individual leaders might accept such arrangements, the sentiment of the people generally is opposed. Trying to obtain special military rights would adversely affect the political impact of the President’s proposals and run counter to the stress placed on building up local power in contrast to the introduction of outside force. The Baghdad Pact countries are most anxious to build up the strength of their own forces for a variety of reasons not necessarily related: to the Soviet threat and are unlikely to accept the logic of reducing their forces as U.S. military strength in the area is built up.

c. Sharper differences would ensue with the so-called neutral nations, especially India. Divisions in the area would be increased.

d. Base or other facilities in the area would in most cases involve continuing difficulties with the host countries. Any facilities would have to be immediately available. It is questionable whether they could be kept in an adequate state of readiness without the presence of considerable numbers of United States personnel. The unfortunate experience of the British in attempting to maintain bases in the area is instructive.

4. A decision to defend the area by local use of U.S. and indigenous forces could lead to increased costs. Payment of local governments for bases and other facilities, the expense of United States personnel needed to maintain the bases, the direct costs of the U.S. troops earmarked for the area, and the cost of indigenous forces would all have to be taken into account.

5. Regarding the Baghdad Pact, it is important that the United States not permit it to fail now. Regardless of the Pact’s past history, United States prestige is deeply involved as is the willingness of area friends to stand up and be counted. At the same time, it would appear inadvisable to link the President’s proposals directly to the Pact, thus jeopardizing their acceptance by other area countries. Although King Saud’s understanding of the purposes of the Baghdad Pact has grown as a result of his visit here, he might withdraw his endorsement of the President’s proposals if they were based on the Pact. Arrangements with the Pact countries should not preclude encouragement of other regional groupings with a pro-Western orientation. The United States can probably act most effectively by continuing to strengthen the Pact while not joining formally. The Military Committee of the Pact provides a vehicle which could be used for planning with the area countries where this is most urgent, while avoiding to a considerable extent the political liabilities of full Pact membership.

Recommendations with Respect to the Richards Mission

While the complex problems outlined above will not be resolved before the departure of Ambassador Richards’ Mission, the Mission should be in a position to convey the impression that the United States is determined to implement if necessary the statement regarding use of U.S. armed forces. It should also try to maintain interest in the Baghdad Pact, disabusing area countries of any belief that the President’s proposals are intended as a substitute. At the same time, the Mission should strive to avoid losing possible support for the proposals from opponents of the Pact.

Accordingly the Mission might take the following positions in talks with foreign officials:

1. The President alone retains the ultimate decision on whether to employ the armed forces of the United States if requested to do so in the event of overt armed aggression by international communism.

2. The Joint Resolution authorizes the President to act quickly in an emergency.

3. Countries in the general area of the Middle East whose acts evidence their determination to maintain their independence against international communism may rest assured that in answer to a request the United States would take appropriate action inside or outside of the United Nations. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate stated—“The Joint Committee strongly supports the policy announced by the President of using armed force, if necessary, to help nations in the Middle East resist overt communist aggression. The Joint Committee has not the slightest doubt that, should such aggression occur and should American help be requested, help would be forthcoming promptly and forcefully.”

4. In reply to any inquiries regarding planning for the use of United States armed forces, facilities or bases, the Mission would state that any views area countries wish to advance will be carefully considered by the United States. The Mission should avoid any appearance of soliciting suggestions for combined planning, bases or other facilities in addition to existing arrangements.

5. The President’s proposals in no way supplant the Baghdad Pact. In the sense that both are directed at building strength against international communism they supplement each other. The United States stands fully behind its statement of November 29, 1956.

6. For their own confidential information only, the top leaders of the Baghdad Pact countries would be informed that the United States is prepared to join the Military Committee of the Pact if invited to do so at the next meeting of the Council. The desirability of keeping the information confidential for the present would be stressed. King Saud would be told of the decision and its importance in developing area strength against communism would be emphasized.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–3157. Top Secret. The source text is marked “General Paper 11” and is part of a series of position papers, drafted in the Department of State, in preparation for the special mission of Ambassador Richards to the Middle East. In addition to 11 position papers concerning economic, military, and procedural issues in general, papers analyzing the possibilities for involvement in the President’s special Middle East program were prepared for the following countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. All of these papers are ibid.

   Documentation on the Richards Mission in general is printed in this compilation. Documentation concerning those aspects of the Richards Mission pertaining to individual countries is printed in the respective compilations in volumes XIII, XVI, and XVIII. Additional documentation relating to the Mission is in Department of State, Central File 120.1580 and NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616, which contains Ambassador Richards’ personal files.

   The position paper printed here is a revision of a paper originally drafted on February 27. A cover sheet indicates that the paper was drafted by Burdett and cleared with Memminger, Stevens, Rockwell, Jones, and Withers in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; with the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and with Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff, except for recommendation 6. The paper was also cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Department of Defense “as appropriate guidance for the Richards Mission from a military viewpoint.”

2. The ellipses in the following quotation are in the source text.