Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

148. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, November 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Near East Policy

In response to your request there is attached an outline of short and long term U.S. plans in the Middle East. Current developments will, of course, affect actual implementation and timing.

We believe that the measures listed form an integrated program which gives reasonable chances of obtaining United States objectives in the Near East. These may be summarized as dislodging the Soviet Union from the foothold it is now in the process of acquiring and subsequently denying to it access to the area, while retaining the area resources, especially petroleum, for the West. In drawing up the program, we have taken into account the drastic decrease in British and French influence precipitated by their military action in Egypt, but because of our global relationships, hope we can cooperate.

We are now working through the United Nations in an endeavor to contain the immediate crisis, avoiding further gains for the USSR and to set in motion procedures for solving the basic problems. We recognize that firm measures may be necessary involving strong leadership and increased commitments by the United States. The long range program is designed to encourage the development of viable nations and their cooperation with the West. Strong emphasis is placed on economic and social progress as paths to area stability and achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the area.

Herbert Hoover Jr.

[Attachment]

AN OUTLINE OF SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM UNITED STATES PLANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Basic Objectives

A. Continued free world access to oil reserves

B. Continued free world right of passage (Suez Canal, pipelines, air lanes, etc.)

C. Preservation of the state of Israel and of independent Arab States

D. Exclusion of Soviet military power or political control

II. General Premise

A. United States objectives are best served by peace, political stability and economic and social progress in the Middle East.

III. Short-Term Plans

A. Measures within the United Nations

1. Continued compliance with Cease Fire Resolution of the General Assembly

The United States will continue to support the provisions of the resolutions with all parties concerned.

2. Withdrawal of British, French and Israeli Forces From Egyptian Territory

The United States would continue to hold that the forces of the three named countries are obliged to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The only question with regard to the immediacy of withdrawal would be that no political or military vacuum is created by the withdrawal of the forces. Such withdrawal therefore must be coordinated with the entry into the area of United Nations forces. It is not, however, up to the three Governments to decide on the nature and strength of the United Nations forces that replace their forces as they are withdrawn.

3. The United Nations Emergency Force

The United States would render such logistical and political assistance to the Secretary General and the Commander of the United Nations forces as may be requested and as may be feasible. The United States would hold that the area of operations and the duration of their stay in Egyptian territory for policing purposes should be clarified in the process of negotiations between the Secretary General and the parties concerned. It should be clear that the area and duration of stay are subject to review or approval by the General Assembly, and they cannot be unilaterally decided by the United Kingdom, France, Israel or Egypt.

4. Clearance of the Suez Canal

At Egypt’s request United Nations aid in clearing the Canal has been initiated. The United States would support any further United Nations steps necessary to ensure the most expeditious clearing of the canal and to ensure against any delay or conditions imposed by the Egyptian Government or by the British and French prior to their withdrawal.

5. Possible Enforcement of Israel-Arab Armistice Observers

The Acting Chief of Staff of the truce supervisory organization is Col. Byron V. Leary USMC. The United States would raise with the Secretary General the possibility or necessity of increasing the observer corps on the Jordan-Syria-Lebanon armistice lines with Israel.

6. General Assembly Action on the Settlement of the Suez Canal Problem

The United States would press for early consideration, subject to the views of the Secretary General and the reaction of member states, of the resolution which it tabled at the Emergency Session of the General Assembly calling for the establishment of a committee to negotiate a settlement based on the 6 proposals adopted by the Security Council on October 13.² An alternative to the Committees would be for the Secretary General himself to conduct the negotiations as already proposed by the Security Council. This change in the resolution is being actively considered at the moment. The United States must decide on its position with respect to the nature of the organization which will eventually run the Canal. This position would appear to lie somewhere between the 18 power proposals of London and the Menon plan which is in Egypt’s favor.

7. Settlement of the Arab-Israel Problem

The United States would press at a reasonably early date (depending on current developments and reactions of other member states) for adoption of the resolution which it tabled at the Emergency General Assembly Session which called for the establishment of a negotiating committee to replace the moribund and ineffective Palestine Conciliation Commission.³ The United States would be prepared to consider only such amendments to our proposals as would not prejudice the outcome of the efforts of the Committee and which [would not?] threaten any prompt or realistic settlement. The United States will have to make decisions which will serve as some guidance to the Committee on such matters as whether or not Arab-Israel negotiations will be direct; whether or not the Partition plan of 1947 should be the basis for negotiations between the parties; whether or not all refugees shall have an option for repatriation to Israel. Decision on these questions will probably have a determining effect on the passage of the United States resolution and the success of any negotiations resulting therefrom.

8. Arab Refugee Problem

We are actively considering whether to press at this General Assembly the reorganization of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine so that the administration of relief would be transferred to the Arab Governments instead of continuing the present unsatisfactory system of United Nations administration which has often not received the cooperation of the Arab states. While the desirability of taking this step is recognized, the question of timing has to be left open in light of developments in the area.

B. Other Political Measures

1. Saudi Arabia

We believe the influence of King Saud important in moderating both extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet views among the Arabs. We believe the King should be kept generally informed of our policies in the area and encouraged to support United States views. We continue steps which will draw Saudi Arabia and Iraq closer together [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. We are playing a moderating role in the dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom with respect to Buraimi. During recent months we have been discussing with King Saud and his advisers the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. King Saud has pressed for extensive grant military aid. We have made several alternative suggestions and expect to resume discussions in the near future.

2. Jordan

British influence is declining. The Soviet Union is endeavoring to increase its influence in Jordan by offers of arms. Jordan may establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Finally Jordan may break with the United Kingdom and take action terminating the present British subsidy. If this latter step should take place and in order to forestall a Soviet takeover, the United States should offer to assist Jordan financially and perhaps militarily in the context of closer federation with Iraq.

C. Economic Measures

1. Emergency Relief

a. Gaza

The Gaza refugee population will continue to be supported by UNRWA. The requirements of the non-refugee component of the population will be met by the Government of Israel as long as that Government remains in control of the area, with some supplementary assistance from voluntary agencies.

b. Suez Canal

Relief for the population in the Suez Canal Zone, including displaced persons, will be coordinated under the United Nations Emergency Force. International Red Cross has already provided some assistance.

2. Economic Aid

a. Technical Assistance

The United States has been extending technical assistance to the Arab States and Israel. No new assistance is now, however, planned for Egypt or Israel. The United States would extend aid to Syria if a new government not unfavorable to the West is established and to the Sudan if that Government should desire.

b. Development Assistance

The United States has been extending development assistance to the Arab States and Israel. No new assistance is now, however, planned for Egypt or Israel. The United States would extend assistance to the Sudan if that Government should wish, and to a new government in Syria if requested. The United States is also prepared to give loan assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iraq through MSP funds if these Governments are interested.

c. Export-Import Bank

The United States is prepared to support requests to the Export-Import Bank from the Arab States except in the case of Egypt and Israel.

d. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(Same as c, above, re Export-Import Bank financing.)

3. Transport of and Alternate Sources for Middle East Petroleum

a. Reactivation of tankers

The Maritime Commission and the Navy Department will continue to reactivate tankers for sale or lease by the MSTS.

b. Tanker Construction Program

A super tanker program should be carried out in American shipyards and financed by private industry.

c. Construction of Pipelines

(1) Turkey

Petroleum industry has from time to time indicated an interest in construction of a pipeline from the Iraq and Iranian oil fields through Turkey to Iskenderun. The Iraq Petroleum Company has undertaken a preliminary ground survey of such a pipeline. We support this activity. Projected growth in European consumption of petroleum suggests that this may be a desirable project.

(2) Israel

The Government of Israel is most anxious to construct a pipeline from Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba to Haifa on the Mediterranean. The practicality of this program depends on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This project does not seem feasible because Arab sources of oil would not be available to transit Israel.

(3) TAPLINE

TAPLINE is the only pipeline in operation in the Middle East. We should continue to urge the countries through which the lines operate to give adequate protection.

4. Iraq Petroleum Company

Three pumping stations were destroyed in Syria. IPC reports that partial flow can be restored. We should continue to urge Syrian cooperation in re-establishing the operation of these pipelines.

d. Assistance from the Western Hemisphere

Increased production in the United States and other Western Hemisphere producing areas would reduce the impact of the loss of Middle East oil to Europe. We are studying ways and means, through existing committees, to compensate for the disruption in oil supplies from the Middle East.

e. Financing

We have before us the financial impact on Britain, France and certain other countries of the Near East crisis which we will have to consider and in all probability will have to lend some assistance.

4. Trade Controls

The United States is screening the export to Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia of quasi-military items such as jeeps, tires and tubes, automotive parts and multiple drive trucks.

5. Egyptian Assets Controls

Following Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal, the United States blocked approximately $40 million of assets belonging to the Government of Egypt, as well as assets belonging to the Canal Company.

D. Military Measures

1. Baghdad Pact

During the past few weeks there has been increasing pressure on the part of the members of the Baghdad Pact for US adherence. American representatives in the countries of the Baghdad Pact all favor US adherence. Some of the Departments and Agencies of the US Government in Washington favor US adherence. The Department of State does not believe that the US should adhere to the Baghdad Pact at this time. Reasons against adherence include the adverse reaction of the USSR, Israel and some of the Arab states. Meanwhile the Department of State believes there are several intermediate steps which would have the effect of supporting the members of the Baghdad Pact. These include:

a. The immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar with American training crews. This equipment would also serve southeastern Turkey and parts of Iran.

b. An offer to survey air raid warning requirements in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. This might be accompanied by a visit from a high-ranking US Air Force officer. Turkey’s needs are being handled through NATO.

c. Immediate implementation of a small US program to train 15 Iraqi pilots which later might be enlarged.

d. A public reaffirmation of support for collective security through the Baghdad Pact. A proposed statement is attached (Tab A).⁴

2. Military Assistance to Near Eastern States

At the present time Iraq is the only Near Eastern state which receives US grant aid. The program is small, totalling only about $10 million annually. Other Near Eastern states, including Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel have mutual security agreements under which they may with US consent purchase military items in the US. There are no agreements with Syria and Jordan. We believe this program should continue with the following changes: The present ban on shipments of military items to Israel and Egypt should continue for the time being. The US would be willing to supply military assistance on a grant and loan basis to Syria and Jordan should subsequent circumstances make it desirable. The US would also be willing to supply grant military assistance to Saudi Arabia in addition to present reimbursable aid providing reciprocal advantages were received at Dhahran air field.

3. US Sixth Fleet

An immediate visit by major units to Beirut [to] demonstrate US support for Lebanon. A similar visit to the Persian Gulf ports of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran by units of CONMID East Force.

IV. Long-Term Plans

A. Preservation of Peace

1. Take leadership in UN action to fix permanent boundaries between Israel and the Arab states and participate in such guarantees against change by force as may be necessary.

2. Strengthen the military posture of Iran with emphasis on internal security and resistance to infiltration and guerrilla activities.

3. Re Baghdad Pact

a. Give unilateral assurance of assistance pursuant to our constitutional processes to all Pact members in case of armed attack.

b. Induce Pact members to revise the Pact giving greater emphasis to economic, political and cultural cooperation, possibly making it more attractive to other states in the area.

4. Consider ways and means of controlling arms shipments to Israel and the bordering Arab states.

B. Improvement of Political Stability

1. Utilize all appropriate opportunities to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reduce Nasser’s prestige and influence.

2. Assist Iraq to expand its influence in Syria and Jordan.

a. Possibly encourage a federation of Iraq, Syria and Jordan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified],

3. Further strengthen Saudi Arabia [less than one line of source text not declassified],

4. Possibly encourage a North Africa confederation from Libya to Morocco as a counterpoise to Egypt and if necessary to an Iraq-Syria-Jordan federation.

5. Support political elements in Israel that accept the permanent Israel-Arab states boundaries to be fixed.

6. Base our association with France in the Middle East on a recognition that the French are no longer able to play a constructive role in the area.

7. Base our association with the UK in the Middle East on a recognition that its position in the area has been seriously prejudiced by its action against Egypt and that the US must assume leadership in maintaining and restoring the Western position in the area.

C. Economic Measures

1. Take the leadership in UN action to bring about the resettlement of the Arab refugees.

2. Encourage the formation of a regional economic organization among the Arab states to deal with the resettlement of the refugees and to foster general economic and social progress in the area.

a. Encourage the oil producing states to assist Syria and Jordan.

3. Provide substantial economic and technical aid to assist the member states of the organization in carrying out programs for refugee resettlement and general development either

a. through bilateral programs geared to the organization’s plans and projects or

b. by contributions to a common organization fund and pool of technicians.

4. Encourage production of super-tankers and possibly an Iraq-Turkey pipeline to reduce Western European dependence on the Suez Canal for access to Middle East oil.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text is undated, but another copy with the attachment is dated November 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–2156) A separate copy of Hoover’s covering memorandum is also dated November 21 and bears the typed marginal inscription: “Prepared for mtg at White House at 4:00 4/21/56”. (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Near & Middle East)
2. Tabled on November 3; see vol. XVI, p. 960.
3. Tabled on November 3; see Ibid.
4. Not attached to the source text. A copy of the proposed statement is attached to the copy of this memorandum in Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–2156.