147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 21, 1956, 4 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Humphrey
- Secretary Robertson
- Dr. Flemming
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- Admiral Radford
- Mr. Jackson
- Colonel Goodpaster
- Secretary Hoover
- Mr. Rountree
- Mr. Phleger
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Hollister
The President opened the meeting saying it was for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the sequence of actions planned in the Middle East, and the means of dovetailing actions in the fields of oil and finance, for example, with these plans. The meeting was not intended to result in decisions. Mr. Hoover gave the President a preliminary document,2 which he stressed was not thoroughly coordinated or refined, outlining such steps, and the President read it to the assembled group, interspersing comments from time to time.
The President reiterated his feeling that we should work toward building up King Saud as a major figure in the Middle Eastern area. He thought we should probably search for some way to induce the British to get out of Buraimi. He thought that we must make sure that Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq at least are aware of what we are doing, and give their assent. We must explain a number of points to them very carefully. We must prevent the dissolution of Western Europe, and once withdrawal from the Suez has begun, we must let them know that we are going to aid Western Europe financially. We must stress the importance of restoring Saud’s oil markets in Western Europe. If we raise output from the U.S., it will be very hard to cut back. If at all possible, [Page 341] we should use Buraimi as an ace in the hole. We must face the question, what must we do in Europe and then the question, how do we square this with the Arabs?
Mr. Hoover said that as soon as a major movement of French and British out of Suez begins, he felt sure we would see a relaxation throughout the area. The President thought we should not simply assume this, but should work out an understanding with the Arabs. Mr. Rountree thought a schedule showing a sequence of steps would be valuable. Mr. Phleger suggested that it seems likely the British Cabinet will decide to get the troops out of the Suez area. Mr. Humphrey said that our next step must be to get square with the Arabs, once withdrawal has begun.
Mr. Robertson made a strong statement in behalf of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. He felt that Iraq, Iran, and perhaps Saudi Arabia would welcome such action, the latter particularly if it were tied to an agreement on Buraimi. The President thought that if the British get us into the Baghdad Pact—as the matter would appear to the Arabs—we would lose our influence with the Arabs. The British could then take a very intransigent stand. He suggested the possibility of getting the British out of Buraimi; then we and the Saudis should declare our support for the Baghdad Pact.
Mr. Hoover said that timing is the key to the whole problem, and said that we might do well to make a declaration in support of the Pact, rather than joining it.
The President reiterated that we ought to approach the U.K. asking them to express readiness to leave Buraimi. This would give us something with which to work out further agreements with the Arabs. Mr. Hoover said it is a question not only of King Saud himself, but of his people—who may desert him in order to oppose the West at any time. He said he had talked to Mr. Anderson, and was planning for Mr. Anderson to go out next Tuesday.
Mr. Humphrey thought we should not let Butler and Macmillan come until after a talk with Saud had been conducted. Thus, we would establish our position, so that he would understand the British being here. Mr. Hoover said the essential step is that the British and French get out of Port Said. The President pointed out that this really had two parts—the first when they start to leave and the second when they are completely out.
Mr. Allen Dulles stressed that the situation is worsening very seriously in Iraq, and that Nuri may not be able to survive very long. There was discussion as to what could be done to bolster his position, with a consensus indicating that provision of some military aid, particularly radars, and possibly some U.S. air units, coupled with a statement of some sort in support of the Baghdad Pact nations, seemed to be a desirable plan. There was discussion as to the relative importance [Page 342] of the Middle East and of Western Europe, culminating in statements by the President and Secretary Humphrey that the two must be considered together, and are together the most strategic area in the world—Western Europe requires Middle Eastern oil, and Middle Eastern oil is of importance mainly through its contribution to the Western European economy.
Dr. Flemming said we must know soon about going ahead with our oil pooling. He could see the way clear to do this if the Arabs agreed, but if they did not, he wondered what our line of action would be. Mr. Hoover said that the Canal can be cleared to 25 feet within 30 days, according to British estimates. Mr. Humphrey said that more than oil is involved. The British are facing a financial crisis within ten days. He thought the sequence of events was this: the British will start out of Suez in a few days; the British will want to come over here a few days later, and this will be the time when we must bargain hard with them; between these dates we must let King Saud, and even Nasser, know that, in starting talks with the British, we have not reversed our stand toward them, and that we want an understanding with them prior to the British talks; by December 3rd our arrangements must be in hand, since this is the date of the British financial announcement.
Mr. Hoover said that we are dealing with slow moving Governments in the Middle East and we cannot expect quick results. He would try to give the Arabs the idea that we helped to get the British and the French out of Suez. The President said that the moment troops start out of Suez we should tell the Arabs that we are starting to confer with the Western Europeans on how soon we can restore Middle East oil markets in Western Europe.
The President finally asked whether there is anyone we can send out to Iraq to try to help out in that situation. He thought that we could perhaps help in Iraq by working through the Saudi Arabians. Mr. Rountree raised the possibility of a unilateral declaration in support of Iran and Iraq. He thought this would bolster these countries.
Colonel CE, U S Army
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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. A memorandum from MacArthur to Hoover, November 21, indicates that during MacArthur’s meeting with President Eisenhower that morning, the President directed Goodpaster to call an off-the-record meeting of the members of the NSC and certain other key government officials to discuss the Department of State’s plans in the Middle East. MacArthur’s memorandum also notes that following this meeting he met with Rountree and Bowie and that work was currently underway to produce two papers: one on short-term and the other on long-term plans.
Attached to MacArthur’s memorandum is a memorandum from the President to William Jackson directing Jackson to arrange an informal meeting at the White House to include the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The purpose of the meeting was to receive a Department of State outline on short-term and long-term plans in the Middle East and “to make certain that our trade and other operations are coordinated with the principal elements in the State Department planning”. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/11–2156)
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