143. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, November 16, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of 26 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Burke. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy, Bowie, and Wilkins. The first three items discussed were: “Eastern Europe,” “Near East Situation,” and “Syria.”]
4. Baghdad Pact
Admiral Radford referred to a telegram from the Army Attaché in Baghdad (AB 212 of November 14) in which responsible Iraqi army leaders indicated considerable pessimism and stated that only the U.S. could save the situation. Admiral Radford then stated that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs, it was felt that the U.S. should join the Baghdad Pact immediately. He did not believe Israel would oppose our joining the Pact. The Joint Chiefs consider this step to be the only way to stabilize the situation.
Mr. Murphy commented that Secretary Dulles had considered this matter several days ago and continued to be of the view that we should not join.
Admiral Radford emphasized that the Pact is likely to fall apart and, if it does, it cannot be put together again. He noted both that the recent meeting of prime ministers in Baghdad was unanimous in support of the view that the U.S. should join the Pact and also that all our ambassadors in the area are emphatic in support of our joining.
Admiral Radford asked why Mr. Dulles opposes our joining. Mr. Murphy replied that the Secretary presumably felt that the same reasons for opposition to our joining as were applicable earlier still persist. He then asked what advantages the Joint Chiefs thought might flow from our adherence.
Admiral Radford replied that we are already closely involved in financial and military planning aspects of the Pact. If we join, we would probably be asked to designate an American commander-in-chief, which would give us further control over activities under the Pact. We could establish U.S. bases probably in Iraq at the north end of the Persian Gulf; we could from such bases be prepared to operate rapidly in event of difficulty in Syria. We could also support Iraq, which is now in a bad way.
[Page 328]The Admiral also thought that we could persuade Israel that it is in its interest that the U.S. join the Pact in order to counter what might happen in Syria and to support Iraq.
Admiral Radford also observed that Nasser’s prestige is now greater than ever. The only effective way for us to counter this is by joining the Pact.
Mr. Murphy inquired whether the Joint Chiefs thought that our joining the Pact might not bring about a closer association between the Soviet Union and the Arabs. Admiral Radford said that they did not think so. Mr. Murphy inquired about the reaction of Saudi Arabia, and Admiral Radford replied that the Saudis might even join the Pact. He noted that Governor General Mirza of Pakistan had so predicted.
General Taylor said that Admiral Radford’s description of the reasons why we should join expressed his views. Admiral Burke said he thought another affirmative factor is the likelihood that our declaration of intention to join the Pact would facilitate a withdrawal from Suez by the British and French. He noted that the British now have 12,000 to 17,000 troops in Suez and want the UNEF to build up to this approximate level before they pull out. If the British do not pull out soon, say within two to three weeks, the Arabs will react impetuously and may possibly seek to force the UK out of the Baghdad Pact.
Admiral Radford said that if the British and French do pull out of Suez, we will have no way to counter Soviet influence in the Near East other than by taking immediate steps to join the Pact. Our joining would make the British and French much more willing to withdraw from Suez. He noted that the French now believe it desirable for us to join the Pact.
Admiral Radford stressed that the situation is urgent. We must act fast. The danger of collapse in Iraq is great. The Admiral ventured the guess that, if we do not act by December 1, we will have lost our chance.
Mr. Wilkins commented that two serious objections to our joining the Pact had always been the danger of a serious adverse Soviet reaction and the likelihood that we would thereby be more associated in Arab minds with the UK and the French. He also noted that Turkey and Pakistan, two members of the Baghdad Pact, are allied with us in NATO and SEATO. He commented that possibly by separate arrangements with Iraq and Iran we could accomplish our purposes without formal adherence to the Pact.
Admiral Radford said that he had followed this situation carefully in the NSC and in discussions at the White House with Congressional leaders. He is of the view that opposition to our joining would not be particularly strong. His impression was that we had decided earlier not to join for domestic political reasons, and he doubted that these were now as strong as they might once have been. Mr. Murphy noted that [Page 329] there were of course other important factors such as the Soviet reaction, the position of Israel, and the general uncertainty in the area. Admiral Radford reiterated that if we do not join in one month, we will have lost our opportunity.
Mr. Murphy commented that earlier the Joint Chiefs had not shown much enthusiasm for involvement in the Near East. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs have for some time now felt it desirable that we join the Pact. He emphasized that our joining would give us further control over the situation in the Near East.
Mr. Bowie said that U.S. adherence to the Pact as urged by Admiral Radford raised a number of basic questions, such as the degree of commitment we would undertake if we were to adhere, the matter of obtaining bases and administering them, the political effect on the situation in the Near East, questions of supply and equipment, and finally the best way to deal with the Soviets in this situation. Might not, for example, a flat declaration by the U.S. that it would not let the Soviets get away with intervention in the Near East serve the same purpose.
Admiral Radford replied that to date we had neither joined the Pact nor made any unilateral statement. Mr. Murphy commented that we would have less freedom of action if we joined than we have now. The Admiral replied that this is so but is always the case if we remain outside of a treaty.
Mr. Gray commented that the question of military assistance would probably be more difficult if we joined the Pact. Admiral Radford replied that we are getting a large volume of requests for equipment now and that in any case we recognize the need to do more for countries in the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Bowie observed that whenever the U.S. joins a security arrangement the other participants are inclined to feel that they are doing us a favor and, therefore, we should reward them. Admiral Radford said that he thought the problem of military assistance could be handled adequately.
Mr. Bowie asked whether the military forces that would become allied with us could be considered significant. Admiral Radford commented that we do not have significant forces allied with us in some parts of NATO and SEATO.
Admiral Radford said he thought the NSC should consider this matter urgently. Mr. Bowie said that the question of our relations with the Baghdad Pact would be before the Planning Board on November 19. Mr. Wilkins said that NEA is preparing a memorandum on this subject describing the problems and listing a number of courses of action, including ones short of our adherence to the Baghdad Pact, which might be taken to help the situation.
[Page 330]Admiral Radford described the various military measures being taken by the Joint Chiefs to be prepared for possible additional trouble in the Near East. He noted that a memorandum on this subject is in the Department for clearance before going to the White House. He said that the difficulty faced by the Joint Chiefs is having forces ready and available if trouble should start.
Mr. Murphy inquired about the air situation in Turkey. Admiral Radford replied that it is bad and then referred to the memorandum of the Turkish recently handed to Ambassador Warren. General Twining replied to Mr. Bowie’s question that planes in Turkey are capable of getting up to 35,000-40,000 feet and not simply to 20,000 feet as indicated by the Turks. Admiral Burke said that the Russians are running pretty good reconnaissance over Turkey, mostly from an altitude of about 35,000 feet.
Mr. Murphy said that he would talk to Secretary Dulles about this matter before the Secretary leaves for Florida and that the Department would give urgent consideration to this problem. A future meeting with the Joint Chiefs might be held as a matter of priority.2
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 66 D 407. Top Secret. Drafted by Richard Finn. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with Defense.”↩
- Murphy subsequently sent a memorandum to Hoover summarizing this conversation. Murphy added to his memorandum the handwritten comment: “I also agreed to obtain the Secretary’s views which were later provided to Radford by memo.” (Ibid., 780.5/11–1656) For the Secretary’s views, see infra.↩