Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 15, 1956—1 p.m.

856. Baghdad Pact. I have noted with considerable interest series recent requests and pressures in Baghdad and at pact-member capitals for US adherence BP, particularly those flowing from Tehran meeting Moslem PMs. Am pouching tomorrow despatch containing my views.² Summary follows.

As I informed Department prior to Council formation (Embtel 715, March 15, 1955)³ and prior April pact meeting Tehran (Embtel 1050, April 17, 1956)⁴ I believed half measures not enough and that formal adherence by US to pact needed more than anything else to transform pact into going concern. Today reasons for this view exist in even greater force.

Pact objectives same as those US and of undoubted validity pact considerable symbol US policy objectives Northern Tier area and if it falters seriously or fails, US position and influence will suffer major setback. For last few months pact facing difficulties particularly in economic and military fields. Owing observer status US limited to observations and inhibited from taking leadership many matters thus leaving UK with major burden. Now even this in jeopardy owing loss UK prestige in ME and Iraqi views re its relationship to UK in pact. It clear in Baghdad that Iraq and pact member representatives expect decision for US adherence soon after elections. This expectation real and resulting disappointment and disillusion may well affect our friendly and cooperative relations with some present pact members. Owing pact wording actual US defense commitments would not be increased. While some increase in “moral commitment” toward area might result, US response to attack in pact area, as elsewhere, would depend upon total circumstances existing at time. Communists and neutralists attacking pact may well conclude their efforts have borne fruit if no US adherence and they may be emboldened to further activity vis-à-vis pact and ME members. US prestige now at new high in ME thus blunting weapons most local opponents. Within limits of pact US would have large legitimate measure freedom of action and movement to meet present serious threat and urgent military needs of Iraq. It also possible US adherence will make continued UK membership more palatable to ME members, especially Iraq.

In my opinion most of reasons formerly advanced for non-adherence now no longer valid or have dwindled in significance.

I reiterate best available means of obtaining Northern Tier goals of prevention eventual successful Communist subversion and domination several major ME countries is US adherence to pact at or before Karachi meeting. Otherwise it will slowly die and it will be a long time, if ever, before circumstances will make possible the recreation of a framework with which to plan and act for the safety and well-being of this sensitive part of the world.

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1556. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, Tehran, Paris, and Rome.
2. Despatch 307 from Baghdad, November 15. (Ibid., 780.5/11–1556)
3. Reference is presumably to telegram 713, Document 24. Telegram 715 from Baghdad concerns another matter.
4. Reference is presumably to telegram 1050 from Baghdad, April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–756) In this telegram, Gallman noted in part: “Unquestionably considerable impatience and discouragement are developing with what is regarded as equivocal US position regarding Pact. I am not convinced however that at this late date half measures are going to help. As I have indicated before, our formal adherence is needed more than anything else to transform Pact into a really going concern.”