131. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 7, 19561
SUBJECT
- Meeting of Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact Powers
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Musa Shabandar, Iraqi Ambassador
- His Excellency Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- His Excellency Dr. Ali Amini, Iranian Ambassador
- His Excellency Mohammad Ali, Pakistani Ambassador
- Mr. Ilhan Savut, Counselor, Turkish Embassy
- Mr. Hashim Khalil, Counselor, Iraqi Embassy
- Mr. William M. Rountree, Department of State
- Mr. David D. Newsom, Department of State
President’s Statement:
The meeting began with a general discussion of the statement made the previous day by the President concerning neutral nations. The Ambassadors present expressed the hope that the United States would not embarrass those who were cooperating in collective security by excessive concessions to neutral nations. During the course of the meeting, Mr. Rountree received and distributed the later clarification of this statement issued by the White House. The Pakistani Ambassador said he would have wished the statement to be somewhat stronger, but he and the others expressed general satisfaction with it. The British Ambassador remarked that, considering the frequency with which U.S. officials exposed themselves to the press, it was remarkable that there were so few problems of this kind.
Nehru’s Visit:
The Pakistani Ambassador, reading from a telegram from Karachi, then stated he wished to express the concern of his government over the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Nehru of India to the United States. He said his government was fearful that Mr. Nehru might attempt to influence the economic and political policies of the United States in Asia and that any change in these policies would have serious repercussions in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact countries. He asked that Mr. Rountree make known these views to the President and the Secretary. The Iraqi and Iranian Ambassadors concurred in the démarche; the others said they would request instructions.
[Page 304]The Ambassador then expressed his personal view that Mr. Nehru, who desires India to be in a position to dictate to both power groups, would put the President and the Secretary initially on the defensive by his approach. He said he believed the United States should “call Nehru’s bluff” and take a stiff attitude with him. The United States, he said, should not be fearful that Nehru will be thrown to the Communists.
Governments in countries which have taken the bold step of supporting collective security will be weakened by any evidence that the neutral nations benefit from their position, the Ambassador said. People, he added, are already asking questions in the absence of strong moral support from the West, and particularly, from the United States. He did not deny, he said, that the United States should help India, but the feeling must be avoided that the Pact nations are “taken for granted” and others gain.
Mr. Rountree replied that the Baghdad Pact nations needed have no fear of any lessening of the firm United States support for collective security. Mr. Nehru’s views, he said, were well known to the United States and it would be difficult to perceive that they could be more forcefully brought to United States attention than in the past. He said further that he was surprised that there should be such a question of the degree of support which we give to our friends. He said this support has been definitely greater than what we have given to others. Our aid to India, for example, he said, has not been large in terms of India’s total population.
One may ask, he added, why we aid India at all? In the judgment of the United States we should continue to work toward influencing India to adopt new policies. India is clamoring for help. If she does not get some from the United States, she may get it entirely from the Soviet bloc; this would make the task of the Soviet bloc that much easier. The problem of the United States is to maintain a balance. Mr. Rountree said he believed that balance had been maintained fairly well.
The Secretary’s statement in Karachi, he said, should have gone far toward meeting the Pakistani desire for an expression of United States interest. Similarly, he added, the United States program in Iran is a concrete demonstration of United States interest.
The problem is complicated, Mr. Rountree pointed out, by an exaggeration of the help we are giving to others, even where careful examination shows no favoritism. In the case of the High Aswan Dam, for example, the amount the United States might spend would be over a long period of years and would, annually, be small in comparison to the aid given our friends.
[Page 305]The Pakistani Ambassador replied that he appreciated Mr. Rountree’s remarks. The problem, however, he said, is not so much what the actual facts are, but lies in what the people understand about them. The Secretary’s statement in Karachi, he said, was not couched in language that made a great impact; he realized, of course, that the United States does not make the kind of irresponsible statements that some other national leaders do.
The Ambassador added that he was troubled by one aspect of the United States aid to India. First, economic aid permits India to use other funds for purchasing armament. Secondly, while Pakistan is required, under the United States aid agreement to maintain its armed forces at a certain level, India does not labor under such a stipulation.
Mr. Rountree replied that economic aid to India did not begin even to meet India’s vast needs. He believed there was little chance United States economic aid actually released any funds for other uses.
Cultural Activities of Baghdad Pact:
Ambassador Shabandar of Iraq said he hoped that Baghdad Pact country Ambassadors would be able to meet from time to time to talk frankly about the Pact. What happened at Tehran, he said, was most helpful and moved many in Iraq who were previously hesitant about the Pact.
The Pact nations, he said, are still confronted by a strong current of anti-Pact propaganda and there is need from time to time to give the Pact a new impetus, either by having the United States formally join or by new ideas and new objectives.
The Ambassador, seeking for some new positive step by the nations in the Pact, suggested that a cultural committee might be formed. He proposed a cultural offensive which would emphasize that, through the Pact, the Moslem nations were ready to cooperate with the Christian nations to meet the Communist threat. He emphasized that the Pact needed an ideology to combat Communist ideology.
The Pakistani Ambassador agreed. He said that the Pact faced three dangers, military, economic, and ideological, and needed to be strong on all three fronts.
The British Ambassador agreed that the Baghdad Pact Organization needed to be broadly based and should take on as many responsibilities as it could readily absorb. The primary purpose, in his view, was the building of a defensive bastion. He emphasized that the Organization was only one year old and that its development had, in actuality, been remarkable in this short time. He said that the Pact Organization was currently proceeding to examine possible joint economic projects and that it was giving attention to the propaganda and publicity aspect. Much work is to be done, he said, in building an audience and a common interest in the Pact. The new radio station at [Page 306] Baghdad, he said, will help in overcoming the previous communications advantage which those attacking the Pact have had. He asked the question whether these activities might not be as much as the Organization could currently absorb.
Referring to the suggestion that a cultural committee be formed, the British Ambassador asked the question whether further committees should be formed now or whether a start might be made on cultural matters within the field of the present publicity and propaganda organs.
The Turkish Counselor said he agreed in principle with Ambassador Shabandar and said he would refer to his Government the suggestion concerning the formation of a cultural committee. He said the need may ultimately arise, but he believed it might be preferable to concentrate on present activities.
The Iranian Ambassador pointed out that the Iraqi Ambassador’s suggestion had been wider in scope than the formation of a cultural committee, that it had, in essence, approached the problem of attracting the rest of the Moslem world to the Christian-Moslem bloc.
Ambassador Shabandar agreed that this was his idea. The Pact nations, he said, were being attacked as supporting imperialism. He mentioned Israel and North Africa. The lives of the Moslem nations are in danger from the Communist threat and they need the support of the strong Christian nations. He said he was writing to his government along these lines. He asked what the views of the United States observer were on this matter.
Mr. Rountree said that he was certain the close collaboration of the Baghdad Pact nations in all fields was in the mind of the people who came together to form the Pact. He said the desirability of using it as an instrument in the cultural field could not be excluded and that it was certainly for the member nations to decide whether any new committees should be created. Whether or not a committee was created, he said, the cultural aspects should be pursued. In general, he said, it was his belief that any idea should be carefully and sympathetically considered which is in line with the broad policy objectives of the Pact. He said he questioned whether the idea of Christian-Moslem religious collaboration might not create more problems than it would solve. A broader cultural exchange might be preferable to one based on religion; the latter might have an unfortunate connotation with people of the other great religions: Hindus and Jews, for example. He said he merely put this forward as a question.
Press Release:
The Ambassadors agreed that a press release would be issued stating simply that the Ambassadors had met for a discussion of common problems.
[Page 307]Next Meeting:
The British Ambassador invited the Baghdad Pact Embassies and the Department to his Embassy for the next meeting. No date was set.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–756. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on June 13.↩