130. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 23, 1956, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follows a list of 23 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Twining, Admiral Burke, and General Pate. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy and Henderson.]
1. Baghdad Pact
Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs would like to hear the comments of Mr. Henderson on the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in April. Mr. Henderson commented as follows:
When he arrived in London April 12 on his way to Tehran, he found great concern on the part of Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd over the Council meeting to be held shortly and over the role of the United States. The British were particularly eager to know what specific contribution the United States planned to make. Eden emphasized his intention to tell the Soviet leaders, who were [Page 300] about to visit London, that the Middle East is an important area to the United Kingdom and the UK could not permit irresponsible elements to take over there.
When he arrived at Tehran, Mr. Henderson found great concern on the part of the Pact powers about the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for the Pact’s future. Nuri Pasha stressed that greater US participation was essential. High officials of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran all revealed feelings of frustration, worry, fear and puzzlement. They were particularly puzzled over the attitude of the U.S. and were concerned lest the U.S. be considering some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union behind their backs. They emphasized that their governments are pro-West but that they were being undermined by the “evangelical neutralists” like Nasser and Nehru. The Turks pointed out that Nasser is apparently going to get large assistance for the Aswan Dam while they, a good ally of the U.S., are having economic difficulties. The Turks and the Iraqis pointed out that Soviet overtures are being made in their direction and that parliamentary leaders of their countries are being invited to Moscow.
Mr. Henderson said that he had stressed at every opportunity the view of the U.S. that there had been no basic change in Soviet objectives but only in tactics. As a general observation, Mr. Henderson felt that the strongest reaction on the part of the Baghdad Pact nations was anger and irritation toward Nasser and Nehru. They were also irritated over Saudi Arabia, which was using money from American oil companies on behalf of Egyptian propaganda. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The UK in this connection, asked about the attitude of the U.S. toward oil revenues for Saudi Arabia. Mr. Henderson commented in reply that the U.S. did not wish to dictate to American oil companies on this kind of problem and pointed out that Iraq and Iran would not want the U.S. to be dictating to American companies operating in their countries should a comparable political problem arise. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey was perhaps the most positive personality at the conference in his attitude toward communists and neutralists.
Mr. Henderson said he thought Mohammed Ali of Pakistan was the star of the conference and was a figure of sufficient restraint, intelligence and forcefulness to be able to hold his own easily with Nehru. Mohammed Ali pressed for Pact actions on Kashmir and the Durand Line. Mr. Henderson had pointed out to him reasons why such action would be unwise, but the Pact powers agreed to statements on both these questions in response to Pakistani urging.
Regarding Afghanistan, Mr. Henderson said that there was general concern it might become a Soviet satellite. The Iranians were particularly worried about this. The Turks had observed that they have [Page 301] good relations with Afghanistan and have a military mission there. The Turks said they would do what they could to help out, and Mohammed Ali also said that he planned to go to Kabul.
Regarding Israel, there was general agreement that there would be no stability in the Middle East until the problem of Israel, or as they preferred to call it, Palestine, was solved. Nuri felt that the U.S. view that Nasser might take a more reasonable position was foolish because Nasser needs the Palestine issue to advance his nationalist purposes. Nuri himself had seemed fairly liberal on the Palestine issue and said he had advised Nasser that he would cooperate in the settlement of this problem.
Admiral Radford said that he had run into very much the same kind of attitudes in the Middle East as those described by Mr. Henderson. The Admiral commented that we must try to counteract these attitudes and that particular attention should be paid to statements appearing in the U.S. press. Mr. Henderson commented that an article in which Walter Reuther praised neutralist India had not helped him at Tehran, even though George Meany had countered the Reuther article the following day.
Mr. Henderson said that the Baghdad Pact leaders had relaxed a good bit when the U.S. showed that it was willing to participate further in Pact activities. They were enthusiastic when the U.S. said it would station a flag officer in Baghdad for military liaison. He stressed, however, that effective action by the U.S. would be necessary before the next meeting of the Pact Council at Karachi in January. Admiral Radford said he thought that the high-powered U.S. delegation had greatly helped the Pact meeting at Tehran. Mr. Henderson replied that Admiral Cassady had been most effective. Mr. Henderson said he personally believed in the Baghdad Pact very strongly and that without it we would be in a bankrupt position in the Middle East. Admiral Radford agreed and added that we could go on the way we are now going only for so long before real difficulty will arise.
Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs feel it desirable to set up a unified command in the Middle East but the problem is where to put it. If we join the Baghdad Pact we could have a place to locate such a command. Mr. Henderson commented that the attitude of the UK has changed and they are now eager for the U.S. to participate in Pact activities. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] He said that he thought he might ask General Whiteley here in Washington what the details of the British plans are. Mr. Murphy said he thought this was a good idea. Admiral Radford said that if the Chiefs agreed, he would ask General Whiteley. If this course failed, perhaps a government-to-government approach to the UK might be made.
[Page 302]Admiral Radford noted that physical facilities in Baghdad are inadequate for a U.S. staff headed by a flag officer. Mr. Henderson said that the Department was in a fairly good position so far as its building program is concerned, and he hoped to be able to improve the situation.
Admiral Burke asked whether it is advisable that the U.S. set up a permanent liaison group in Baghdad before the other powers do. Admiral Radford said that the other powers are setting up permanent groups but that we do not want to have too high ranking an officer. Mr. Henderson commented that the sooner we do this the sooner they will do it, and observed that it would be unfortunate if we went back on our undertaking to assign a flag officer for this job.
[Here follows Item 2, “U.S. Bases in Morocco.”]
3. Middle East Evacuation
Mr. Murphy noted that this subject had been raised some time ago by the Joint Chiefs. He said that the State Department does not favor a general notice deterring travel by U.S. citizens to the Near East and would oppose an evacuation of American citizens from the Near East and restrictions on travel by military dependents to the area at this time. He commented that any such action by the U.S. might have a panicky reaction.
Admiral Radford said that it is basically a problem for the State Department and noted that the situation seems to be somewhat better. Admiral Blake commented that the question is how to put pressure on Nasser to take a more reasonable position. In response to Admiral Radford’s question, Mr. Murphy said that tourism brings in a fair amount of money to Egypt.
Admiral Radford asked whether the appraisal of the State Department is that the Middle East situation is better. Mr. Murphy replied that there appears to be a temporary lull at least.
Regarding the view of UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, Mr. Murphy commented that Hammarskjold appears to shift the tone of his remarks depending on the audience he is talking to.
Admiral Burke expressed the view that Nasser is trying to exert more control over the Egyptian Foreign Office and may even be putting military officers in the Foreign Office.
[Here follow Items 4–7: “Joint Military Planning with the British,” “NNSC,” “Term,” and “Philippine Bases.”]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”↩