Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

338. Memorandum From Paul C. Daniels to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Antarctica

Preliminary examination of problems relating to Antarctica has been completed. This memorandum requests your approval of actions to be taken.

Background

Seven countries have thus far made formal claims to territory in Antarctica—United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina, and Chile. There are two large unclaimed sectors. The United States has important potential claims but has filed no formal claim. The Soviet Union has been engaging in extensive activity in Antarctica in connection with the current International Geophysical Year but has not as yet filed a claim. Japan, Belgium, and South Africa are also participating in the IGY program in Antarctica and have made no claims. Attached as Tab A is a map showing the status of claims.²

In 1948 the United States proposed to claimant powers an international condominium. No action was taken on this proposal. Nor has the United States publicly reaffirmed or withdrawn this proposal.

The NSC on June 26, 1957, adopted a policy (NSC 5715/1,³ attached as Tab B) providing that (a) the United States should immediately determine the areas within presently claimed territory which it wishes to claim; (b) diplomatic conversations should be held with appropriate Free World claimants both to advise them of our intention to advance a formal claim to unclaimed sectors and to other areas in which we have rights and to negotiate mutual recognition of claims and the method of exercising sovereignty; and (c) the United States should assert an immediate claim if the USSR should make a claim or if UN action or other developments made this desirable.

. . . . . . .

Recommendations:

A. That secret consultations be initiated with the Governments of the claimant states, initially with Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, on the basis of the following tentative U.S. position:

1. The U.S. would promptly assert a territorial claim to the unclaimed portions of Antarctica, and at the same time reserve rights in other (unspecified) areas of that continent.

2. Simultaneously, the U.S. would suggest that the other present claimant states (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, and Argentina) join with it in establishing an international regime for Antarctica.

3. In the same proclamation, the U.S. would, without prejudice to any claims asserted by any of such claimants, propose an international conference of states which have a direct and substantial interest in the Antarctic region and which desire to cooperate in the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica. This conference would undertake the drafting of a statute for the proposed international regime.

A draft proclamation covering points 1, 2, and 3 above is attached (Tab D).⁴

4. The statute for the proposed international regime might provide for an International Authority under which states would not be obliged to renounce their claims or recognize other claims, or to transfer sovereignty to the Authority. The Authority would, however, be given administrative power over Antarctica. The statute might also provide for the organization, membership, and procedure of the Authority, for scientific activity, for economic policy including conservation of resources, for demilitarization, and for a working relationship with the United Nations. Attached as Tab E⁵ is a tentative outline of the proposed international regime for Antarctica.

5. Invitations to the conference would be extended to Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and the Soviet Union. South Africa should be invited because of its strategic interest and proximity to Antarctica. There are a number of pros and cons regarding Soviet participation which are summarized at Tab F.⁶ On balance it is believed that it would be desirable to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union to attend the conference.

6. The proclamation asserting the U.S. territorial claim and proposing an international settlement of Antarctica along the foregoing lines would be issued as soon as possible after the consultations with other friendly governments without necessarily awaiting the end of the International Geophysical Year at the end of 1958 and preferably before the opening of the next UN General Assembly anticipated in September 1958. This might forestall possible unfavorable action which might be initiated in the General Assembly by India or the Soviet Union.⁷

B. The OCB Working Group on Antarctica has been informed of the above tentative proposals, but no formal approval has been sought or obtained so far. On the other hand, no objections to this proposed course of action have been advanced. It is recommended that consultations with the claimant powers be initiated on the foregoing basis, and that the United States position be coordinated within the U.S. Government in the light of such consultations.⁸

The substance of the above recommendations has been cleared by the interested bureaus (ARA, EUR, FE, NEA, IO, S/P, L).

I hope that you may have an opportunity to discuss this subject with Mr. Murphy and myself prior to your departure for Paris.

Enclosure No. 1

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Whereas, over a period of many years, commencing in the early eighteen-hundreds, certain areas of the Antarctic region have been discovered, sighted, explored and claimed on behalf of the United States by America by nationals of the United States of America and by expeditions carrying the flag of the United States of America; and

Whereas, during such period, the Government of the United States of America and its nationals have engaged in well known and extensive activities in the Antarctic region;

Now Therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make known that:

I —A. The following areas of the Antarctic region are within the sovereignty of the United States of America:

1. The area between 90° W. longitude westwardly to 150° W. longitude, and between 70° S. latitude and the South Pole, excepting areas of the high seas.

2. (Possibly an area in the vicinity of the South Pole and adjacent to the area of the Norwegian claim.)

B. With respect to other areas of the Antarctic region, the United States of America reserves its rights, pending the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with other states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region.

II. It is the belief of the United States of America that the interest of mankind would be served, in consonance with the high ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, if other states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region were to join with the United States of America in the conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of an international regime for the Antarctic region with a view to the accomplishment of the following peaceful purposes:

A. Encouragement and facilitation of international cooperation in the field of scientific activity for the maximum benefit of mankind.

B. Regulated development and utilization, in the general interest, of the natural resources of the Antarctic region.

C. Conservation, in the general interest, of renewable natural resources of the Antarctic region.

D. Effective demilitarization and neutralization of the Antarctic region.

E. Any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

III. The United States of America accordingly proposes to convene at an early date a conference of states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in the Antarctic region and others having a direct and substantial interest in such region which desire to cooperate in the establishment of an international regime for the purposes stated above.

Enclosure No. 2

CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO POSSIBLE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR ANTARCTICA

The problem of possible Soviet participation in an international regime for Antarctica will be confronted when the time comes to invite certain countries to a conference for the purpose of establishing such a regime. If such invitations are issued, it is assumed that they will be extended to all the present claimant countries, i.e., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Norway, France, Chile, and Argentina. If additional countries are invited to participate, both the Union of South Africa and the Soviet Union will have to be considered. (Possibly some thought should likewise be given to extending invitations to countries having a less substantial interest in Antarctica, such as Japan, Belgium, and perhaps Germany.) Both the Union of South Africa and the Soviet Union have made known their desire to be included in any international settlement relating to Antarctica.

Reasons for Not Inviting the Soviet Union to Participate In an International Regime on Antarctica

1. Such an invitation might be interpreted as a recognition of Soviet interests and rights in Antarctica, and thereby reinforce such rights as the USSR asserts unilaterally.

2. Soviet participation in the conference might render it more difficult to reach agreement on a satisfactory statute for the proposed international regime for Antarctica.

3. Soviet participation in the conference would be logically followed by Soviet participation in the international regime, and thereby render its smooth and effective functioning more difficult to achieve.

Reasons for Extending an Invitation to the Soviet Union

1. Russian interest in Antarctica goes back to Admiral Bellingshausen’s voyage around Antarctica in 1819–1820. In recent years Soviet whaling activities in the Antarctic region have been important. Soviet scientific activities in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year are quite extensive. Even though it is held that such scientific activities constitute no valid basis for territorial claims or political action, the fact that the Russians apparently expect to continue being active in Antarctica beyond the end of the IGY will make it difficult to exclude them from any international regime. Inviting the Russians to the conference would not bring them to the Antarctic, since they are already there. Failure to invite them would not cause them to leave.

2. The Soviet Union has consistently reserved all its rights in Antarctica. It has insisted on being included in any international settlement of the Antarctic problem, specifically in an official memorandum of 1950.

3. If the Soviet Union is not invited to participate in the proposed conference, it would presumably go to great pains to discredit the conference, both directly, and through activity in the United Nations. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union has a certain logical basis for participation in Antarctic matters, such agitation might meet with more success internationally than would otherwise be the case.

4. Failure to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union would very likely result in an undesirable intensification of Soviet activities in Antarctica, because the competitive situation would be accentuated.

5. Failure to invite Soviet participation in the proposed conference would be interpreted in some quarters as aggravating existing world tensions, and might alienate public opinion among the so-called “neutralists”. This in turn would again stimulate proposals for the United Nations to take over the administration of Antarctica. (While this latter solution might conceivably be better than no solution at all, it is believed that an international regime limited to the relatively few states directly concerned would operate more efficiently, and likewise might be in a better position to prevent any undesired Soviet activities in Antarctica.)

6. If the Soviet Union is invited to the conference at the same time that the U.S. advances a territorial claim to a part of Antarctica, it would be harder for the Soviet Union or any other country to criticize the United States for advancing such a claim.

7. Inviting the Soviet Union to the conference would not give it any status as a recognized sovereign power in Antarctica, any more than the Union of South Africa. The eight claimant states would maintain their claims of sovereignty, and no unclaimed areas would remain.

8. If the Soviet Union should participate in the international regime to be established by the conference, it would be easier to observe and control its activities in Antarctica.

9. If the Soviet Union should participate in the proposed international regime, it would be greatly outnumbered by nations friendly to the U.S. There is no thought that it would have any veto power in such an organization.

Possible Results of Soviet Participation In Conference on Antarctica

In the event of Soviet participation in the proposed conference, the following alternative results might ensue:

1. A satisfactory agreement might be concluded establishing an international regime for Antarctica. (The term “satisfactory” means satisfactory to the United States.)

2. No agreement for such an international regime might be reached, and the conference fail.

3. An agreement for an international regime might be reached among most or all of the nations represented, with the exception of the Soviet Union.

Analyzing each of these three possible alternatives, the following considerations come to mind:

1) If a satisfactory agreement is concluded, no comment is necessary because that is precisely what we seek.

2) If no agreement is concluded, then the United States would continue (with the other seven claimant powers) asserting sovereignty over a portion of Antarctica, and reserving rights in other portions, in accordance with the U.S. proclamation which would have already been issued. This new situation, whereby all of Antarctica would have been pre-empted by specific territorial claims by the United States and other friendly powers, would probably be better than the present situation where there is a large unclaimed sector which the Soviet Union might, if it chose, lay claim to at any time.

3) If an agreement is concluded among all or most of the nations represented at the conference, with the exception of the Soviet Union, this would presumably improve the position of the United States and the other associated friendly powers in rebutting Soviet claims and in controlling Soviet activities in Antarctica. Such a joint association, even though falling short of a complete Antarctica settlement, would be preferable to the existing situation.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, perhaps on balance there is more to be gained by inviting the Soviet Union to participate in the proposed conference than in refraining from inviting them. The possible advantages appear to outweigh the possible disadvantages.⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/12–957. Secret. An earlier memorandum on this subject, including Tabs A–D, was originally drafted by Daniels for Secretary Dulles on November 13, and was cleared by seven interested bureaus. On December 3 Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy gave his tentative clearance while recommending to Daniels “that you recast your memorandum in order to give him [Dulles] a fuller picture of the problem. This revision would not appear to require new clearances.” The source text contains Murphy’s initialed clearance. On January 2, 1958, Daniels informed W. Stratton Anderson, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy at Oslo, in response to two previous letters, that “it has not been possible for the Department to send further information or instructions to your Embassy. This is because some tentative proposals regarding Antarctica which I formulated last November have not yet been given full Departmental approval.” (Ibid., 702.022/12–2357)
2. Not printed.
3. Document 333.
4. Enclosure 1 below.
5. Not printed.
6. Enclosure 2 below.
7. At this point in the source text, provision was made for Secretary Dulles to indicate approval or disapproval. In the space marked “Approve” Dulles wrote: “as Dept position, tentative.” However, no date was appended and in light of Daniels’ comments to Stratton Anderson noted in footnote 1 above, the Secretary’s approval was doubtless received sometime after January 2, 1958.
8. A further provision was made at this point for Secretary Dulles to indicate his acceptance or rejection, but the source text contains no indication of the Secretary’s decision.
9. At this point, four documents were attached to the source text, all of which appear to have been drafted early in 1958 since they are not mentioned as being a part of the original document of December 9, 1957. Two of the documents are undated: the first draft of a paper entitled “Nature Of Proposed International Regime For Antarctica (Tentative Outline)” and “Proposal For International Regime For Antarctica (Without Prior U.S. Claim); Summary Of Arguments For And Against.” Of the other two documents, one is a draft aide-mémoire from the Secretary of State to the Foreign Ministers of “other countries which have direct and substantial interests in Antarctica” inviting them “to join with the United States in the conclusion of arrangements for the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica.” Marginal notations on this paper indicate that it was drafted by Daniels on January 14, 1958. The last paper of the four is a redraft of the paper entitled “Nature of Proposed International Regime for Antarctica (Tentative Outline)” unsigned but carrying the handwritten marginal notation: “revised for Secretary’s comments 1/22/58.”