Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

333. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, June 29, 1957.

NSC 5715/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5424/1
• B. NSC 5528
• C. NSC Actions Nos. 1500 and 1705
• D. Memo for NSC from Mr. Cutler, subject: “Interim Report on Antarctica”, dated April 26, 1957
• E. Progress Report, dated May 8, 1957, by OCB on NSC 5424/1²
• F. NSC 5715
• G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Antarctica”, dated June 21, 1957
• H. NSC Action No. 1738

The National Security Council, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Director, National Science Foundation, at the 328th Council meeting on June 26, 1957, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5715, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1738–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5715, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5715/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

In accordance with the President’s directive in NSC Action No. 1738–c, the enclosure is being given a limited distribution on a strict need-to-know basis.

In adopting the enclosure, the Council agreed (NSC Action No. 1738–d) that, in reducing U.S. Antarctic activities in the post–IGY period in accordance with paragraph 23 thereof, consideration should be given not only to reducing the number of U.S. stations in the area but also to substituting expeditions for permanent stations.

A Financial Appendix, Annex A (“Establishment of a Condominium Over Antarctica”), Annex B (“Application of a UN Trusteeship Over Antarctica”), and a map of the area,³ are also enclosed for the information of the Council.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5424/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.⁴

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. Antarctica, comprising a vast continent and nearby islands, is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic “summer”, and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has no present economic value. However, it has considerable importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance could conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica (NSC 5424/1), adopted in July, 1954 and amended in January, 1956 (NSC Action No. 1500), provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctic territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year (IGY).

3. While Antarctica’s strategic significance appears to be limited, the arrival in the area of Soviet scientific expeditions in connection with the IGY has aroused concern among our antipodean allies, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United Kingdom, as to possible future Russian activities in that area.… Soviet expeditionary parties have already established scientific stations and semi-permanent installations in the area presently claimed by Australia, and there is evidence that they intend to remain in Antarctica after the International Geophysical Year. In addition, prominent in the Soviet program are non-IGY activities, such as ground-controlled aerial photography, mapping, hydrographic charting, basic geology and biology, which were not a part of U.S. activities during the past season.

4. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: one extending between 90° and 150° west longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery and on scientific and other activity, both within the other national claims and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced a claim, which might rest on the tenuous historical basis of a single sighting expedition under Von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. However, extensive Soviet activity in the area at the present time could provide a possible basis for Soviet claims which the Western powers might find difficult to refute. In addition, the USSR has since World War II taken part in pelagic whaling in the area. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States, on numerous occasions in diplomatic notes, and publicly, has expressed its policy of reserving all its rights in the area, and the USSR has officially asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.⁵ Japan, the Union of South Africa, and Belgium are participating in the IGY program in Antarctica but have made no claims. Declaration of a claim by the United States or the USSR or other powers might precipitate additional announcements of claims by countries, such as the Union of South Africa, which have begun to show an increasing interest in the area.

5. In 1948, the United States explored unsuccessfully with the claimant powers the possibility of announcing a U.S. claim and placing the Antarctic under some form of international administration. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected, publicly or to the present claimant powers, the position it took publicly in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica. U.S. policy as a matter of fact did not call for further discussions with the other claimant powers regarding the possibility of internationalization of Antarctica. There is some indication, however, that the United Kingdom and Australia have not entirely ruled out internationalization as a possible solution to the Antarctic claims problem. Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and emotional attitude toward their respective and, to a considerable extent, conflicting claims, covering the Drake Straits and the Palmer Peninsula. Argentina and Chile contest the claims of the United Kingdom to the area, and their quarrel with Great Britain is exacerbated by the Argentine-UK dispute over the Falkland Islands.

6. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic may become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. In the event that the issue is raised in the General Assembly, it is possible that a trusteeship arrangement might be proposed as a means of resolving the Antarctic claims problem. The United Nations, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned. If a trusteeship were to be accepted and applied, it does not seem likely that the presence of the USSR as a member of the Trusteeship Council would cause insurmountable difficulty in the immediate future for the United States and the friendly claimant powers. However, the presence of the Soviet Union as one of the trust powers would be unacceptable.

. . . . . . .

8. The existence of a vast unclaimed area in the Antarctic is an open invitation to other powers, friendly and unfriendly, to make claims in the area and develop activities there. The basis of U.S. claims in the unclaimed area might be prejudiced by prior claims other powers might make in the area. Similarly, with respect to presently claimed areas, the legal basis for U.S. claims might be impaired with the passage of time, by increased activity by the Soviets or the present claimant powers, or by U.S. inactivity in these areas.

9. If the United States were to assert a claim, the timing of the claim would become important. The precipitate utterance of a U.S. claim might impair the present highly satisfactory cooperation among the countries participating in the International Geophysical Year in the area, including the Soviet Union. The United States could avoid impairing IGY cooperation by refraining from announcing a claim in Antarctica until activities in connection with the International Geophysical Year are terminated, or until the value to be derived from cooperation in the scientific and intelligence fields is reduced to a point no longer outweighing other factors. However, if before that time the USSR sets out a claim, or if UN action on Antarctica or other developments make it advisable or necessary, the United States could be prepared immediately to make public its claims.

10. The following are the possibilities with respect to the extent of U.S. claims:

a. As to presently unclaimed areas:

(1) The United States might claim the area from 90° to 150° west longitude on the basis of extensive exploration and scientific and other activity.

(2) The area poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° east and 20° west longitude, in the absence of a prior claim by another friendly power such as Norway itself, could be claimed for the United States, though there has been less U.S. activity in this area to justify such a claim. A possibility which would have certain political advantages is to explore with Norway, prior to or concurrent with a declaration of claim by the United States, extension of the present Norwegian coastal claim inward to the South Pole.

The net effect of claiming the unclaimed area would be the completion of a 360° circle encompassing the entire continent and its adjacent islands in the area formally claimed by the United States and friendly powers.

b. As to presently claimed areas:

(1) Rights based on U.S. discovery, U.S. scientific exploration, or other U.S. activity in any and all areas presently claimed by other powers, might be reserved as hitherto. This would be a method of avoiding, for the present at least, a decision as to specific areas to be claimed, and would defer the determination of areas the United States considers most desirable. This course of action could be followed if the United States were prematurely forced to make a claim before a decision regarding specifically delimited claims in the presently claimed area can be made.

(2) The United States might also make specific claims to portions of the claims of one or more of the other powers. A determination within the U.S. Government of what areas these claims might cover would be necessary at an early date. The United States might reach an agreement with the other claimants, preferably by means of prior negotiations, regarding action to be taken to settle the dispute over these areas, i.e., whether by relinquishment of portions of their claims, cession or exchange of territory, or merging of claims in connection with some sort of international administration. A decision to take no action in regard to the areas placed in dispute might also be made.

11. If a decision were made to put forth a claim, the question would then arise as to how the United States would exercise sovereignty over the claimed area. The following possibilities, or combinations or gradations thereof, may be considered:

a. National control. An appropriate agency could be designated to administer the area claimed by the United States. Bilateral or multilateral arrangements could then be made with friendly claimant powers regarding the administration and use, including exploitation, exploration, scientific and other activity, of the respective areas in the Antarctic.

b. International control

(1) Condominium. A condominium could be established whereby claims over all or part of the Antarctic would be merged, provided the United States and all or certain of the other friendly claimant powers were to agree on the advisability and desirability of taking such action. To the extent disputed area is involved, such an international administration would obviate the necessity of negotiating out rival claims as between the claimant powers. The United States, as one of the joint sovereigns over areas in which the Soviets are located, would have a better basis for opposing objectionable Soviet activities or claims in those areas. It is expected, however, that both Argentina and Chile would strenuously resist the concept of a condominium. The nature of such an international administration and the arguments pro and con for a condominium are set forth in Annex A.

(2) Trusteeship. One or more UN trusteeships could be established over parts or all of Antarctica, provided the states directly concerned agree. However, it would be difficult to secure UN approval of trusteeship arrangements which would offer a satisfactory degree of protection for friendly Free World claims and rights in Antarctica. Moreover, it is unlikely that agreement could be reached with the claimant powers, particularly Chile and Argentina, on the application of UN trusteeship arrangements to Antarctica, especially if it were proposed that trusteeships be administered by the UN rather than by the powers themselves. Annex B sets forth the arguments in favor of and against the application of UN trusteeships to Antarctica.

12. The designation of responsibilities within the executive branch for Antarctic matters depends to a large degree on the extent and direction in which the U.S. interest evolves. Current activities in the Antarctic are being carried on under the direction of the Navy acting as Executive Agent. The Department of Interior is the agency in the Government normally concerned with the civil administration of areas under the jurisdiction of the United States. Some areas, however, are administered by other agencies; for example, the Canal Zone is supervised by the Secretary of Army, and several islands in the Pacific, such as the Bonins, are administered by the Navy. The United States also acts for the UN in the administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. A Bill (S. 2189) “to promote the increase and diffusion of knowledge of the Antarctic”, which would create an independent Richard E. Byrd Antarctic Commission, recently has been introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Objectives

13. Orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica which would improve the basis for the establishment of sovereignty over the area by the United States and interested friendly powers.

14. Freedom of exploration and authentic scientific investigation throughout the Antarctic and maximum interchange of Antarctic mapping and scientific data, consistent with the objective in paragraph 13 above.

15. Access by the United States and friendly powers to the natural resources of the Antarctic.

Major Policy Guidance

16. Proceed immediately within the U.S. Government to determine the areas within presently-claimed territory to which the United States wishes to assert claims or rights.

17. On the basis of this determination, commence diplomatic conversations with the Free World claimant countries as appropriate for the purpose of:

a. Making known to them the U.S. intent to advance, at an appropriate time, a formal claim to the unclaimed sectors of the Antarctic and to certain other areas in which the United States has rights derived from discovery, exploration, or other activity.

b. Negotiating with them the possible extent of their and U.S. claims, the mutual recognition of claims, and the method of exercising sovereignty. (See paras. 10 and 11.)

In undertaking these conversations, it should be kept in mind that a breach of secrecy prior to full agreement with the other powers might require a prompt Presidential decision as to immediate public announcement of U.S. claims.

18. If, before completion of action under paras. 16 and 17, the USSR makes a claim, or if UN action or other developments make it necessary or desirable, assert a U.S. claim to the unclaimed sectors of Antarctica, and to such of the presently-claimed areas regarding which arrangements have been made with the Free World claimants concerned, and a reservation of U.S. rights within other presently claimed sectors. If at all possible, advance notice should be given to the friendly claimant powers.

19. Otherwise, refrain from announcing U.S. claims or reservations until IGY considerations are no longer a major factor. At that time, after NSC review of action under paras. 16 and 17, announce the total definitive U.S. claim.

20. In view of the scientific nature of IGY cooperation and the strength of Free World claims based on the pre-IGY period, adhere to the principle that activities represented as participation in the Antarctic IGY program do not constitute a legal basis for the assertion of Antarctic claims.

21. Meanwhile, continue scientific, logistical, and financial preparations for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica. Preservation of our rights and protection of our potential interest will require U.S. activity in Antarctica for a long time to come.

22. Small scale reconnaissance mapping and geologic studies should be promptly undertaken in those areas which the United States determines ultimately to claim, in order to support and strengthen U.S. rights.

23. Make appropriate budgetary provision for two-year resupply, not exceeding the requirements for current level of operations, in order to insure a continuing U.S. presence through April 1959. Reduce U.S. Antarctic activities in the post-IGY period to a minimum essential to support U.S. interests.

24. The Department of Defense should be the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government through 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica. The agency to administer U.S.-claimed territory and participate in any joint administration which may be established in Antarctica should be designated at a later date.⁶

[Attachment]

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

Cost estimates in the Financial Appendix indicate order of magnitude.

Approval of the policy statement does not indicate approval of cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

Appropriations and expenditures to finance the policy will be subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

Special Note

All estimates are subject to the assumptions, footnotes, and summary explanation shown below in this Financial Appendix.

ANTARCTICA ESTIMATED COST OF THE PROPOSED POLICIES

Expenditures by Programs

FY 1955—FY 1960

(Millions of Dollars)

	Actual			Estimated
	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Department of Defense7
Out of Pocket Costs	2.4	11.3	18.9	10.5	11.4	11.4
Supporting Costs	.7	6.0	9.2	8.0	8.1	8.1
TOTAL	3.1	17.3	28.1	18.5	19.5	19.5
Department of Interior8	—	.2	—	1.7	—	—
National Science Foundation9	.2	2.4	.7	1.0	1.4	1.
Grand Total	3.3	19.9	28.8	21.2	20.9	20.5

Annex A

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONDOMINIUM OVER ANTARCTICA

1. The United States in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The United States thereafter suggested for consideration and transmitted to the seven powers a draft agreement proposing an international administration in the form of a condominium for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. This approach was equally unsuccessful.

2. Arguments for establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. Such a regime would have the advantage of placing the U.S. and the seven powers in a position to maintain that they had de jure right to and control of the Antarctic region.

b. At the same time, agreement on the part of the United States and the seven powers to cooperate with the appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN and to administer the Antarctic area in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security (both of which provisions were provided for in the 1948 agreement), would tend to blunt or reduce concern in and outside of the UN over the possible use of the Antarctic by the condominium powers for other than peaceful purposes.

c. The establishment of such a regime for the Antarctic would in no way preclude the United States and the seven powers from reaching agreement at a later time to apply voluntarily for the application of a UN trusteeship to the Antarctic area if they should so wish.

d. The conclusion of a joint administration would resolve the conflicting claims issue as between the seven claimant powers and would eliminate the necessity of the United States having to decide now upon the entirety of the area to which it might wish to lay claim in the Antarctic. As was contemplated in 1948, the United States, under such an arrangement, would lay claim to areas in the Antarctic to which it had right (presumably but not necessarily limited to the unclaimed areas), to place it on an equal footing with the seven powers. Thereupon the United States and the seven powers would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime dedicated to administering and developing the area as a unit, not as individual segments. As matters stand now, the United States is reluctant to lay claim to areas in the Antarctic until it is in a position to ascertain more precisely all the areas to which it might wish to lay claim. By seeking a condominium agreement, the United States and the seven powers could move before Antarctica becomes a subject for continuing discussion in the UN and not be retarded by the conflicting claims issue. Under such an agreement, the announcement of a U.S. territorial claim would occur approximately simultaneously with the announcement of the conclusion of a condominium agreement.

e. A joint as distinguished from an individual country or segment approach to Antarctica would appear to be the most effective and least burdensome way financially to further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. (This could be either a condominium or a trusteeship.)

f. There is no reason why an agreement between the United States and seven powers to establish a condominium over the Antarctic designed to facilitate the further development of the area in the interest of all mankind could not be presented as a dramatic Free World initiative. Access to the area for scientific purposes would be open to all members of the UN or specialized agencies; however, it would be subject to the controls and regulations promulgated by the joint administration.

g. Although the establishment of a condominium would not preclude the Soviets from claiming the right to participate in the administration of the area based on such claims as it might make, and while it would not force or necessarily bring about the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the area, it would provide a basis for the United States and the present claimant powers to question the validity of the Soviet presence in the area.

3. Arguments against establishing a joint administration for the Antarctic comprising the United States and the seven claimant powers would include:

a. It is considered unlikely that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual “sovereign” rights even to a joint administration or condominium limited to the United States and themselves. However, it is thought that this could be presented to them as a more palatable alternative to UN supervision within the trusteeship system.

b. The Soviets and the Indians, for example, would likely attack in and outside of the UN a condominium proposal as inconsistent with IGY objectives and as an attempt to exclude all other countries from the area as a part of the development of the Antarctic as a Free World military base.

c. The announcement of the establishment of a condominium over the Antarctic would probably precipitate Soviet counter-action in the form of a claim to territory in the Antarctic. On the basis of this claim they might either seek participation in the condominium, or merely continue to administer their own zone.

d. The establishment of a condominium would not bring about or necessarily lead to the withdrawal of USSR personnel from the area or make the USSR more responsive to such control measures as might be promulgated by the condominium administration. The right of the USSR to maintain a military base within the area of its claim would be difficult to challenge on legal grounds, and could, as a practical matter, continue to be exercised whether challenged or not.

4. In the absence of an agreement on the part of all of the claimant powers to enter into a condominium over Antarctica in its entirety, it is possible that a condominium could be established over a part of Antarctica by those claimant powers favoring such action. Although arguments generally along the lines of those indicated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above could be made for and against the establishment of a condominium over a part of the Antarctic, a partial condominium would not serve to achieve the purpose of a united front and the benefits to be derived therefrom as reflected in paragraph 2 above. Moreover, a partial condominium would resolve the conflicting claims issue only as between those powers participating in the condominium.

Annex B

APPLICATION OF A UN TRUSTEESHIP OVER ANTARCTICA

1. The NSC Planning Board has requested the Department of State to study and report on whether there could be developed some type of UN trusteeship over Antarctica which would protect friendly Free World claims and rights in the area, and to set forth in such report the advantages and disadvantages of the Free World’s initiating such a proceeding.

2. While the trusteeship system was established primarily for the development of peoples, there is nothing in the Charter excluding the application of a UN trusteeship to uninhabited areas. It could be justified by the first of the four basic objectives of the system as stated under Article 76, viz., “to further international peace and security”. (This has particular interest now since India’s current interest in obtaining GA consideration of Antarctica derives in large part from India’s concern that Antarctica might become a possible area of East-West tension as well as a possible nuclear testing site.) Under Article 77 (c) of the Charter the trusteeship system may be applied to territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. (Those countries having made official claim to territory in the Antarctic consider themselves sovereign within the areas of their claims and hence could be expected to consider themselves as states responsible for administration within the meaning of Article 77.) The Charter also provides that territories held under mandate as well as territories detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War may be placed under the trusteeship system; however, these are not possibilities in the case of Antarctica.

Under Article 79 of the Charter, the terms of trusteeship shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned. (The exact criteria for determining a “state directly concerned” have not been agreed upon in the UN.) Article 81 provides that the trusteeship agreement shall include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority may be one or more states or the Organization itself. (In the latter case, the Organization would designate an administering agent.) Thus the terms of trusteeship agreed upon between the United States and the seven claimant powers could provide for the designation of one or more of their number as the administering authority, or the United Nations Organization itself as the administering authority. Moreover, the seven powers and the United States could agree to designate part or all of the Antarctic region as a strategic area; however, all functions of the UN relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreement, are exercised by the Security Council and would be subject, therefore, to the Soviet veto (Article 83). Additionally, designation of the Antarctic as a strategic area would likely be interpreted by some nations as being in conflict with the objective of peaceful utilization of Antarctica. On the other hand, the functions of the UN with regard to trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of trusteeship agreements, are exercised by the General Assembly. The question of the approval of a proposed trusteeship agreement by the General Assembly requires a two-thirds vote. The UN, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the state or states directly concerned.

All of the foregoing considerations would apply equally if one or more of the claimant powers were to seek individually rather than jointly the application of a UN trusteeship to an area or areas of Antarctica. It is doubted, however, whether any of the claimant powers would be prepared to seek the application of a UN trusteeship to a part of the Antarctic region in the absence of a common agreement with respect to such an approach. Nor could an initiative by one power to seek a UN trusteeship for its claimed area provide a basis for the UN’s imposing a trusteeship on other parts of the Antarctic.

3. While a trusteeship over Antarctica would be possible in principle, whether it could be established as a practical matter would depend upon whether the United States and the present claimants to territory in the Antarctic, viz., Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK, could reach common agreement both in principle as well as upon the terms of trusteeship to be submitted to the UN for approval. The latter would include the designation of the administering authority.

4. There has been no attempt made thus far within the UN framework to urge the states most directly concerned with Antarctica to explore the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over the area in the common interest. India placed Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the 11th GA with a view to obtaining the adoption of a resolution calling for the peaceful utilization of Antarctica. India insisted that it had no wish to raise the question of the status of territorial claims in Antarctica, but was concerned over the possibility of Antarctica’s becoming a scene of “cold-war” conflict. India withdrew the item when it became apparent that there might not be a majority for inscription. It is anticipated that India will try again to raise Antarctica at the 12th GA. If Antarctica should become a subject for discussion in the UN under these circumstances, it would appear inevitable that attention will be focussed on the political aspects of this problem which could lead to pressure for the establishment of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica with a view to furthering international peace and security. However, the GA could only recommend such action to member states concerned. It could not establish a trusteeship over the Antarctic with itself as the administering authority in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

5. The United States in 1948 explored without success the possibility of establishing a UN trusteeship over Antarctica. The United States proposed to the UK, Chile and Argentina for consideration the possible establishment of a voluntary joint or collective non-strategic UN trusteeship for Antarctica, the terms of which were to be agreed on by the United States and the seven claimant powers before submission to the UNGA for approval. The trusteeship was to be a joint trusteeship administered by the foregoing powers who were to merge and join their respective claims to and interests in the area in a special regime. To place itself on an equal juridical footing with the other powers, the United States contemplated making at an appropriate time an official claim to areas in Antarctica to which it had the best rights. The proposed trusteeship agreement also contemplated free access to, and freedom of transit through or over, the area of Antarctica under such rules as the special regime established by the administering authorities might prescribe. Additionally, the administering authorities were to take all necessary measures in the trust territory, within the terms of Article 84 of the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since this proposal met with some opposition from the British and was not well received in either Argentina or Chile, the United States then suggested for consideration and transmitted to all seven claimant powers in early August, 1948, a draft agreement proposing an international administration (condominium) for the Antarctic whereby the parties would merge and join their claims to and interests in the area in a special regime which would cooperate with appropriate organs and specialized agencies of the UN. Only the UK and New Zealand accepted the proposal as a basis for discussion. Australia, Argentina, and Chile rejected on grounds of sovereignty. The latter took the position as well that internationalization was inconsistent with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, although the United States took exception to this. France favored some scheme of internationalization that would not involve the surrender of individual sovereignty; and Norway viewed internationalization as unnecessary.

6. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected publicly or to the seven friendly power claimants to territory in the Antarctic the position it took in 1943 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica.

7. It is anticipated that the USSR might claim all or a part of the unclaimed sector of Antarctica in the near future. Since neither the USSR nor any of the states presently claiming areas of Antarctica have succeeded in establishing the permanent occupation and control normally required by international law as a basis for the establishment of sovereignty over terra nullius, the USSR claim might well stand on the same legal footing as the other claims.

8. Arguments for seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

a. A proposal by the United States and the seven claimant powers for the application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica would reduce appreciably Indian and international concern manifested in the UN as regards Antarctica’s possibly becoming a scene of East-West conflict or being used for military or nuclear development purposes.

b. Agreement by the United States and Free World territorial claimants on internationalization under a trusteeship arrangement would eliminate friction arising among them because of conflicting claims.

c. If the proposed trusteeship agreement designating the United States or one or more of the seven claimant powers as the administering authority were approved by the GA, the USSR would be excluded from participation in the administration of Antarctica, although it might be expected to argue for its inclusion as a power directly concerned and to subject the Antarctic trust administration to annual criticism in the Trusteeship Council. However, it is not thought that the Soviets could pursue this line beyond seeking detailed reports and their inclusion in visiting missions to the area.

Once the USSR had made a claim, however, its insistence on the status of a “state directly concerned” would be difficult to dispute on legal grounds. The USSR could be expected to seek participation in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement and the administration of the territory. However, if the United States and the seven powers were to agree to the designation of the Organization as the administering authority, this would appear to offer the most effective way of excluding the Soviets from participation in a joint administration of the Antarctic.

d. The approval of such a trusteeship agreement would reserve to the Western powers primary control over the strategic use and economic value of the area, although it would envisage free access to the area for scientific purposes under conditions prescribed by the administering authorities.

e. An international or joint administration for Antarctica could serve to promote most effectively the further scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as permit an equitable sharing of the financial burden. Such an administration would facilitate the correlation of meteorological observations.

f. If the United States and the seven claimant powers were to be able to reach common agreement on such a proposal to submit to the UN, it would be a dramatic move in terms of demonstrating a Free World initiative within the UN framework dedicated to the development of a largely undeveloped continent in a way best designed to further the scientific knowledge and well-being of all peoples. Such a move would strengthen the UN in that it would constitute evidence of Free World faith in UN institutions.

g. While the approval by the Assembly of a trusteeship arrangement for the Antarctic to be administered by the United States or one or more of the present claimant powers would not necessarily result in the physical exclusion or withdrawal of the Soviets from Antarctica, UN pressure could be mustered to facilitate the exercise of control over Soviet activities in the Antarctic.

9. Arguments against seeking the application of a UN trusteeship administered by one or more of the states claiming territory in the Antarctic would include:

a. It is considered not only unlikely but improbable that the present claimant powers to territory in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to give up their individual “sovereign” rights in Antarctica and to accept voluntarily such UN supervision over the Antarctic as might be exercised by the Trusteeship Council. Chile and Argentina, backed by the entire Latin American bloc, as well as the UK, Australia and New Zealand, strongly opposed consideration of Antarctica at the last GA session, even though India made it clear that its initiative was in no way intended to raise the question of territorial claims. (The United States also decided to oppose inscription.) It is believed that the reaction would be even more negative if the suggestion were made that the trusteeship be administered by the UN. The position taken by the present claimant powers would also appear to preclude the possibility of one or more of the claimant powers’ seeking an individual trusteeship arrangement for its claimed area.

b. The establishment of a UN trusteeship administered by the United States and the seven powers would not further the attainment of the present U.S. policy objective which seeks to ensure control of Antarctica to the United States and friendly powers and exclude its most probable enemies from the area. Although the United States and the claimant powers under a trusteeship agreement would have primary control over the area, they would find it difficult as trust powers to exclude any power including the USSR, from access to the area for scientific purposes, etc. Moreover, the administering authorities would have to be prepared to accept a continuing and close UN interest in the area.

c. It cannot be assumed that a UN trusteeship is the only or even the most effective way of furthering scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena as well as facilitating the correlation of meteorological observations.

d. If the United States and the seven powers were to agree to request application of a UN trusteeship to Antarctica on the basis of terms proposed by them, it is anticipated that the USSR would endeavor to establish its status as a “state directly concerned” under Article 79; and, at a minimum, try to modify the proposed terms of the trust agreement, particularly as regards provisions for the future admission of additional states to participate in the international administration. While it is possible that the Soviets might be able to line up a blocking one-third vote to prevent the approval of the proposed trust agreement, the Free World powers could likely block similarly any amendments unacceptable to them. Such an impasse, however, would hardly contribute to a lessening of tension over Antarctica.

If the USSR had claimed part or all of the presently unclaimed territory in Antarctica, its claim would be on a legal basis equivalent to that of the other claimant states, and a U.S. position that the USSR alone, of all the claimants, is not a “state directly concerned”, would be difficult to support. If the USSR’s status as a “state directly concerned” were accepted, it could claim the right to participate in the drafting of the terms of trusteeship and would have a strong basis for claiming a right to serve as one of the administering powers in view of its claim to a sector of the territory. An attempt to deny them this status might result in an impasse in the Assembly in which no trusteeship agreement could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.

10. Arguments in favor of the claimant powers’ seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

a. A UN trusteeship administered by the Organization, as prescribed in Article 81, would exclude the USSR from direct participation in the administration of the area. If the USSR were to be considered a “state directly concerned”, it could claim the right to participate in the preparation of the trusteeship agreement under Article 79, but it would have no direct role in the administration of the area.

b. If such a trusteeship were proposed by the present claimant states, the USSR would experience difficulty in organizing an effective opposition to it in the Assembly without assuming the role of a selfish obstructionist. A number of states (such as India) which would support the USSR in its objections to a trusteeship administered by the other claimant powers but excluding the USSR, would be unable to support its objections to a trusteeship administered by the Organization.

c. A trusteeship administered by the Organization would appear to offer an effective means of controlling the activities of the USSR in the area. The USSR could not undertake activities in the area contrary to the wishes of the UN without damaging its international posture. This would require the USSR to justify the activities which it proposed to take and would preclude military activities by them in the entire area.

11. Arguments against the claimant powers’ seeking a UN trusteeship administered by the Organization rather than by themselves include:

a. It is considered even more improbable that the present claimant powers in the Antarctic, particularly Chile and Argentina, could be persuaded to accept voluntarily the application of a UN trusteeship over Antarctica and to agree to an administering authority selected by the UN. This would dilute even further whatever claims and rights the United States and the present claimant powers have in the Antarctic.

b. While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would eliminate the possibility of the USSR’s participating in the administration of the area, it might also eliminate by the same token the participation of the present claimant powers and the United States. This would likely be considered too high a price to pay by the present claimant powers.

c. While the designation of the Organization as the administering authority would provide an effective means of controlling Soviet activities in the Antarctic, this could tend to limit the activities of the United States and the present claimant powers in the area as well.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica—NSC 5715. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior, to the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget, of Central Intelligence, and of the National Science Foundation, and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A one-page table of contents is not printed.
2. References E–G are not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. By a Soviet Memorandum of 1950 to the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Consideration of the need for a separate Antarctic Commission will be handled through the legislative reference process of the Bureau of the Budget. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The above Defense estimates for FY 1959 and FY 1960 assume continuation of current level of activity. The FY 1959 estimate is based on activity for a full fiscal year. A reduction in activity level subsequent to the IGY (which ends December 31, 1958) would result in a lower level of expenditure for FY 1959. The estimates provided below give a range of expenditure for FY 1960 based on alternative reductions in present Antarctic activity (seven stations).

   a.	Four Stations (McMurdo, Byrd, Pole and Weddell)	$15.	million
   b.	Three Stations (McMurdo, Byrd, and Pole)	11.5	”
   c.	Two Stations (McMurdo and Byrd)	8.5	”
   d.	One Station (McMurdo Sound)	7.	”

   [Footnote in the source text.]

8. The FY 1958 estimate depends on securing authorization and funds for mapping and scientific investigations by the Department of Interior. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Includes an estimated $2 million for scientific activities ($1 million in FY 1959 and $1 million in FY 1960) on the assumption that there is to be activity in Antarctica in CY 1959 on a level equivalent to that carried on during the IGY. [Footnote in the source text.]