Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

60. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 12, 1957¹

Washington, July 12, 1957

SUBJECT

• Pakistan-Indian Relations: the Kashmir Dispute
• Participants for Pakistan:
• The Prime Minister
• Mr. M.S.A. Baig, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. A. Husain, Secretary of Defense
• Participants for the United States:
• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Ambassador-designate James Langley²
• William M. Rountree, NEA
• Robert R. Bowie, S/P
• J. Jefferson Jones, III, SOA
• Charles D. Withers, SOA
• John M. Howison, SOA

The Secretary said he understood that United States and Pakistan representatives had yesterday agreed upon a Kashmir resolution which the United States could support.³ Mr. Rountree seconded that view, observing that we had indicated to the Pakistani representative that the US would wish to have consultations with other members of the United Nations before assuming a final position. The Secretary said that he thought we could support the present draft with some changes in wording.

Mr. Suhrawardy asked whether the United States or Pakistan should initiate the discussions mentioned by Mr. Rountree. In his response, Mr. Rountree said that it was our view that the locus of future discussions on the Kashmir issue might best be moved to New York and that the consultations to which he referred would also be carried out in New York. While the precise procedure to be followed in the consultations could be determined at a later date, it might be better for the Pakistanis to open consultations with members of the Council regarding the type of action they desired. We might thereafter hold consultations with other members regarding the terms of the resolution. We would maintain close liaison with Pakistan representatives, both here and in New York.

The Prime Minister asked about the timing of the introduction of the resolution in the Security Council. He observed that the British thought the Jarring report should be discussed before the resolution was introduced.

Mr. Rountree replied that we thought that the question of timing was primarily one to be worked out by the parties in consultation with the members of the Security Council. We had no strong views of our own and would go along with the views of the parties and the other Council members. Our only qualification was that we thought there should be sufficient advance notice of the holding of the hearings to enable adequate consultations to be held to organize the session properly. At least a week would be required for this purpose. We understood that Foreign Minister Noon believed that discussions in the Council should not be initiated until the end of August.

The Prime Minister indicated that late August might be satisfactory to the Pakistanis for the initiation of the discussions on Kashmir but expressed doubt that they should be deferred after that date.

The Prime Minister said that he wished to speak a moment about India before saying goodby. The instability of East Bengal was entirely the result of Indian-inspired subversion. If the Americans had not yet learned to recognize the Indians in their true colors, they were bound to do so in time. India’s neutralism was called “positive neutralism” by Nehru; the Prime Minister preferred to call it “offensive neutralism”. (Mr. Husain then showed an intelligence map⁴ purporting to demonstrate that three-quarters of the Indian army was ranged along the border of West Pakistan facing Pakistani forces of one-fourth their strength.)

Concluding the meeting, the Secretary declared that he had spoken with utmost frankness on all topics covered in the conversations; it had been a great satisfaction to have such frank talks with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to the Secretary for the very helpful discussions.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–1257. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Howison.
2. Langley had been appointed Ambassador to Pakistan on June 13; he officially presented his credentials on July 27.
3. This draft resolution was discussed in a conversation between Baig and Department officers on July 11. (Memorandum of conversation by Withers, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–1157)
4. Not printed.