Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

61. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 50–57

Washington, July 16, 1957.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE²

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in the Kashmir dispute through early 1958, with particular reference to the likelihood of major military clashes or other disturbances.

Conclusions

1. Tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir will continue high during the next six to nine months, and the outlook is for a period of intensified political and diplomatic maneuvering by both countries. However, the likelihood of major hostilities remains small. (Paras. 11, 18)

2. Pakistan’s probable failure to obtain significant concessions from India through the UN may lead it to consider more forceful measures for obtaining a satisfactory settlement, but it will probably conclude that the chances of success are not sufficient to justify the military and political risks. (Paras. 9, 14)

3. There is only a slight chance that major hostilities will develop through inadvertence or miscalculation, and, except in the event of major hostilities, the odds are against the outbreak of widespread communal disturbances. (Paras. 12–17)

4. In the diplomatic contest over Kashmir, the US will almost certainly be subjected to strong pressures from both sides, and is bound to incur some bad feelings in India and Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute will continue to be a major source of friction between India and Pakistan and an obstacle to the development of stability and economic strength in the area. (Paras. 19–21)

[Here follows the section entitled “Discussion.”]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. Special National Intelligence Estimates were high-level interdepartmental reports appraising foreign policy questions that were of particular urgency. SNIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the members of the NSC.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet of this SNIE, the following intelligence organizations participated in preparation of this estimate: CIA, and intelligence organizations of Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with this estimate on July 16 with the exception of the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.