Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

59. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, July 10, 1957¹

Washington, July 10, 1957

SUBJECT

• Kashmir and Indus Waters Disputes with India
• Participants for Pakistan
• The Prime Minister²
• Ambassador Mohammed Ali
• The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. M.S.A. Baig
• The Secretary of Economic Affairs, Mr. S.A. Hasnie
• The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Akhter Husain
• The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr. Aftab Khan
• Participants for the United States
• The Secretary
• Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
• Ambassador-designate James M. Langley
• Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, SOA
• Mr. John M. Howison, SOA

The Prime Minister declared that during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference just completed in London the British Prime Minister had tried to arrange a meeting between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India. Mr. Suhrawardy had avoided such a meeting. He had told Mr. Macmillan that Pakistan was being provoked by Nehru, who threatens Pakistan in the Indus waters issue.

The Prime Minister then observed that Pakistan could be starved out if India chose to cut off water from Punjab. The Prime Minister then asked rhetorically what the Pakistanis should do. He answered that they would fight. The Americans and British threw up their arms at such statements. He agreed 100 percent that such a war would present a drain upon Pakistan’s non-existent resources. India was four or five times stronger than the Pakistanis were.

There were two ways to avoid such a development which had been tested on past occasions. In March 1950 Nehru had massed troops with the intention of making war upon Pakistan. In this instance war had been avoided by Liaquat Ali’s³ trip to Delhi in which compromises were made. In July 1951 Nehru had again massed troops and had even signed “the order to make war”, but was advised that Pakistan’s newly received Liberators would be able to retaliate to the extent of bombing New Delhi and other Indian cities.

Prime Minister Suhrawardy argued that it was only recently that India had begun to advance the contention that “preliminary conditions had not been met” making fulfillment by India of UN resolutions on Kashmir impossible. (The Prime Minister had reference to the cease-fire provisions of the UNCIP resolutions.) Until recently the Indians had based their position on three other arguments: a) when the US had extended military assistance to Pakistan, India had answered that the Kashmir issue was ended; b) when Pakistan had joined the Baghdad Pact, Nehru had again declared that the question was ended because the balance of power had been altered; and c) when elections had taken place in Kashmir and a Constituent Assembly formed, Nehru had again declared that the question was ended. This position he took despite the fact that a Security Council resolution had pointed out that nothing done in Kashmir by either party to the dispute would have any effect on the previous UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite.

During the recent discussions which the Pakistanis have had in London with the British, the latter expressed the view that a Security Council resolution on Kashmir should not mention the plebiscite but should merely call upon both parties to demilitarize. The Prime Minister observed that he did not like the resolution which had been prepared in accordance with the British suggestion because it raised the question of whether first steps towards implementation of UN resolutions had been taken (i.e. the cease-fire provisions). In Pakistan’s view, there was no such question.

In concluding his discussion of Pakistan’s major disputes with India, the Prime Minister again reverted to the canal waters question which he described as the most immediate, contrasting it with the Kashmir question which in his opinion would go on and on.

Prime Minister Suhrawardy declared that he would leave further discussion of Kashmir to his associates, Messrs. Baig, Aftab and Noon. They could discuss with the appropriate US officials the question of the timing of next steps in the Kashmir issue. The Prime Minister added that he himself favored immediate action in the United Nations.

The Prime Minister also suggested that the details of the canal waters dispute be discussed later, as he had not had time to read the Iliff report.⁴ He hoped to read it tonight. At this point, he wished to observe only that he had told Nehru, while in London, that the canal waters question was a purely legal one which ought to be settled in accordance with clearly established principles of international law governing the rights of a lower riparian versus an upper riparian power.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–1057. Confidential. Drafted by John M. Howison of SOA.
2. Prime Minister Suhrawardy was in Washington for a 3–day official visit, July 10–12.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan, former Prime Minister of Pakistan.
4. This report by William A.B. Iliff, Vice-President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, made proposals for settling the Indian-Pakistani canal waters dispute.