Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, September 25, 1956—6:33 p.m.

711. Joint State–ICA. Deptel sent Karachi 497 Kabul 299.² Department believes time has come to move forward cautiously but purposefully on Afghan–Pakistan transit project. Instructions herein are sent on assumption that reasons for delay hitherto advanced and accepted have now abated so that Washington and two Embassies can concert in approaching two governments.

If you do not see substantial objections you should promptly approach highest level of Government, explaining simultaneous approach being made in other capital and state continuing great importance US attaches to development of good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and encouragement US has felt over recent actions each has taken in general context of genuine Pak–Afghan amity. Offer opinion that time is propitious for moving forward with transit project and remind Government successfully to bring project about requires initiative and action on part of all three governments in moving toward common goal.

State further along lines that: US Government has examined, although on basis inadequate data, needs of both countries so that they can collaborate in smoothing out transit of goods through Pakistan to and from Afghanistan and that based on such tentative examination US is thinking of transit zone and warehouses in Karachi for Afghan goods, additional rolling stock on Pakistan railways exclusively for transiting Afghan goods, spurs from Chaman and Landi Khotal in Pakistan to Spin Baldak and Torkham in Afghanistan (Kabul should avoid specifying where one territory becomes the other), warehousing at end of each spur in Afghan territory, improvement of roads from warehouses to Kandahar and Kabul respectively, and from Kandahar to Kabul. It is US view that each element of this project is important to both countries involved and to US and US considers project in that sense to be indivisible.

US would have to be formally assured by each government that it desires total project, would derive benefits from it and wishes to proceed. FYI Obtaining of such assurances is immediate objective this instruction in order qualify project under President’s Regional Fund.³ End FYI. Given such assurances, US as first step would be ready to participate in technical survey of project to clarify physical and financial requirements as basis of final decisions by three governments concerned including respective contributions. Both governments should realize that such project will at later stage require mutual collaboration in which US will render such discreet assistance as may be appropriate.

Embassies Kabul and Karachi should agree on early date for their coordinated approaches and notify Washington that they will be made.

After receipt foregoing notifications we shall take advantage of presence Amjad Ali and Malik⁴ in Washington and make similar representations to them individually on informal basis apprising them that formal approach is being made at capitals of their countries. We shall urge their understanding of opportunity, what it involves and necessity for their statesmanlike backing. Reports of conversations will be telegraphed to both Embassies.

Department prepared at short notice send out State–ICA team for brief visits both capitals to assist along lines recommended Kabul’s 275⁵ if Embassies now desire and so request. Otherwise we hope results initial formal approaches by Ambassadors and subsequent informal approaches in Washington to Malik and Amjad Ali will begin come to fruition late in October; at that time Rufus Burr Smith (and ICA representative) will visit both Embassies en route Colombo Plan conference Wellington and will if Embassies wish, consult with them on best way, in light developments two countries and in Washington, push project toward consummation.

FYI. Due passage of time and worldwide preoccupation with intervening Suez crisis Department postponing for time being further consideration Presidential messages to Mirza and King Zahir (paragraph 1 reftel) unless Embassies strongly recommend. End FYI.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9–2556. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Smith and Witman and cleared with E, ICA, NEA, and U/MSA. Also sent to Kabul.
2. In telegram 497, August 31, the Department noted that the August 7–11 visit of President Mirza to Afghanistan had resulted in an “improved atmosphere” in Pakistani-Afghan relations. The Department suggested that the present period of “relaxed tension” would be aided by the American Ambassadors in Kabul and Karachi conveying to both governments U.S. congratulations for the successful outcome of the recent meeting and the hope that the meeting “foreshadows further efforts bring about solution existing differences.” The telegram set forth the Department’s view that discussions should be held soon with both governments aimed at the initiation of concrete measures to improve the transit situation. (Ibid., 689.90D/8–3156)
3. Reference is to the Asian Development Fund.
4. Abdul Malik, Finance Minister of Afghanistan.
5. In telegram 275, August 14, Ambassador Mills suggested that an ICA–Department of State team be dispatched to visit Karachi and Kabul as soon as possible to find out what proposals each government had in mind for improving transit facilities and what assistance beyond its own economic resources the United States could provide. “I wish to reiterate,” he stressed, “that now is time to act and that undue delay may result in letting slip this opportunity to nail down by positive action good feeling engineered by visit. If as result our stimulus GOP and RGA could set up commission on transit, this could serve as prototype and impulse towards similar joint commissions to settle peacefully other causes of friction such as frontier incidents.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/8–1456)
6. In telegram 527 from Kabul, October 2, Ambassador Mills reported that he had conveyed the substance of the above message to Daud that morning. Daud expressed great appreciation for U.S. efforts to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations and left Mills with the impression that he was inclined to assent to the U.S. offer. (Ibid., 689.90D/ 10–256)

   In telegram 941 from Karachi, October 2, Ambassador Hildreth reported that he had conveyed the substance of telegram 711 to Karachi to Pakistani officials that morning. They appeared sympathetic to U.S. objectives, he explained, but wished to make it completely clear that Pakistan could accept no proposal which involved in any way any surrender of its sovereignty. (Ibid.)