Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

121. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Afghanistan

1. Afghanistan’s economic dependence on the USSR has in the last eight months expanded to the point where, if the present trend continues, the Soviet Union will probably be able within the next few years to influence effectively Afghan political as well as economic policy. The basic cause of closer Afghan-Soviet relations is Afghan prime minister Daud’s conviction that only from the USSR can he obtain the large-scale economic assistance required for the rapid modernization of his country and the political and military support to make his dream of Pushtoonistan a reality. Daud now appears to be stronger than ever—both internally and in regard to his bargaining position with Pakistan.

2. Recent completion of contracts for Soviet construction of ten development projects in all parts of Afghanistan, extensive Afghan use of the transit route through the USSR, reported shipment of almost half of Afghanistan’s total exports to the USSR, and Afghan receipt of Soviet and probably Czech arms are evidence of the closeness of current Afghan-Soviet relations.

3. Kabul continues to maintain contact with the West—as in the case of the $14,500,000 aviation agreement recently signed with the United States²—and Daud will probably continue to be susceptible to Western proposals which would give him some protection against an eventual Soviet takeover. However, the overall trend of Afghan policy at the present is clearly toward closer relations with the Soviet bloc.

4. The Pakistanis and Iranians have for some time been convinced it is impossible to do business with Daud. Turkish prime minister Menderes was apparently completely disillusioned with Daud during his 26–30 July visit to Kabul, and has reportedly concluded that Daud must either be compelled to change his policy by force or be ousted. This is the situation in which Pakistani President Mirza’s visit to Kabul will take place between 7 and 11 August.³

Allen W. Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.89/8–656. Secret.
2. This agreement was signed in Kabul on June 23 by Mills and Naim. It provided for the construction of Kandahar International Airport with Pan-American Airways designated as the American contractor to furnish training and operational and management assistance to Afghanistan. The agreement is printed in 7 UST (pt. 2) 2047.
3. Upon the recommendation of W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, with the approval of Under Secretary Hoover, this memorandum was not shown to Secretary Dulles since it did not contain any new information. Armstrong believed that although there was an ever-present Soviet threat to Afghan independence, the CIA memorandum tended to overemphasize the economic factor. “Regarding purely economic relations,” Armstrong stated, “we have estimated that any overt attempt by the USSR to employ economic sanctions would drive the Afghans at once, even at sacrifice of Pushtunistan, to seek support from the West.” (Draft memorandum from Armstrong to the Secretary of State, August 14; Department of State, Central Files, 661.89/8–656)