Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, May 23, 1956—10 a.m.

1430. In my calls on various Cabinet Ministers, some, in addition Prince Naim (Embtel 1338),² have brought up Pushtunistan. In polite but definite manner I have made it clear United States must accept both Pakistan and India as successor states of British India. For example in conversation with Court Minister May 21, I stated I could not conceive that Pakistan, which has several languages and racial groups, would commit suicide by agreeing to let one or another group split off, and that India was in same situation. In fact, I stated, it seemed to me that Afghanistan also would face crisis if Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Iranians, for example, suddenly demanded separation and perhaps union with similar racial and linguistic elements across international frontiers. There can, therefore, be no doubt in minds of any Afghans re position of USG on Durand Line, which I have emphasized does not prejudice desire of USG for friendship with Kingdom.

I have tried to make plain that position of United States in recognizing Durand Line as northern boundary of Pakistan is based both on principle and political realities. Nevertheless it would be mistake in my opinion to give impression that Pakistan is setting the tune for USG relations with Afghanistan in all respects. I have been seen frequently with Pakistani Chargé d’Affaires, and I have and shall cooperate with him loyally on matters where our policies and interest march together. But I intend avoid giving impression that American Embassy is branch office of Pakistan Embassy or vice versa.

I therefore believe it would be mistake for this Embassy to be spokesman for GOP re forebearance of latter at Baghdad Pact meeting in Tehran. Unless instructed to contrary, I therefore shall not pursue suggestion in Embassy Karachi telegram 2463³ to Department.

Mills

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5–2356. Confidential. Repeated to London and Karachi.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. In telegram 2463, May 18, Ambassador Hildreth reported that the Pakistani Government suggested to him that the United States explain to the Afghanistan Government that the Durand Line was not mentioned in the final communiqué of the Baghdad Pact meeting only because of Pakistani forebearance in view of the possible meeting between the King of Afghanistan and the President of Pakistan. Such an approach, the Pakistanis believed, “would help produce proper climate for President–King meeting.” (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5–1856) The Baghdad Pact Council meeting was held in Tehran, April 16–19. The text of the final communiqué is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 561–564.