Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

117. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 2, 1956¹

Washington, April 2, 1956

SUBJECT

• Afghan Protest re SEATO Reference to Durand Line

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Mohammad Kabir Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan
• NEA—George V. Allen
• SOA—John M. Howison

Ambassador Ludin handed Mr. Allen a five-page note protesting the reference to the Durand Line as the Afghan–Pakistan boundary made in the communiqué issued by the second conference of SEATO at Karachi.² He stated he supposed Mr. Allen had already been made acquainted with the substance of the note, which had previously been delivered to Embassy Kabul.³

Mr. Allen reminded Ambassador Ludin that he had accompanied Mr. Dulles to Karachi and had participated in the SEATO meetings. He wished to give Ludin his impressions of the way in which the matter had been discussed. He personally had hoped that the Durand Line question could have been avoided altogether by the conference. However, the Bulganin statements supporting Pushtunistan,⁴ which he supposed were not solicited by the Afghans (Ludin affirmed this), had made it appear necessary for SEATO to “set the record straight” so that there might be no misunderstandings. Mr. Allen emphasized that the position taken by the SEATO conferees was taken “severally”. As he recalled, Australia had been the first to express its view, and then it had developed that each of the countries represented also recognized the Durand Line as the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. This particular sector of the SEATO perimeter was singled out for clarification because it was the only sector which had been called into question.

Mr. Allen called attention to the sentence in the fourth paragraph of the Afghan note to the effect that the Afghan stand is based on post-partition developments in the Indian subcontinent. Although Ludin explicitly confirmed this statement, he repeatedly referred to pre-partition aspects of the question in the general discussion which followed.

Asked whether Afghanistan would accept the adherence of Pushtunistan if the Pushtuns themselves voted to join Afghanistan, Ludin responded emphatically in the negative. It was Afghanistan’s belief, he said, that if Pushtunistan were independent, there would then be no issue to prevent close solidarity among Afghanistan, Pushtunistan, and West Pakistan; they would become virtually a single entity. When Mr. Allen pointed out that the Pushtunistan idea was not very practical since there was no local de facto government capable of assuming responsibility for maintaining stability in the area, Ludin made no direct rejoinder.

During a discussion of the legal aspects of the question of sovereignty over the disputed area, Mr. Allen observed that in cases where real estate ownership was in dispute and neither party held a deed, one factor usually taken into consideration was the intention of the previous holder of clear title. In the case of Pushtunistan, Britain had previously exercised authority over the area, and it appeared from Mr. Eden’s recent statement in Commons⁵ that Britain had intended to convey its “ownership” of Pushtunistan to Pakistan.

Ludin expressed great personal concern over the situation in Afghanistan, and voiced the hope that the U.S. would do something to halt present trends. Pushtunistan tensions seemed to be self-aggravating, and the situation of Afghanistan was causing Ludin to lose sleep. Mr. Allen replied that he hoped the prospective Mirza–Zahir talks would improve the situation, although he was aware that such talks sometimes produced negative results.

Ludin expressed the hope the Department would make an official response to the Afghan protest note; he appreciated Mr. Allen’s personal explanations, but feared that it would be improper for him to report them as representing the U.S. position. He might be suspected in Kabul of attempting to put too good a face on the American position, and he wanted to be sure he was reporting the official U.S. view accurately. Mr. Allen undertook to consider a possible reply.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/4–256. Confidential.
2. See footnote 3, Document 114.
3. In telegram 1030 from Kabul, March 20, Counselor of Embassy Armin H. Meyer reported that Afghanistan had officially delivered a protest to the Embassy regarding the SEATO communiqué. He briefly summarized its chief points, concluding that while the fact and the language of the protest were unwelcome, it was obviously a “face-saving move” by the Afghans. Meyer, who had been American Chargé at Kabul since Ambassador Ward’s retirement on March 3, added that Afghanistan’s apparent desire to proceed with plans for the proposed meeting between the Afghan King and Pakistani President were actions which spoke louder than words. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–2056) In telegram 1007, March 15, Meyer similarly assessed Afghanistan’s reaction to the SEATO communiqué regarding the Durand Line.
4. These statements were made during the Bulganin–Khrushchev visit to Kabul, December 15–19, 1955.
5. On March 1, Eden reaffirmed Great Britain’s recognition of the Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
6. On May 15, the Department of State delivered an official reply to the Afghan protest note. The U.S. statement reads in part:

   “The Government of the United States has always regarded the Durand Line as the legal boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This view has been affirmed by the United Kingdom, which previously exercised responsibility over the area. By its participation in the SEATO communiqué, the Government of the United States has reaffirmed its position, with which the Government of Afghanistan is familiar.

   “The reference to the Durand Line in the SEATO communiqué should be primarily regarded in the broad context of developments in South Asia in recent months. These developments have made it desirable that members of SEATO, all of which recognize that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, make it clear that the region referred to in Articles IV and VII of the Treaty includes the area up to that line, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in this respect.” (Note from the Secretary of State to the Afghan Ambassador; Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5–1756)