Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan¹

Washington, March 14, 1956—7:32 p.m.

600. State–ICA message. Department concerned at increasing indications USSR and Afghanistan intend proceed rapidly towards implementation $100 million loan agreement with possible result of Soviet domination main sectors Afghan economy. We are particularly anxious lest Soviets initiate projects southern part country which would provide opportunity for them inject themselves in delicate situation arising bad state Afghan-Pakistan relations.

One means limiting extension Soviet influence might be initiation economic development program in Afghanistan which would effectively demonstrate continuing US interest in maintenance Afghan ties with West. Department and ICA considering advisability such program. One of chief problems arising in consideration program is our desire prevent creation impression Afghanistan has only agree accept assistance from Soviet Union in order receive substantial aid from US. We also have to take into account effect on our relations Pakistan in view resentment Pakistani leaders US policy giving aid to states adopting neutral position in free world-communist conflict. It would be helpful if Afghans prior any discussion with them of aid program were to give some tangible evidence desire continue cooperation free world. (One such possibility would be issuance firm invitation Governor General Mirza visit Kabul; another would be Afghan relaxation present restriction import US goods through Pakistan.)

Among projects we have been considering are those submitted for FY 56 in Toica A–355 and A–378² from Kabul, particularly airline project.

In order assist Department and ICA arrive decision re Afghan aid desire comments Embassy and USOM on following points:

1. Recent evidences if any of Afghan interest in US development assistance program.

2. Desirability of initiating such program in near future.

3. Composition of program and timing and method of approach to RGA.

4. Probability Afghanistan will be willing proceed with projects described Icato 182 Kabul,³ 430 Karachi, requiring Afghan–Pakistan cooperative effort.

For Karachi.

Would appreciate Karachi’s comments on methods overcoming Pakistani objections expansion US aid program Afghanistan.⁴

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.89/2–1456. Confidential. Drafted by Jones, cleared with MSA and ICA, and approved by Rountree. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi, London, and Lahore.
2. Neither further identified.
3. In this joint Department of State–ICA telegram, October 12, several possible projects were described in which Mohammed Ali had expressed interest, including improving port facilities in Karachi and equipping Pakistani railways to facilitate the transit of goods from Afghanistan. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–1255)
4. In telegram 1588, February 17, Ambassador Hildreth suggested that the aid offer be postponed until after the meeting between the Governor General and the King and the upcoming SEATO conference. “Embassy alarmed broader implications of policy of rushing aid offer in attempt outbid Soviets,” the Ambassador stated. “If this criterion is followed results bound to be unfortunate in all underdeveloped countries including Pakistan. Embassy suggests that Afghans will be guided eventually by their true national interests which would appear to lie in continuing to play role of buffer state and keeping foot in both camps, East and West; therefore they will seek us out sooner or later and we can afford to be patient for the present.” (Ibid., 790D.11/ 2–1756)

   In telegram 892 from Kabul, February 23, Ambassador Ward indicated that he agreed with the Embassy in Pakistan “that to rush in now with indiscriminate offers of aid in attempt outbid Soviets would have generally undesirable repercussions in other underdeveloped countries, more so in Baghdad Pact countries and, of course, most of all in Pakistan.” Instead, he recommended that the United States move forward first with regional projects in order to test Afghanistan’s “pro-West bonafides and if reaction to test is favorable will proceed in relationship to Afghan reorientation towards Pakistan and free world.” (Ibid., 661.89/2–2356)