Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

118. Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956¹

Washington, May 17, 1956

Present at the 285th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 3 and 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Jackson and Dodge; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of Egypt’s recognition of Communist China, the North African situation, and several other matters.]

Apropos of Afghanistan, our policy toward which presently would be the subject of Council discussion, Mr. [Allen] Dulles pointed out that there was no doubt that the Soviets were making a major effort to extend their influence over that country. Visas had been recently issued for the entry of several hundred Soviet technicians into Afghanistan. Some $30 to $60 million of the $100 million loan recently made by the USSR to Afghanistan had already been allocated among thirteen different projects. As yet, however, nobody knew how much, if any, money had been spent. In addition, truckloads of small arms were entering Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. While the Soviets could not yet be said to have taken over Afghanistan and might not be able to do so, as long as Afghanistan was cut off from the West by its feud with Pakistan, Afghanistan would turn more and more to the USSR. Mr. Dulles noted that some hope of a settlement of the quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan attached to the forthcoming visit of President Mirza of Pakistan to Kabul. After discussing the projects for the development of airlines and airports in Afghanistan, and the rivalry between the United States and the USSR with respect to these projects, Mr. Dulles recommended strongly that the United States try at least to maintain an air foothold in Afghanistan.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Egyptian recognition of Communist China; the North African situation; the announced Soviet armed forces reduction; the situation in Poland; railroad construction by the Communist Chinese to Amoy and Fuchow; and Afghanistan.

2. United States Policy Toward South Asia (NSC 5409;² Progress Report, dated March 30, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5409;³ NIE 53–54;⁴ NIE 53–56;⁵ Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 14, 1954⁶ and May 14, 1956;⁷NSC Action No. 1542)

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the recommended changes proposed by the NSC Planning Board in our present policy toward Afghanistan. In concluding, he pointed out the Planning Board’s feeling that there were very severe limitations on the capability of the United States to counter Soviet maneuvers in Afghanistan. (A copy of Mr. Anderson’s brief is filed in the minutes of the meeting.⁸)

When Mr. Anderson had finished, the President asked if anyone had anything to say on the subject. Secretary Dulles replied that the newly proposed paragraph 56–A of NSC 5409, which warned against undertaking an economic program matching in size and scope that of the Soviet Union, was not intended by its authors to exclude continued economic developmental assistance to Afghanistan. Mr. Anderson reassured the Secretary of State that this paragraph was not intended to exclude economic developmental assistance to Afghanistan.

Director Brundage called attention to the figures in the Financial Appendix to the revised policy statement, indicating that the United States estimated possible expenditures in the years 1958 and 1959 for economic assistance to Afghanistan of up to $12 million in each year. Mr. Brundage wondered whether it was wise to make commitments of this size for a period so far ahead.

The President agreed, and stated that he did not see how we could estimate such commitments until we had determined how such funds were actually to be spent in Afghanistan. Secretary Wilson added the view that the United States could really do nothing for Afghanistan until the latter’s quarrel with Pakistan had finally been settled.

In response to Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan had already been going on for hundreds for years, to which Admiral Radford added, thousands of years. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles doubted the wisdom of waiting upon a settlement of the feud before trying to do something to save Afghanistan.

Mr. Hollister pointed out that the International Cooperation Administration was trying to do what it could to see that the Helmand Valley project was effectively completed. If the Morrison-Knudsen Company fails on this job, Mr. Hollister predicted that the U.S. Government would be blamed. Secretary Dulles said that the Helmand Valley project seemed to be a kind of white elephant on our hands.

Governor Stassen thought that we should strongly back the efforts of Pan American Airlines to fly in and out of Afghanistan, even though this course of action did not fall within the category of economic aid called for in the new paragraph 56–A, which recommended projects which would provide “immediately visible evidence of continued U.S. friendship” for Afghanistan. Governor Stassen suggested the addition of new language to paragraph 56–A to take account of such projects as the Pan American. Mr. Hollister replied that it might be better to consider backing the Dutch KLM Airways in their efforts to fly into Afghanistan. KLM appeared more willing than Pan American to put up the necessary funds to accomplish this objective, and besides, it might be better for an ally of the United States, rather than the United States itself, to attempt to secure an air foothold in Afghanistan. Both the President and Secretary Dulles thought Mr. Hollister’s suggestion a good one. Accordingly, Mr. Hollister said he would try to find out how serious the Dutch were in the pursuit of the KLM enterprise. Admiral Radford noted that arrangements had already been concluded between Afghanistan and the USSR for flights of Soviet aircraft between Moscow and Kabul. Mr. Anderson assured the Council that there was nothing in the newly recommended courses of action which would be at variance with the airline proposals.

Admiral Radford expressed the view that the free world had less than a fifty-fifty chance of keeping Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit ….

Secretary Dulles commented that he had discussed the situation of the Afghan Government with high Pakistani officials during his recent visit to Karachi. He had observed two divergent lines of thinking among the Pakistani. One group thought that the situation in Afghanistan could be improved by peaceful means. On the other hand, President Mirza thought that a coup would be necessary to clear up the situation. Mirza added that he would try further to size up the situation of Prime Minister Daud in the course of his forthcoming visit to Kabul. Secretary Dulles believed that Mirza would probably seek U.S. assistance when he made his decision after the visit was over….

Secretary Wilson inquired about the assets of Afghanistan and whether the country had any significant natural resources. Under Secretary Hoover replied that important oil deposits had been discovered, as well as deposits of uranium.

. . . . . . .

Governor Stassen stated his belief that it was essential that a program be worked out among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan if the latter were to be saved from the USSR. Admiral Radford added that he had talked about this situation with the Shah of Iran when he was last in the Middle East, and the Shah had told him that unfortunately Iran’s relations with Afghanistan were not very close. Admiral Radford expressed grave doubt as to the efficacy of increased U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan ….

The President observed that if there was one sentiment universally abroad in the world today, it was the sentiment of nationalism. Accordingly, the only course of action for the United States was to stress the significance of nationalism and to make clear to the Afghans that they will lose their national identity if they continue to go along with the plans of the Soviet Union. If they should do so, we should point out that they would become simply another Tibet. Nationalism and the Moslem religion, repeated the President, were the only real influences in Afghanistan on which we could base our hopes. The United States could certainly not compete for Afghanistan with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

Governor Stassen expressed agreement with the President’s view, but Secretary Wilson said that if Afghanistan was unable to get along with its immediate neighbors, it was unlikely to get along with the United States.

. . . . . . .

Discussion of this item closed with a warning from Governor Stassen against too great pessimism in our assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. Governor Stassen insisted that there were at least some hopeful signs.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the recommendations by the NSC Planning Board for additions and amendments to the existing courses of action on Afghanistan in NSC 5409, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1542 and transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 14.

b. Adopted the following additions and amendments to the existing courses of action on Afghanistan in NSC 5409:

(1) Paragraph 53: Revise to read as follows:

“53. Encourage the growth of closer economic and improved political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus creating conditions favorable to settlement of the Pushtunistan dispute and strengthening Afghanistan to enable it better to resist Soviet penetration. Encourage efforts by other nearby Muslim nations friendly to the West, such as Turkey and Iraq, to strengthen their ties with Afghanistan and to use their influence to alert the Afghans to the danger of close association with the Soviets and to bring about better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

(2) Add a new paragraph following paragraph 56 to read as follows:

“56–A. Do not undertake an economic aid program aimed at matching in size and scope the credit and aid activities of the Soviet Union, but give assistance for a limited number of projects which will provide immediately visible evidence of continued U.S. friendship for and interest in Afghanistan.”

(3) Delete present paragraph 59 and add a new paragraph 59 reading as follows:

“59. Discredit and make more difficult increased Soviet activities in Afghanistan and encourage firmer resistance to Soviet penetration on the part of the Afghan Government.”

Note: The amendments to NSC 5409 referred to in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5409 and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for NSC 5409.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3–9, including “United States Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors,” “U.S. Policy on Turkey,” and “Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on May 18.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1089.
3. Not printed here.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1481.
5. “Probable Developments in Afghanistan’s International Position,” January 10, 1956, not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
6. See Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1151.
7. This memorandum was prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1542, approved on April 27, 1956, which directed the Board to undertake an immediate review of those sections of NSC 5409 pertaining to Afghanistan. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action) Enclosed with this memorandum was a report entitled “Expansion of Soviet Influence in Afghanistan and U.S. Countermeasures”, reviewing the Soviet offensive in Afghanistan and suggesting certain revisions in NSC 5409 which were discussed at this NSC meeting. (Ibid., NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5409–45 Policy Toward South Asia)
8. Not printed.